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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION  
 My dissertation attempts to answer an enduring empirical puzzle about the relationship 
between economics and conflict. Do dyadic economic linkages reduce the likelihood of conflict? 
Contemporary conventional wisdom tends to adopt the idea that economic ties somehow interact 
with conflict. International relations literature, however, tends to provide somewhat mixed 
results. The contemporary debate in the literature about the potential pacifying effects of 
economics is centered around the proponents of economic interdependence and the capitalist 
peace. For instance, the role of economic interdependence and its influence on conflict is 
complex, and as we will see has been open to a host of different interpretations. As Mark 
Crescenzi points out, there are two primary issues within the literature on economic 
interdependence which involve the variation in measurement, and the general lack of causal 
explanations in terms of how economic relationships influence the likelihood of conflict 
(Crescenzi 2005). One goal of this study is to provide a useful measurement of economic 
interdependence. In an argument that is related to the economic interdependence literature, 
researchers in the capitalist peace camp make the contention that free markets lead to peace 
(Gartzke 2007). The claim of interstate peace through economics is not novel, but the 
sophisticated approach by those in the capitalist peace camp has breathed new life into the debate 
over the role of economic ties. Skeptics maintain that the democratic peace is still the superior 
theory, arguing that the democratic regime type leads to peace, at least between democracies, and 
it accounts for the economic ties examined within the capitalist peace literature (Dafoe 2011). 
This study, however, moves away from the debate between the democratic peace and capitalist 
peace, and instead focuses on developing a synthesized theory for the role of economic ties and 
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peace. Moreover, my dissertation will incorporate the use of exit costs as the causal mechanism 
between private actors and political decision makers, which is important since the reason why 
economic ties reduce the likelihood of conflict has been somewhat of a missing link in the 
research on economics and conflict. The specific focus of this study is to generate a theory that 
explains why economic ties have a pacifying effect on the onset, and escalation of conflict within 
interstate dyads. The approach of this study, therefore, is to investigate the relationship between 
economics and conflict from a perspective focused on specific variables influenced by the 
literature on international political economy. Furthermore, a new measure, operationalized as 
dense economic integration (DEI), is introduced that synthesizes the tenets of economic 
interdependence and the aspects of capitalist peace, which theorists believe to have a pacifying 
effect, in an effort to explore the relationship between economics and conflict.  
 I invite you to join me on this journey to understand and explain the complicated 
relationship between economics and conflict. First, I will break down the literature on economic 
interdependence to understand why there is a problem with misspecification. The arguments of 
the capitalist peace will also be examined to explore the role different aspects of capitalism play 
on the global stage. The broad paradigm of neo-liberal institutionalism and the field of 
international political economy will be used to build a foundation from which the proposed 
theory in this study can be placed. Moving on from where we have been as a research 
community in the literature review chapter, I will introduce my theoretical contribution in the 
subsequent chapter. The proposed measure of DEI will be explained, and the factors that are 
combined to calculate the variable will be introduced. The theoretical and casual link between 
DEI and conflict will be explored, and the role that exit costs play will provide clarity to a 
somewhat murky relationship between economics and conflict. The design of my dissertation 
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follows, where the specific details of the study are expanded. Data sources, variable 
operationalizations and measurements, and statistical methodologies are designed to answer the 
research question about the pacification of conflict through DEI. The measure of conflict is 
separated into the onset of MIDs, the onset of war, and the escalation of MIDs to test what 
effects DEI may have at the various potential levels of interstate conflict. Next, the findings are 
discussed at length in terms of interpretation, but also in terms of what the findings imply. The 
key question, therefore, is if DEI reduces the likelihood of conflict? Finally, the contentious 
dyads of India-Pakistan, China-Taiwan, and Greece-Turkey are explored in a series of case 
studies in an attempt to apply the theoretical propositions of this study to individual cases.  
 Why is it that the relationship between economics and war has been so difficult to 
understand? The difficulty, no doubt, lies in the complexity of the units under study. On the one 
hand, economic ties between states encompasses a multitude of issues and interests. For instance, 
private actors are carrying out the actual financial transactions and foreign direct investment 
across borders, but it is public officials who determine trade and tariff policies. In other words, 
public actors determine the rules of the game, while the private actors are the players on the 
field. The types of issues that arise from a public and private relationship tend to be complicated 
because players are operating under different rules for each country. Complicating the issue of 
economic ties further, is the convoluted web of preferential trade agreements and politically 
motivated tariffs. Private actors, determined to access foreign markets, therefore must become 
experts in international trade and the policies specific to where they want to conduct business. 
Developing a theory about the relationship between economics and conflict is difficult because 
private and public actors must be accounted for. Furthermore, the economic intentions of states 
must be examined. For instance, do states engaged in economic relationships with other states 
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simply want to benefit from opening their markets and allowing capital to flow freely across 
borders; or, are these states aiming to increase economic ties to build peaceful relations? I argue 
that states are building economic linkages because they hold the potential to financial prosperity, 
and peaceful relations are the byproduct of the exit costs that are introduced into the bilateral 
relationship. First, states, realizing that protectionism leads to stagnation, have benefitted greatly 
by becoming players in the global economy. The driving force of economic integration among 
states, therefore, is the need to leverage foreign economies to support their own. In addition, 
private actors, like multinational corporations, engage in the actual trade between the states to 
reduce costs or expand into new markets to generate more profit. Together, these economic 
forces converge when two states agree to engage in a deep economic relationship, and the private 
actors within those states begin to invest overseas.  
 If the problem with understanding the relationship between economics and conflict was not 
already complex enough based on the economic issues, the consideration of interstate conflict 
only makes the relationship more complicated. Interstate war, easily one of the most enormously 
complex activities in the world, remains a phenomenon that we still fail to fully comprehend. 
Why does it occur? Are there underlying causes that we can understand? Are there any necessary 
or sufficient conditions for war? These questions have plagued mankind since antiquity, and a 
sophisticated analysis of the activity dates back to even Thucydides’ account of the 
Peloponnesian War in 450 BC. As of this date, we do not possess a unified theory of why war 
occurs, but we have made considerable progress toward that goal. Although we do not fully 
understand all of the intricacies of war, we do know that certain conditions make war more or 
less likely. In fact, there is some agreement in the field that wars occur from a “conjunction of 
conditions” which taken together make war more likely (Geller 2004, 232). For instance, we 
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know that states that are close in proximity to each other are more likely to engage in conflict. 
On the other hand, the democratic peace theory points to dyadic peace between states with 
democratic forms of government. In international relations no theory can explain war on an 
island, and therefore we must incorporate the findings from previous research. My dissertation is 
no exception, and the known conditions that affect the likelihood of conflict between states are 
statistically controlled for.1 These issues about the relationship between economics and conflict 
are explained in chapter three on theory.  
 Another aspect that requires attention is the causality between the effects of economic 
relationships on state behavior, or more specifically on interstate conflict. Determining the 
causality between the two phenomena is difficult because it requires a theoretical link between 
public and private actors. As Mansfield and Pollins argued, there is a general lack of causality in 
the literature between economics and conflict, and the root of the problem lies with the fact that 
most research glosses over the causal mechanism between the public and private spheres 
(Mansfield and Pollins 2003). My dissertation aims to provide such a theoretical link. Simply 
stated, exit costs are erected between states when they engage in DEI and neither state can leave 
that economic relationship without incurring costs. These exit costs, which are manifested 
through mutual dependence, serve as a financial barrier that links and constrains public and 
private actors’ intentions. Political officials are constrained to avoid a decision to engage in 
conflict with a state if it has an economic relationship, otherwise the state would incur exit costs. 
Furthermore, higher levels of economic interdependence in turn lead to higher exit costs. Private 
actors, therefore, have a financial incentive to attempt to influence political officials into 
widening avenues of trade and to avoid engaging in conflict, which could disrupt current trade 
                                                
1 These conditions are discussed in the research methodology section of chapter four where I control for these 
effects on the likelihood of conflict. 
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flows. Even more, private actors may have substantial investments in the trading partner state 
and cannot afford to lose business because the political officials have decided to conflict with 
each other. This loss of business, and the effects it would have on the multinational corporation’s 
home state, are included as exit costs to the state. The causal link, therefore, exists in the shared 
destiny between multinational corporations engaged in foreign investment with a certain trading 
partner state, and the political officials who must choose between conflictual behavior or 
cooperation to balance the health of their economy with foreign policy aspirations. Exit costs 
form a bond between the public and private spheres, because neither party wants to incur the exit 
costs by disrupting the current state of economic interdependence. Exit costs, and the role they 
play in pacifying conflict, are explored fully in chapter three in the theoretical layout. 
 One important note is that this study is conducted at the dyadic level, and only provides a 
theoretical relationship between states at that level of analysis. All state interactions discussed 
going forward should be assumed, if not explicitly stated, to be at the dyadic level. This is an 
important distinction because dyadic and monadic state relationships are two completely 
different levels of analysis that have separate research agendas. Dyadic relationships are between 
two states, and all interactions and variables explored in this study are also only between two 
states. As a result, the dyadic relationships studied, and the generated results, cannot be applied 
to monadic state interactions. In other words, states may be shown to behave more peacefully 
when there is a presence of high levels of DEI with the dyadic partner state, but those states may 
be hostile towards states outside the dyad. Dyadic and monadic interactions are theoretically 
distinct and results from one level of analysis cannot be extrapolated to the other. Attempting to 
explain the behavior of a single state, therefore, would be erroneous since the theories and 
propositions discussed here are only at the dyadic level. In addition, this study is a large-N 
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research project and dyadic interactions will be aggregated on an annual basis. As a result, any 
given dyad may act differently than the findings reported here, but that is to be expected with this 
type of study. To attempt to explain the behavior of a single dyad, based on the findings in this 
study, would involve performing an ecological fallacy. With that said, however, I will be 
attempting to apply the theoretical arguments in this study to three individual dyadic cases at the 
end of this study in chapter six. Following my warnings about an ecological fallacy, the case 
studies are only used to help explain the findings in terms of how they may play out in reality. 
The case studies are not intended to predict the behavior of those dyads, but the theoretical 
principles from this study will be examined in terms of the role DEI may have played in 
pacifying conflict.  
 The three cases included for analysis are the India-Pakistan, China-Taiwan, and Greece-
Turkey dyads. Each of the dyads has had a unique history of tension, and at times the dyads have 
also had interrupted periods of open conflict. The case studies will be used to see if these dyads 
have developed economic relationships that may have had influences on restraining political 
decision makers from pushing tensions towards interstate war. By focusing on these dyads, I can 
attempt to apply the theoretical propositions in this study to states that have interesting and 
unique dyadic relationships. These dyads stand out primarily because each dyad has engaged in 
conflict over the territorial control of a region or land that both sides argue belongs as part of 
their state. India and Pakistan have had numerous conflicts over the Kashmir region, and which 
state can officially claim the region. China and Taiwan is a strange relationship because China 
calls for the unification of Taiwan back into being a part of China, while Taiwan struggles to 
maintain independence. Greece and Turkey have had a long history of conflict over the island of 
Cyprus, and the territorial control of the Aegean Sea. An abridged history will be provided for 
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each dyad to explain what has caused the conflict between the states. Furthermore, the conflicts 
that have occurred during the temporal domain of this study from 1965 to 2001 will be detailed. 
Together these dyads will be used to see if increased levels of economic integration led to 
peaceful relations. 
 In sum, the goal of my dissertation is to develop a theory that explains the relationship 
between economic ties and interstate conflict. First, the theoretical connections between the two 
phenomena will be examined to understand the relationship and the potential for the pacification 
of conflict through increased economic ties. I argue that the proposed measure of DEI accounts 
for the type of economic ties that have the potential to reduce the likelihood of conflict between 
states. DEI is operationalized as dyads with free trade agreements, high levels of trade density, 
and joint membership in economically-focused IGOs.2 Second, the proposed causal mechanism 
of exit costs will be explored for the potential role they have in modifying state behavior to avoid 
conflict. In addition, exit costs will provide the link between the private and public spheres of 
international relations in terms of dyadic state behavior, a link that has been elusive. The data 
used in this study contain all dyads from 1965 to 2001, restricted by data availability. The 
hypotheses will be subjected to statistical analysis, and a conservative alpha level of .05 will be 
used for testing. All results are discussed at length, and the implications of my findings are 
explored. The next chapter contains literature that is relevant, both foundational and 
contemporary, to my dissertation. 
 
 
  
                                                
2 These independent variables are explained in chapter four on research design. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 This chapter will lay out the relevant literature that is related to the relationship between 
dense economic integration (DEI) and conflict. The literature review will be focused on 
informing the theoretical contentions of this study in the next chapter. The theoretical arguments, 
therefore, draw on a broad set of literature since this study examines a relationship that is 
interdisciplinary in nature, and spans the literature on international political economy, economic 
interdependence, and conflict. Since DEI is a measure to link economics and conflict, I will draw 
on the relevant literature and focus especially on the economic interdependence and conflict 
literature.  
 The literature review will be separated into three distinct areas of research, where each 
research area has a unique contribution to the study. First, the broad area of research related to 
international political economy (IPE) and conflict will be considered under the paradigm of neo-
liberal institutionalism, where the tenets of neo-liberal institutionalism will be related to the 
theoretical propositions in this study. In short, the neo-liberal institutional paradigm is examined 
first to understand the way in which IPE relates to interstate conflict. Second, the area of research 
about the relationship between economic interdependence and conflict will be reviewed. This 
area of research is important because the theoretical relationship I propose between DEI and 
conflict relies on this literature for the justification of exit costs. The literature on economic 
interdependence, therefore, will be fully explored in this chapter, and will be highlighted again in 
chapter three for relevant theoretical arguments. Third, the literature on what is called the 
capitalist peace is examined in terms of the types of economic relationships explored in the 
theory. Together these three areas of research are reviewed to inform the theoretical arguments in 
this study in the next chapter.  
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 The literature on economic interdependence and the capitalist peace literature have both 
been fertile grounds for quantitative research. For instance, the capitalist peace literature is 
related to the research discussed about economic interdependence, but takes a slightly different 
angle in terms of analysis. Unlike the literature on economic interdependence, which focuses on 
the interactions of states, peaceful or otherwise, under a situation of dependence, the capitalist 
peace literature advocates peace through increased capitalist type state interactions. The key 
difference between the literature on economic interdependence and the capitalist peace is that the 
capitalist peace camp promotes a law-like proposition that peace in the world can be achieved 
through increased capitalist based interactions. The literature on economic interdependence, on 
the other hand, is focused on studying the relationship between economic interdependence and 
conflict. The capitalist peace theorists may in the end, however, be correct and capitalist ties may 
actually promote peace through the world. That type of generalized theory, however, is not the 
focus of this study; rather, I will propose a theory that synthesizes the literature on economic 
interdependence and the capitalist peace about the likelihood of dyadic conflict. For instance, I 
will be studying the effects of DEI, a variable that fits well within the economic interdependence 
literature, on the pacification of conflict, which is similar to the capitalist peace arguments, but I 
will only be focusing on dyadic peace. In other words, my theoretical proposition will 
incorporate ideas from both sets of literature.  
Liberalism, IPE, and Conflict 
 How does neo-liberal institutionalism help us understand the relationship between IPE and 
conflict? Essentially, the neo-liberal paradigm posits that countries can escape the security 
dilemma with certain states by increasing information about the intentions of those states. The 
quality of information is improved through international institutions, which enables states to 
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build trust through cooperation. Unlike realism, which treats information about other states’ 
intentions as unreliable and untrustworthy, neo-liberal institutionalism treats information as a 
variable than can be improved. For instance, neo-liberals agree with realists that information is 
scarce, but since information can be changed by states, leaders will take steps to improve 
information available to them if they believe it will improve their standing. States, therefore, 
construct institutions to improve information about the intentions of states. In fact, it is argued 
that international institutions facilitate interstate cooperation and mutual gains by increasing 
information about the intentions of states, and help states to gain compliance with international 
agreements (Keohane and Nye 1989; Nye 2002). As the theory suggests, states that possess more 
information about each other can begin to cooperate over time. In addition, with institutions 
providing deeper and stronger information about intentions of other states, then states can start to 
escape the security dilemma, and can afford to cooperate. This cooperation takes the form of 
increased economic relations, which in turn may lead to more peaceful relations between states. 
For instance, the following description of the potential role for economic relations supports these 
theoretical contentions: 
 
Cobden [the renowned nineteenth century British statesmen] hoped that he had begun 
genuinely to persuade the peoples and Government of Europe that free trade could be 'not 
only a law of wealth and prosperity but a law of friendship ... a web of concord woven 
between people and people.’ Others, such as John Bright, Henry Thomas Buckle, Sir 
Robert Peel, William Gladstone, John Stuart Mill, and Albert the Good proposed 
‘variations of the same idea’ (Blainey 1973) quoted in (Polachek 1980, 59). 
 
 At the dyadic level, the argument is that economic integration increases the levels of 
contact and communication between both private and public actors, which leads to cooperative 
political relationships (Doyle 1997; Hirschman [1945] 1980; Mansfield and Pollins 2003; Stein 
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1993; Viner 1951). Since, the cooperation among states is carried out through international 
institutions, the interactions are institutionalized. Institutions set the rules and norms of the 
system, and states have financial incentives to abide by these rules and norms. For example, the 
World Trade Organization is an institution that caters to the Western economic principles of 
liberal economics, and countries must play by their rules to participate in the growing world 
trade system. Cooperation may come at a cost for some states to conform to the rules and norms, 
but the financial gains may outweigh the costs, therefore providing an incentive to join. In the 
end, these rules and norms begin to shape state behavior towards cooperation.  
 The contention that economics may influence the likelihood of conflict between states is 
not a novel idea, since many studies have attempted to understand the relationship. In fact, the 
ideas about economics and peace are rooted in the liberal peace literature. One of the original 
empirical analyses of economics and peace, and an often cited work, argued that “trade is a 
powerful influence for peace” (Oneal 1996). Similarly, other studies have argued for the 
pacifying benefits of economic interdependence (Mueller 1988; Rosecrance 1986). More 
recently, there have been studies on bilateral trade and bilateral war, with mixed results (see 
Martin 2008; Polachek 2007; Spolaore 2009). The conventional wisdom that economics interacts 
with, and possibly pacifies, conflict has been treated to a variety of empirical studies and there is 
no real consensus in the literature. 
 In an analysis of Immanuel Kant’s work, some argue that the various pieces of his writings 
fit together and can be seen in today’s work (see Doyle 1983; Doyle 1983, 1986; McMillan 
1997; Stein 1993). In fact, it is argued that there are four causal arguments that can be discerned 
from Kant’s liberal writings: political liberalism, economic liberalism, sociological liberalism, 
and sophisticated liberalism. McMillan, however, points out that these four causal arguments are 
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not mutually exclusive, rather they can be viewed as being complementary to each other. 
Political liberalism focuses on the international political constraints to conflict, and argues that 
states benefit from following the rules and norms of international institutions. These rules work 
to pacify the likelihood of conflict, and war is viewed as no longer being in the interest of the 
people (see Hirschman 1977; Keohane 1990; McMillan 1997). Political liberalism, therefore, 
influences the use of the joint membership in economically-focused IGOs variable in this study 
because it is an aspect of the pacification of conflict. In terms of causality, political liberalism 
promotes “political institutions … [which] create incentives for cooperation among states, 
reducing the likelihood of war” (McMillan 1997, 39). 
 Economic liberalism focuses on the pacifying benefits of international commerce, and the 
chance that it could reduce the passion for conflict (Hirschman 1977, 79). The causal link 
between economics and reduced conflict in economic liberalism, however, is not well specified. 
Instead, early attempts at causality argued that international commerce would increase the 
amount of good will between nations. For instance, an early casual argument was that 
international commerce was “viewed as a ‘powerful moralizing agent’ that would help improve 
society by contributing to good manners, industriousness, frugality, and punctuality among other 
things (Hirschman 1982, 1465) quoted in (McMillan 1997, 36-37). Other attempts at explaining 
the causal relationship suggest that peace emerges naturally from international commerce 
(Hirschman 1977; Keohane 1990). For example, Montesquieu states that, “commerce … polishes 
and softens … barbarian ways … [and] … the natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace” 
(McMillan 1997, 37). It has also been argued that states engaged in free trade will become 
dependent on one another, where the states would realize that their own economic success and 
wealth is dependent on their trading partner, where this dependence would reduce conflict (see 
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Cain 1979, 234; Stein 1993, 253; Angell 1933 [1908], 91; Rosecrance 1986; Kaysen 1990, 51). 
These cited studies, however, focused on the systemic level where they argued that increased 
trade and commerce would lead to reduced conflict in the world system because states would 
find it too costly to pursue their goals through conflict. As can be seen in the world today, there 
is a high level of international trade and also a considerable amount of conflict. The problem of 
looking at the entire system is that states may actually behave differently with certain dyadic 
partners compared to their general foreign policy prescriptions. For these reasons, therefore, my 
study focuses on political and economic state interactions at the dyadic level. In terms of 
causality, economic liberalism “focus[es] on the commercial activities [of] free trade and finance 
that create interests within society that restrain rulers from going to war” (McMillan 1997, 39).  
 Sociological liberalism focuses on the communication aspect of international interactions, 
and therefore also supports the use of the joint membership in economically-focused IGOs 
variable used in this study. For instance, “the simple act of communication paves the way to 
international cooperation by increasing each people’s knowledge of others and their ways, 
customs, practices, and concerns” (Stein 1993, 249) quoted in (McMillan 1997, 38). In terms of 
causality, sociological liberalism “expects increased contact among individuals to create a sense 
of community, thus decreasing the likelihood of war” (McMillan 1997, 39).  
 Sophisticated liberalism focuses on a combination of political and economic liberalism, 
and most closely resembles the paradigm of neo-liberal institutionalism. Furthermore, the 
institutional rules and norms and international commerce are considered together (Keohane 
1990). As Keohane argues, “the rules of international exchange and institutions must be based on 
the principle of state sovereignty, but they provide an incentive structure that promotes 
international cooperation, as well as prosperity” (Keohane 1990, 166). In other words, the causal 
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mechanism suggested by Keohane is through the institutions themselves that promote 
cooperation and economic exchange, and thus peaceful relations. The strength of the neo-liberal 
institutionalism argument by Keohane, is that the theory accepts the core assumptions of realism 
(state centrism, power, and rationality) while at the same time accepting the presence of anarchy 
in the world system. Anarchy is overcome, however, through cooperation in international 
institutions. Furthermore, Keohane is not idealistic in terms of peace, rather he argues that if the 
“political order is threatened, force may be required to defend it” even within the theory of neo-
liberal institutionalism, and “… even though liberalism is oriented toward peaceful international 
relationships, its effects are not necessarily benign” (Keohane 1990, 188). Arguing along these 
same lines, Waltz stated that, “Close interdependence means closeness of contact and raises the 
prospect of at least occasional conflict" (Waltz 1970, 205). In terms of causality, sophisticated 
liberalism implies that “when more of the different types of causal mechanisms are present and 
working in conjunction with one another, interdependence will have an even stronger negative 
effect on interstate conflict” (McMillan 1997, 39).  
 Neo-liberal institutionalism is the most appropriate out of the four causal arguments for 
peaceful relations because, as McMillan points out, “sophisticated liberalism is more sensitive to 
the costly effects of interdependence” (McMillan 1997, 38). Moreover, McMillan argues that, 
“interdependence is still expected to decrease war, but it is not a guarantee against war or 
conflict more generally” (McMillan 1997, 38). If this is the case, then sophisticated liberalism 
provides the foundational logic for the proposed theoretical relationship between DEI and 
conflict. Overall, the four causal strands within liberalism are related to interdependent state 
behavior: 
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Liberals, emphasizing the mutual benefits to be gained from trade between and among 
countries, expect economic interdependence to produce strong incentives for peace and, 
therefore, less conflict. Each causal strand of liberalism’s argument emphasizes how 
individuals or governments react to maximize the benefits of interdependence (McMillan 
1997, 42).  
 
In addition, I argue that IPE includes aspects from each of the four causal mechanisms, but finds 
its roots most strongly with sophisticated liberalism, and thus neo-liberal institutionalism.  
 The terminology of interdependence used to describe state relationships varies across 
studies, and is open to different interpretations. For instance, Ken Waltz warns that the term 
interdependence is too vague and encompasses too much, when he stated that, “… one has to 
unpack the word ‘interdependent’ and identify the varying mixtures of relative dependence for 
some nations and of relative independence for others” (Waltz 1979, 153). Keohane and Nye 
provide a useful definition of interdependence as being “characterized by reciprocal effects 
among countries … Where there are reciprocal (although not necessarily symmetrical) costly 
effects of transactions, there is interdependence” (Keohane and Nye 1989, 8-9) quoted in 
(Crescenzi 2005). A simplified version states that interdependence is the presence of “shared 
reliance between two states” (Crescenzi 2005, 29).  
Economic Interdependence and Conflict 
 The literature on economic interdependence and its role with conflict is an interesting line 
of inquiry, and provides a fertile foundation for future research. The overarching theme is the 
general lack of consensus in the literature about the role economic interdependence plays with 
conflict. The primary issue is that researchers have not only measured economic interdependence 
in different ways, but also have developed different mechanisms to explain how economic 
interdependence may affect the likelihood of conflict. The lack of consensus in relation to the 
operationalization of the measure itself is problematic because each iteration of the economic 
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interdependence measures are isolated from comparison. What is the appropriate measure for 
economic interdependence? The preceding question can be broken down into a question of three 
parts. First, what is the relationship between economic interdependence and conflict? Second, 
how do we measure the phenomena which deal with such a complex relationship? Third, what 
can we surmise about the causal link between economic interdependence and the potential for a 
pacification of conflict? The literature examined in this section will provide answers to these 
questions, but the proposed theoretical relationship between DEI and conflict in this study will 
provide the most clarity.  
 The potential for a path to peace through economic relations has become a complicated and 
fruitful line of research. Some important theorists studying the phenomenon point to some of the 
initial intuitive reasons for the pacification of conflict. For instance, it has been argued that 
“economic exchange and military conquest are argued to be substitute means of obtaining the 
resources required for political security and economic growth (Staley 1939). The suggestion that 
economic exchange and military conquest are substitute state activities to obtain resources is an 
idealist concept, however it fits well within classical liberal thought. Today, neo-liberal 
institutionalists have no delusions about the propensity for states to fight wars. In other words, 
economically interdependent states may fight fewer wars between each other, but may be just as 
likely to engage in conflict with other states. In a similar argument, Rosecrance states that “as 
trade and investment increase, countries have fewer incentives to satisfy political needs through 
territorial expansion, imperialism, and conquest” (Rosecrance 1986). Turning the same argument 
on its head, Viner argues that “barriers [constructed by states] to international economic 
involvement can spur conflicts that may lead to political and military discord (Viner 1951). More 
relevant to this study, however is Montesquieu’s argument about the way in which states will 
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become interdependent and mutual beneficial dyadic relationships will be formed, when he 
stated that, “the natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace. Two nations that trade together 
become mutually dependent: if one has an interest in buying, the other has an interest in selling; 
and all unions are based on mutual needs" (Hirschman 1977, 80) quoted in (Mansfield and 
Pollins 2001). Montesquieu’s argument places the dyadic interdependent relationship in 
economic terms that holds up according to more recent definitions of economic interdependence.  
 In a useful summary, Mansfield and Pollins point to a lack of consensus in the literature on 
the role of economic interdependence on conflict, where they argue it stems from conceptual and 
methodological differences (Mansfield and Pollins 2003). In other words, there are various 
studies in the literature that use different research methodologies and conceptualizations to 
address the question on economic interdependence and conflict. What is the relationship? That is 
the most straight forward part of the question. More troubling, however, is the question: how do 
we measure this relationship and determine any sense of causality among these complex 
phenomena? Compounding this problem, Mansfield and Pollins argue that the research 
community has not addressed the differences in definitions and measurements among different 
studies (Mansfield and Pollins 2003). In a more recent study, Crescenzi attempts to synthesize 
the current state of the literature on economic interdependence into a new perspective on 
measurement and causality in relation to conflict.  
 Crescenzi provides a thorough summary of the literature about the relationship of 
economic interdependence and conflict (Crescenzi 2005). More specifically, Crescenzi points to 
the misspecification of the economic interdependence measure. The operationalization of 
economic interdependence has had many perspectives. After summarizing the current state of the 
literature, Crescenzi offers a definition of economic interdependence, which focuses on the 
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relationship between economic interdependence and conflict where he explains the role of exit 
costs. For instance, Crescenzi defines economic interdependence as: 
 
Economic interdependence exists when there are exit costs for any two states vis-a-vis 
their economic relationship. These costs are a function of market structure, asset 
specificity, and salience. The salience of interaction exacerbates interdependence, but 
only when market conditions constrain adaptation. Thus, the highest forms of 
interdependence exist when exit options are scarce, adaption is costly, and the economic 
relationship is highly salient (Crescenzi 2005, 43). 
 
Other researchers have defined economic interdependence on different principles, but similar 
themes of exit costs are prevalent. For instance, Hirschman defines economic interdependence 
as: 
 
EI is a function of the alternatives states face with respect to economic ties. A lack of 
alternatives in the marketplace leads to interdependence. A lack of diversity in trading 
partners and a high degree of international trade as a proportion of a state’s total economy 
both exacerbate the problem (Hirschman [1945] 1980) quoted in (Crescenzi 2005, 32).  
 
In his definition, Hirschman points to the lack of alternatives as a reason for states to remain 
dependent on one another. Similarly, other authors have referred to the costliness of 
interdependence: 
 
EI results when mutual cost-benefits of economic linkage[s] in interstate relationships 
exceed alternatives. EI manifests itself as reciprocal opportunity costs. These costs refer 
to severing existing economic ties (Baldwin 1980) quoted in (Crescenzi 2005, 32) … EI 
involves mutual costly ties. Sensitivity refers to short-term costs of adaptation to severing 
economic ties or costs associated with maintaining the relationship; vulnerability refers to 
long-term costs that occur despite adaptation when the economic relationship is severed 
(Keohane and Nye 1989) quoted in (Crescenzi 2005, 32). 
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Once again, these definitions of economic interdependence allude to the role of exit costs. 
Another aspect of the economic interdependence definition within the literature refers to the role 
of international trade: 
 
EI is a function of the interaction of trade salience and symmetry between two states. 
Trade salience is a function of the total trade between two states as a proportion of each 
state’s total trade with the international system. Symmetry is a function of the balance of 
the importance of trade between two states (Barbieri 1995) quoted in (Crescenzi 2005, 
32) … Broken down into directional dependence, which is a function of the trade 
between the two states as a proportion of GDP for each state (Oneal and Russett 1997) 
quoted in (Crescenzi 2005, 32). 
 
Barbieri provides different measures of trade to account for economic interdependence, while 
Oneal and Russett focus on dependent states within a dyad. It is clear, therefore, that there are 
various definitions of economic interdependence, but the themes are similar. Trade plays a role 
in developing interdependent relationships, and exit costs serve to maintain those relationships.  
 The causal mechanism proposed in this study is built upon the work by Crescenzi on the 
role exit costs play in interstate relations. Exit costs, and their pacifying role, are explored fully 
in chapter three on the theoretical layout of this study; however the literature defining exits costs 
are explained below. First, however, consider the following hypothetical story by Angell which 
relates to the two aspects used to define exit costs: 
 
The boat was leaky, the sea heavy, and the shore a long way off. It took all the efforts of 
the one man to row, and of the other to bail. If either had ceased both would have 
drowned. At one point the rower threatened the bailer that if he did not bail with more 
energy he would throw him overboard; to which the bailer made the obvious reply that, if 
he did, he (the rower) would certainly drown also. And as the rower was really dependent 
upon the bailer, and the bailer upon the rower, neither could use force against the other. 
(Angell 1914, 17) quoted in (Baldwin 1980, 483) and (Crescenzi 2005, 33).  
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 Crescenzi expands on Angell’s allegory about interstate dependence to develop his definition of 
exit costs. Crescenzi points out that the story implies that the two men are interdependent, but 
there is a need for missing information to surmise that relationship. Also, Crescenzi explains that 
there is a need for more information about the potential costs to the rower and bailer. The first 
tenet of the allegory that Crescenzi expands upon is the division of labor in the tasks that need to 
be performed for survival. Crescenzi relates the idea about the tasks to the concept of market 
structure, where each of the men holds a monopoly over their performed task, either rowing or 
bailing. They hold a monopoly because only one man can perform one of the tasks at a time. 
Second, Crescenzi argues that one man could not do 50 percent of each of the tasks, which he 
relates to the concept of asset specificity. The importance in Crescenzi’s analysis of Angell’s 
story is that he relates these concepts of market structure and asset specificity into a model to 
explain the role of exit costs in defining economic interdependence at the state level. For 
instance, Crescenzi argues that the concepts of market structure and asset specificity are more 
complex in world politics, and are therefore more difficult to calculate on an interstate basis. 
Both concepts, however, have an impact on the exits costs each state within a dyad with DEI 
must be aware of, otherwise there would be nothing stopping them from leaving the economic 
relationship.  
 It is important to step back and define market structure and asset specificity in the context 
of Crescenzi’s definition of economic interdependence, since it forms the basis for exit costs. It 
should also be mentioned that asset specificity and market structure are not concepts created by 
Crescenzi. The terms are borrowed from economics and are used to evaluate both the makeup 
and structure of the economy. In addition, other theorists in economic interdependence have used 
the terminology or some similar idea. For example, Hirschman, discussing the importance of 
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adaption, defines asset specificity as “the possibility of diverting capital goods to new purposes, 
… the geographical mobility of the factors of production, and, above all, the ability of labor to 
turn new tasks” (Hirschman [1945] 1980, 28) quoted in (Crescenzi 2005, 44). Crescenzi’s 
defines asset specificity in the following terms as, “resources that are rigid in their relation to an 
international economic relationship make states vulnerable to their trading partners. Resources 
that are more mobile or fungible enable states to adapt to potential changes that other states may 
threaten to impose” (Crescenzi 2005, 44). In other words, foreign direct investments in assets 
that cannot be adapted or repurposed easily or cost efficiently make the investor more 
vulnerable. States with investments in expensive and long-term assets will incur higher exit costs 
if they were forced to abandon those assets. Crescenzi also explains the role of market structure 
in terms of alternative trading partners, stating that “if such substitutes exist, then the trade-
related opportunity costs of war will be low. This is precisely what the dispersion of market 
power implies: the existence of substitutes for import and export markets” (Gowa 1994, 118) 
quoted in (Crescenzi 2005, 44). The implication here is that states without viable alternative 
trading partners would incur higher exit costs than a state with a variety of alternative trading 
partners. In other words, the state without alternative trading partners will become dependent on 
their current trading partner. Crescenzi goes on to stitch the concepts of asset specificity and 
market power together into an argument about the impact on economic interaction. Equally 
important is the link Crescenzi suggests with dyadic state relationships, where the effects of asset 
specificity and market structure may be pronounced within the dyad. Crescenzi argues that: 
 
Together, market power interacts with asset specificity to delineate the context within 
which economic interaction takes place. Embedding dyadic economic activity within this 
systemic and domestic context provides more accurate and complex information about 
the economic relationship (Crescenzi 2005, 45). 
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 Crescenzi contends that when a state has many alternative trading partners, then the exit 
costs from abandoning one of the state’s current trading partners is low. On the other hand, when 
a state has a dearth of alternative trading partners, then the exit costs from abandoning one of the 
state’s current trading partners is high. In other words, the exit costs are higher when a state has 
fewer alternative trading partners because the impact on the state’s economy could be dramatic 
from a loss of trade if they were to abandon one of their few, or only, current trading partners. In 
terms of the measures I propose in this study, the dyadic trade density variable is the best proxy 
measure for the alternative trading partner phenomenon Crescenzi illustrates.3 Dyadic trade 
density, which is operationalized to measure the ratio of trade within a dyad compared to the 
total trade of each state, can be used to assess the likelihood a state could find alternative trading 
partners. For instance, a state within a dyad with high levels of dyadic trade density will find it 
more difficult to find an alternative trading partner quickly enough to not suffer economic losses, 
since high levels of dyadic trade density indicates trade dependence within a dyad. On the other 
hand, a state within a dyad with low levels of dyadic trade density will not have much trade 
volume to find an alternative partner for, therefore, having much less to lose. If this is the case, 
then dyads with higher levels of dyadic trade density will have higher exit costs, because as 
Crescenzi suggests dyads with less access to alternative trading partners will have higher exit 
costs.  
 Other authors have highlighted the role of exit costs in previous research. For instance, as 
Hirschman explains, the way for a state to avoid incurring the exit costs from leaving a trading 
relationship is to supplant that relationship with an alternative. Without which, however, the state 
                                                
3 This variable, and all other variables, are discussed at length in Chapter 4 on research design. 
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will incur the costs of abandoning a trading relationship. Hirchman’s argument is that states have 
the ability to avoid exit costs when there is a viable alternative partner: 
 
A country menaced with an interruption of trade with a given country has the alternative 
of diverting its trade to a third country; by doing so it evades more or less completely the 
damaging consequences of the stoppage of its trade with one particular country 
(Hirschman [1945] 1980, 29) quoted in (Crescenzi 2005).  
 
Similarly, Gowa argues that in terms of exit costs the important aspect is whether or not a state 
has alternative trading partners. Gowa argues that: 
 
Large volumes of trade between or among prospective belligerents, however, are not 
necessarily a valid indicator of trade-related opportunity costs of war. Instead, what really 
matters is whether close substitutes exist for the export markets and imports that prewar 
trading partners supplied (Gowa 1994, 118) quoted in (Crescenzi 2005). 
 
Crescenzi, who was attempting to develop a clear definition of exit costs, argues a similar point 
about the role of alternative trading partners. Crescenzi argues that: 
 
Economic interdependence is not merely a function of current economic activity. It is a 
function of economic activity within the context of the alternatives available to both 
states. If we assume that states are involved in economic relationships that maximize 
welfare, then the costs involved in exiting these relationships are essentially what is lost 
in switching from this ‘best’ option to the next best alternative. These alternatives could 
involve other trading partners or a return to autarky (economic isolation), where all the 
goods and services previously obtained from a trading partner must be substituted with 
domestic alternatives. I define the opportunity costs associated with these alternatives as 
exit costs (italics in original) (Crescenzi 2005, 41).  
 
Taken together, Crescenzi’s inclusion of asset specificity and market structure with alternative 
trading partners creates his definition of exit costs.  
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 Another theoretical concern about the relationship between economic interdependence and 
conflict is the role played by multinational corporations, or private actors more generally, in a 
world system usually relegated to state power. For instance, McMillan argues that “relating 
trade, which is an activity of individual activities, to international conflict, which is an activity of 
states, requires a theory of state, society relations that has not been addressed” (McMillan 1997, 
39). The distinction between the two spheres of economic interdependence is blurred to be sure, 
since there are overlapping economic activities among the states and private actors. Exit costs, 
however, do account for the complexity of state and private economic interactions. Asset 
specificity and market structure, however, are both outcomes of decisions made by private actors 
operating within the rules and norms established by the states involved in the trading 
relationship.  
 In an article aimed at exploring the theoretical connections between economic 
interdependence and conflict, Solomon Polachek makes the case for the pacification of conflict. 
For instance, Polachek states that, “it is argued that the mutual dependence established between 
two trading partners (dyads) is sufficient to raise the costs of conflict, thereby diminishing levels 
of dyadic dispute” (Polachek 1980, 55). In fact, Polachek finds that, ceteris paribus, countries 
with the greatest levels of economic trade engage in the least amounts of hostility, where a 
doubling of trade on average leads to a 20 percent diminution of belligerence. He hints at exit 
costs as the costs of conflict. Polachek also talks about the idea that natural peace is created 
through economics rather than initiated through third party nations, where he argues that “a 
natural peace is one based in part on mutual dependence...[where] mutual dependence makes 
conflict more costly, thereby increasing the incentives toward cooperation, and hence toward 
peace." (Polachek 1980, 56). Similar to past studies, he uses international trade as a measure of 
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mutual economic dependence. What Crescenzi illustrated, and I concur, is that trade alone is a 
poor measure for economic interdependence.  
 Another aspect of economic interdependence between states is the role comparative 
advantage can play in terms of the amount and level of trade. Polachek discusses the concept of 
comparative advantage and its role with economic interdependence. Since states do not produce 
everything they need, they find it advantageous to specialize their labor, or products they 
produce, to an area they are most efficient. The concept of specializing labor is known as the 
division of labor.  
 
A division of labor comes about because persons work at what they do best, and trade for 
what they produce inefficiently. International trade occurs for the same reason. One 
country is not able to produce all it needs as efficiently as another. A country is said to 
have a comparative advantage over another when it is relatively more efficient in the 
production of a particular commodity. The existence of comparative advantages enables 
both countries to increase their own welfare through trade. Loss of existing trade, for 
example because of conflict, would imply potential welfare losses. (Polachek 1980, 57). 
 
 In addition, comparative advantage implies that states will produce more of, or solely 
produce, only the products they are efficient at producing through cost savings like economies of 
scale, particular natural resources, or labor talent. If this is the case, then those same states will 
develop a trading relationship to acquire the products they do not produce efficiently. In the end, 
at least theoretically, a comparative advantage could operate on a large scale where states each 
produce a handful of products, and trade with each other for the items they require. Polachek 
suggests that the potential losses, from the type of trade dependence generated through a 
comparative advantage between states, have a pacifying effect on conflict. In other words, states 
that trade with each other to obtain a comparative advantage will be highly dependent on each 
other because such countries rely on each other to fulfill their trade obligations. If one state fails 
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to produce enough of a certain product, or conflict disrupts the flow of trade, the other state, 
operating under the principles of comparative advantage, will simply not have the product. As a 
result, states operating under a comparative advantage trading relationship need each other to 
produce all of the products they require. Although it is not clear if a dyad is pursuing a 
comparative advantage strategy, the presence of a free trade agreement is a good proxy measure. 
 It is clear that in terms of a definitive theoretical relationship between economic 
interdependence and conflict, there is a lack of consensus within the literature. In fact, many 
attempts have been made to understand the causal relationship between economic 
interdependence and conflict within the context of international relations. Most studies tend to 
follow the ideas laid out by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in terms of their mutual dependence 
argument. In fact, according to Keohane and Nye interdependence is synonymous with mutual 
dependence, where states are dependent on each other (Keohane and Nye 1977). There is a 
distinction in the literature on economic interdependence between measures of state 
interconnectedness and interdependence. This point is clearly made by Robert Keohane and 
Joseph Nye, who argue that: 
 
… interconnectedness is not the same as interdependence. The effects of transactions on 
interdependence will depend on the constraints, or costs, associated with them … where 
there are reciprocal … costly effects of transactions, there is interdependence. Where 
interactions do not have significant costly effects, there is simply interconnectedness. 
This distinction is vital if we are to understand the politics of interdependence. (Keohane 
and Nye 1989, 9) emphasis in original, quoted in (Crescenzi 2005).  
 
In addition, Keohane and Nye adopt a similar definition from David Baldwin, where they define 
the components of interdependence as being vulnerable or sensitive types of dependence 
(Baldwin 1980; Keohane and Nye 1977). In a summary of the theoretical connection between 
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economic interdependence and conflict, McMillian offers a clear explanation of vulnerability and 
sensitivity interdependence: 
 
Sensitivity is the extent to which one country is affected by the actions of another, 
whereas vulnerability is the extent to which a country can insulate itself from the costly 
effects of events that occur elsewhere. Interdependence then ‘means mutual dependence’ 
(Keohane and Nye 1977, 9), a condition in which countries are both highly sensitive and 
vulnerable to each other (McMillan 1997, 34). 
 
The definition of interdependence by Keohane and Nye is noticeably similar to Baldwin’s 
definition of interdependence, where he states that interdependence can be understood as, 
“international relationships that would be costly to break … [and] the opportunity costs of 
autonomy are prohibitively high” (Baldwin 1980, 484 & 489) quoted in (McMillan 1997).  
 Another issue that adds complexity and confusion to the literature on economic 
interdependence and conflict is that studies use varying levels of analysis to explore the 
relationship. Some studies examine the relationship at the dyadic level, while others examine 
state interactions at other levels of analysis at the systemic or at the country-specific level. I 
argue that the dyadic level is the appropriate level of analysis for studying the relationship 
between economic interdependence and conflict in this study, because state interactions at the 
dyadic level can be influenced by aspects of the dyadic relationship outside of politics. In fact, 
the central tenet of my theoretical argument in this study is that dyadic economic relations can 
have an impact on the likelihood of dyadic conflict. This study, therefore, includes variables and 
data that are measured only at the dyadic level of analysis to ensure that any conclusions about 
the relationship under study are not erroneous.  
 The evidence within the literature on the relationship between economic interdependence 
and conflict is mixed with authors on either side of the issue. Specifically, some researchers find 
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that economic interdependence reduces the chance of conflict, while others contend that it 
increases the chances of conflict. The standoff between the two camps of researchers points, 
once again, to the misspecification of the measured phenomena. One interesting aspect in the 
literature is that researchers from opposing paradigms, like realism and liberalism, find opposing 
results about the relationship between economic interdependence and conflict. In a summary of 
the current state of the research at the time, McMillan points out this dichotomy between realists 
and liberals (McMillan 1997). For instance, liberals tend to support the proposition that 
interdependence reduces conflict. McMillan explains that researchers starting from a liberal point 
of view in favor of the “beneficial aspects of trade interdependence” tend to find supporting 
evidence (Gasiorowski and Polachek 1982; McMillan 1997; Polachek 1980; Polachek 1992; 
Polachek and McDonald 1992). Studies from a realist point of view, which argue that trade 
either has no impact or increases the chance of conflict, tend to find supporting evidence 
(McMillan 1997; Ripsman and Blanchard 1996; Uchitel 1993). Other authors have focused on 
the potential for interdependence to increase the likelihood of conflict more specifically. For 
instance, (Gasiorowski 1986) found that when the concept of interdependence was broken down, 
various aspects either increased or decreased the likelihood of conflict. Similar findings about the 
potential for individual aspects of interdependence to increase the likelihood of conflict have 
been explored (Oneal and Russett 1999). As (Mansfield and Pollins 2001, 840) point out, 
however, these findings were "almost certainly underspecified" since too many variables 
affecting the likelihood of conflict were omitted in those studies. The dichotomy in findings 
between realist and liberal studies is somewhat corrected if the “costly and beneficial aspects of 
interdependence” are included in the analysis (McMillan 1997, 52). In addition, for evidence of a 
negative relationship between trade and conflict the “costly aspects of interdependence must be 
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controlled” for (Gasiorowski 1986, 52) quoted in (McMillan 1997). Overall, the evidence on the 
relationship between economic interdependence and conflict is mixed. Mcmillan provides a good 
summary statement about the state of the literature: 
 
 … interdependence is a multifaceted concept. It not only involves both costs and benefits 
for countries, but it consists of more than trade volumes between countries. When 
indicators of interdependence include political as well as economic dimensions, (De 
Vries 1990) finds that interdependence serves as a catalyst that intensifies both conflict 
and cooperation. When control variables measuring other forms of international 
relationships - such as alliance membership and joint democracy - are included in dyadic 
models, they may be accounting for some of these political aspects of interdependence 
(For example Barbieri 1995, 1996, 1996, 1996; Oneal 1996). Clearly, interdependence is 
a broader analytic concept that involves more than the level of trade. To make empirical 
and theoretical progress in understanding the link between interdependence and conflict, 
this complexity must be recognized and incorporated into future studies (McMillan 1997, 
52). 
 
 In a comprehensive study, which includes a thorough review of the literature on economic 
relations and conflict, Pollins separates the international trade and politics literature into three 
bodies of literature where each focuses on a different aspect of a cooperative interstate 
relationship (Pollins 1989). First, Pollins identifies the line of literature examining the role of 
international trade with the occurrence of conflict. For example, Pollins argues this first body of 
literature claims that, “trade inhibits conflict from classical and neoclassical proofs that 
international trade benefits both parties to the exchange” (Pollins 1989, 467). Pollins includes a 
list of studies that find similar results in terms of trade reducing the likelihood of conflict (Arad 
and Hirsch 1983; Gasiorowski and Polachek 1982; Polachek 1980). The second body of 
literature classified by Pollins is what he calls the “transaction flow analysis" where it is claimed 
that cooperative nations will trade more, and conflictual nations will trade less (Kunimoto 1977; 
Nagy 1983; Pollins 1989; Savage and Deutsch 1960). The third body of literature Pollins 
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identifies are studies that attempt to measure the effect of institutionalized political-economic 
cooperation on trade flows. These political-economic institutions take the form of FTAs, which 
have a pacifying effect on conflict (Aitken 1973; Brada and Mendez 1983; Pelzman 1977; 
Pollins 1989). 
 Overall, the evidence from the preceding studies reiterates the fact that the economic 
interdependence and conflict relationship is still unresolved. In fact, the divergent findings about 
the effects of economic interdependence, and the lack of consensus on both the proper 
measurement and an explanation about how economics influences conflict points to the main 
area for improvement. Exit costs are included in the theoretical argument of this study to explain 
that when dyads reach high levels of DEI they see a reduction in the likelihood of conflict.  
Capitalist Peace 
 The third area of research literature to highlight is the area known as the capitalist peace. 
The capitalist peace was positioned as a new theory to supplant the democratic peace theory, 
which at the time was the dominant theory for peace within the liberal paradigm. Capitalist peace 
theorists argue that democratic peace theory is missing a larger part of the story. Essentially, 
capitalist peace theorists contend that it is the economic relationships between countries that 
leads to democracy and peace, rather than the democratic form of government leading to peace. 
As a result, peaceful relationships between countries are possible through economic interactions.  
 Overall, numerous economic variables have been constructed to test the validity of the 
contention. Variables concerning trade, capital openness, and private-to-public sector ratios have 
been used most recently. Studies using these variables have tried to test the relationship 
described in what has been named the capitalist peace literature. For example, some authors 
argue that it is capitalism, or more precisely free markets, that are associated with peace (Gartzke 
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2007). Some capitalist peace proponents claim that there are free market variables that account 
for the peace between certain states and that regime type may be spurious, but those authors are 
attempting to supplant the democratic peace (see the following for a discussion on the merits of 
the capitalist peace over the democratic peace Gartzke 2007; Gartzke and Hewitt 2010; Gartzke 
and Li 2003; Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001; Gleditsch 2006; McDonald 2007, 2009, 2010; 
Polachek 2005; Schneider and Gleditsch 2010; Weede 2005, 2010). A recent critique, however, 
illustrates how the free market, capitalist peace proponents may be misled and much of the error 
lies in their research methodology (Dafoe 2011).  
 A contemporary and compelling approach, which counters the free marketers, called the 
economic norms theory is the most recent contribution to this line of literature (see Mousseau 
2000; Mousseau 2009, 2010). According to Mousseau, he has discovered that dyadic peace can 
be found in dyads where both states have contract-intensive economies. Mousseau’s findings 
may be spurious, however, since the primary independent variable in his study is operationalized 
at the monadic level, even though he is applying his findings to dyads.  
 Nonetheless, Mousseau provides a valuable and in-depth structure to the literature on the 
capitalist peace (2010). Mousseau divides the literature into two theoretical camps on the basis of 
how each provides an explanation for peace. The first set of literature he labels the free-market 
theories of capitalist peace because the authors of those theories focus on economic variables 
related to one of three categories: trade, openness, or private sector ratio calculations. Mousseau 
argues that the public-to-private sector is a conditional measure for the democratic peace, while 
capitalist peace theorists, including the trade and capital openness proponents, claim to overturn 
the democratic peace. The second set of literature Mousseau highlights is his previous work on 
the social-market models of capitalist peace (see Mousseau 2009, 2010).  
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The Trade Model of Capitalist Peace  
 There has been a growing debate within the literature about the role of trade in relation to 
conflict. Some authors argue that since trade may promote both peace and development, then 
trade might account for the peace among democracies (see Weede 1996, 2005). Some adhere to 
the findings in the works by Barbieri where she argues that trade may increase the probability of 
conflict between countries (see Barbieri 1995, 1996, 1998). On the other hand, some authors 
adhere to the idea that trade reduces conflict (see Oneal and Russett 1999, 1999; Oneal and 
Russett 1997). Gartzke and Li frame the debate and spark an interesting discourse between Oneal 
and Russett, on one hand, and Barbieri on the other by comparing how the differing variable 
constructs have produced opposing views on the relationship. For instance, they contend that 
trade does seem to reduce conflict in agreement with Oneal and Russett (Gartzke and Li 2003). 
Gartzke and Li, however, argue that Barbieri suffers from incorrect variable construction; but, 
they acknowledge Barbieri’s conclusions were correct if one ignores the errors in methodology. 
Both sets of authors have written replies to Gartzke and Li to defend their own methodologies 
(see Barbieri and Peters 2003; Gartzke and Li 2003, 2005; Hegre 2005; Oneal 2003).  
 Essentially, there is a disagreement about the proper specification of the measurements 
used in the studies. Since the studies are either approaching the question about trade and conflict 
differently, or under different conditions, there may be little chance of reaching a conclusion 
about the relationship using the same methods. Clearly, there is little consensus in the literature 
about the role of trade and peace. To bring clarity, it may be more beneficial to include a more 
complex or comprehensive measure of international trade, along with other economic aspects of 
state interaction, to understand the role it has with conflict. This study is aimed at such a goal. 
The Capitalist Openness Model of Capitalist Peace 
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 The capitalist openness model is the focus in the contemporary work by Gartzke. For 
instance, Gartzke offers three pillars which are development, foreign policy preferences, and 
openness to foreign investment, which work together to promote peaceful relations between 
states (Gartzke 2007). The conception of the third pillar offers an explanation that leaders, 
wishing to avoid capital flight, will work to avert war (Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001). In other 
words, capital openness is viewed as having a pacifying effect on the onset of conflict. In fact, 
one study illustrates that higher levels of capital openness results in a lower probability of 
conflict (Gartzke 2007). In his 2007 study, Gartzke went on to make a controversial claim that 
the democratic peace is insignificant once you control for the proposed three pillars. This claim, 
however, has been contested by other authors (see Choi 2011; Dafoe 2011). Moreover, it has 
been argued that only the third pillar in Gartzke’s work about openness is capitalist in nature, and 
that it is unlikely that capital openness can supplant the democratic peace (Mousseau 2010).  
The Private Sector Model of Capitalist Peace 
 Mousseau explains how the private sector model is based on the premise that a dispute will 
escalate to war if there is a lack of credible commitments to peace (2010). For instance, states 
can avert war by improving their credibility in the pursuit of peace relations (Fearon 1995). This 
logic is followed by the authors of the private sector models since the need for rallying public 
support for conflict can have a pacifying effect. This idea is rooted in classical liberalism, and 
was examined by Immanuel Kant when he argued that republics might be more peaceful than 
autocracies because leaders would be constrained by the will of the people. More recently it has 
been argued that states with large private sector ratios should be more credible in their peace 
commitments since they would have to finance war with tax revenues (McDonald 2007, 2009). 
In other words, leaders must gain support from, and are constrained by, the size of the private-to-
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public sector ratio present in their state. Commitments to peace, therefore, might be seen as more 
credible if the leader must raise tax revenue to fund war activities. States with small private-to-
public sector ratios would not have the need to gain public support, thus reducing the credibility 
of their commitment to peace. In other words, the government could use its own funds to finance 
war activities with less concern for the input from the private sector. In addition, some studies 
argue that interstate dyads are less likely to engage in militarized disputes when at least one of 
the states in the dyad has a large private-to-public sector ratio (McDonald 2007, 2010).  
The Social-Market Model of Capitalist Peace 
 The social-market theory, according to Mousseau, has shown that the democratic peace is 
spurious as he explains how the reason for peace in the world between some states is the 
presence of contract-intensive economies (Mousseau 2010). Although this is a far-reaching claim 
that is sure to be contested, Mousseau does provide a thorough and useful empirical analysis. At 
the heart of Mousseau’s theory is the distinction between contract-intensive and contract-poor 
economies. Contract-intensive economies are characterized by preferences towards developing 
habits for universal rights, impartial law, and democratic regimes. Even more, contract-intensive 
economies trust that other states share these same preferences. Contract-poor economies, on the 
other hand, tend to distrust outside groups and instead form habits with their in-groups. As a 
result, contract-poor states tend to exclude themselves from international relationships. Briefly 
stated, Mousseau argues that there is an economic conditionality to the democratic peace 
(Mousseau 2000; Mousseau, Hegre, and Oneal 2003). Moreover, Mousseau claims that the 
democratic peace has been overturned (2009). Ultimately, Mousseau argues that contract-
intensive states are not necessarily less war prone, but are focused on maintaining and fighting 
for, if necessary, global law and order (2010).  
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 In summary, it is clear that there have been varied studies attempting to understand and 
explain the phenomenon of interaction between economics and conflict. There is no clear 
consensus in the literature about the role of economics and its potential impact on the likelihood 
of conflict. As discussed, this chapter has laid the theoretical foundation for the propositions in 
this study. First, the neo-liberal institutionalism paradigm was cited as the theoretical 
underpinning to the focus of this study on the role of DEI and the pacification of conflict. More 
specifically, the role of IPE with conflict is the larger theoretical framework that best describes 
this study. Second, the literature on economic interdependence was examined to inform the 
theoretical justification of the proposed DEI variable. Moreover, exit costs were explored 
through the economic interdependence literature and serve as the causal mechanism between 
high levels of DEI and the reduced likelihood of conflict. Third, the literature on the capitalist 
peace was examined because it relates to the hypotheses in this study about the pacification of 
conflict through economic interactions. Within the context of these three areas is where my study 
fits in the literature, because it attempts to provide some clarity and evidence to a broad and 
encompassing phenomenon that touches on a variety of state and private interactions. The 
theoretical propositions in the subsequent chapter are informed by the reviewed literature in this 
chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL LAYOUT 
 The theoretical contribution of this study to the literature on international political 
economy and conflict in international relations is the proposition that DEI reduces the likelihood 
of conflict and escalation leading up to, and including, the onset of war. The theoretical argument 
of my dissertation is that high levels of DEI within dyads has the effect of generating high exit 
costs to both states which reduces the likelihood either state will break the economic 
relationship, and thereby reduces the likelihood of conflict between the states. DEI is 
operationalized as the presence of a dyadic free trade agreement, high levels of dyadic trade 
density, and the presence of joint membership in economically-focused intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs). These variables are defined and explored in the research design chapter. 
Furthermore, the DEI variable proposed in this study is a factor score based on these three 
independent variables, which measure different aspects of economic interdependence. The 
theoretical connections between economic interdependence and conflict are tentative, since 
authors tend to address the topic from a variety of angles. Compounding the problem is a lack of 
consensus in the literature that revolves around the various methodologies adopted to test the 
relationship.  
 The primary goal of this chapter, therefore, is to develop a theory that provides an 
explanation for the phenomena under study: the pacification of the occurrence and escalation of 
dyadic conflict. I propose that dyads that reach high levels of DEI will have a reduced likelihood 
in the chance of conflict because DEI between states generates high exit costs to the economic 
relationship. The pattern of regularity in terms of the pacifying behavior within dyads occurs 
because neither state wants to engage in conflict and incur the exit costs. The proposed theory 
therefore states that dyads with high levels of DEI engage in fewer conflicts with each other. 
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Thus, my theory is a type of “covering law” explanation about the relationship between DEI and 
conflict (see arguments by Hempel, Lakatos, and Popper about the explanation of phenomena by 
means of covering laws in Martin and McIntyre 1994; Delanty and Strydom 2003). The cause is 
the development of high levels of DEI within a dyad, which produces exit costs, and has the 
effect of reducing the likelihood of conflict occurrence and escalation between the two states. 
The theory proposed in my dissertation is an inductive-probabilistic form, and the theoretical 
arguments are supported empirically. In other words, the probability of dyadic conflict 
occurrence and escalation is lower when dyads engage in high levels of DEI.  
 My dissertation, which provides a new and encompassing measure of economic 
integration, is couched in the theoretical paradigm of neo-liberal institutionalism; more 
specifically, my dissertation is related to the literature on the theoretical connections between 
economic interdependence and conflict. The economic interdependence literature focuses on 
understanding the way in which economic ties can affect conflict. I classify my work under the 
neo-liberal institutionalism paradigm because the proposed new measure is a measure of 
economic interdependence that operates at the international institutional level. Furthermore, the 
focus of this study is at the dyadic level of interaction, and the international institutions 
developed by dyads engaging in DEI are powerful and influential in international relations. In 
addition, the type of interaction within a dyad engaged in high levels of DEI does not occur by 
chance, but is rather a devised plan to develop a lasting and mutually beneficial relationship. DEI 
is different from other conceptualizations of economic interdependence because it measures 
three important aspects of dyadic economic relationships, as opposed to former economic 
interdependence measures which focused primarily on trade flows.  
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 Some of the studies examined in the previous chapter focused on examining the 
relationship between economic interdependence and conflict at the systemic level of analysis. 
The problem of looking at the entire world system is that states may actually behave differently 
with certain dyadic partners compared to their general foreign policy prescriptions. I argue that a 
given state is less likely to engage in conflict with their dyadic partners when the level of DEI is 
high, but that same state is just as likely to engage in conflict with other states. In other words, I 
am not making a theoretical argument for monadic state interactions; rather I am only focusing 
on the dyadic level of analysis. So, at the monadic level, I argue that states are not more or less 
war prone than other states; however, dyads with high levels of DEI are less likely to engage in 
conflict.  
 The three components of the DEI factor score variable were selected to capture a different 
aspect of dyadic economic relationships. DEI, I argue, differs from previous measures of 
economic interdependence because as a single measure it captures the theorized deep economic 
relationship that has the potential to reduce conflict. Free trade agreements, dyadic trade density, 
and joint membership in economically-focused IGOs each capture a specific attribute of dyadic 
economic relations. Free trade agreements capture the level of economic commitment between 
two states. Dyadic trade density is similar to previous measures used in economic 
interdependence studies because is calculates a ratio based on trade flows. Dyadic trade density 
differs, however, because it calculates the density of the trade flows within the dyad as a ratio of 
the entire trade flows generate by each partner state. Joint membership in economically-focused 
IGOs is used to measure the level of cooperation in international institutions. As discussed, 
arguments from neo-liberal institutionalism indicate that states can escape the security dilemma 
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if they can cooperate and improve information about one another, ultimately leading to increased 
levels of trust.  
 Too often, economic interdependence and international trade are used synonymously, even 
though trade is a type of financial interaction, and interdependence suggests a different, more 
established type of relationship, one where the states are mutually dependent on one another. A 
measurement of trade flows alone does not meet the type of interdependence that is required to 
truly understand how integrated two states’ economies may be, and more importantly how 
influential the economic relationship may be on affecting foreign policy with the state’s 
economic partners. DEI, on the other hand, is designed to measure the depth and strength of a 
dyad’s economic relationship because it accounts for three different aspects of the relationship.  
 First, the presence of a free trade agreement is included in the measure because this type of 
trading relationship illustrates the importance two states place on their trading relationship. For 
instance, free trade agreements are developed to be mutually beneficial to both states in the dyad, 
and are used to foster higher levels or trade, thereby increasing the total amount of dyadic trade. 
Second, the level of dyadic trade density, a measure I will develop in a later chapter, is designed 
to measure the level of dyadic trade compared to the total trade of both states. In other words, 
dyadic trade density measures the amount of dyadic trade as a percentage of the combined total 
trade of each state. Dyadic trade density is useful for two reasons. The first reason is that it is a 
unique measure of the amount of trade flowing between the states in a dyad compared to the 
flows outside of the dyad, which accounts for the significance of the trading relationship to each 
state. The second reason dyadic trade density is useful is that it can be used to compare the 
trading relationships across dyads, which is important in this cross-sectional study. Third, the 
presence of joint dyadic membership in an economically-focused IGO is included in the DEI 
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measure because it is a proxy for the level of economic communication occurring within the 
dyad. Since it would be nearly impossible to quantify all of the actual economically related 
communications occurring within a dyad, the fact that both states in a dyad are members of an 
outside economic institution indicates the level of communication and coordination. As members 
of an economically-focused IGO, it can be assumed that both states are involved in cooperative 
efforts with each other. As in the neo-liberal institutional paradigm, states work through 
international institutions to improve information about the intentions of other states. In the case 
of economically-focused IGOs, the states interact to improve their economic standing but also 
forge influential relationships. Together these three variables, which were used to generate the 
DEI factor score, provide a unique and meaningful measure of economic interdependence.  
 The independent variables are theorized to represent different aspects of economic 
interdependence at the dyadic level. In fact, I argue that the independent variables measure 
unique and meaningful relationships between states. Those states, therefore, will not easily break 
these relationships to engage in conflict. Further, I contend that states engage in the three 
economic variables in this study for the primary purpose of connecting with the global economy 
and in the pursuit of prosperity. As a result, states engage in these economic activities for 
economic reasons, and peaceful relations are the byproduct of these interactions. Economic ties 
are made by financial decisions, therefore, and it is only after these economic ties become 
invaluable to a country that spillover may occur on the political side. For instance, if an 
economically poor and isolated nation becomes prosperous through economic ties, like the 
independent variables in this study, then that state may want to avoid conflict with its economic 
partner nations to avoid the risk of losing their economic advantage. In other words, there are 
high exit costs within the dyad that serve as incentives to maintain the economic relationship. 
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Therefore, I argue that the more a dyad engages in DEI, the more the two states become 
economically integrated; therefore, increasing the exit costs and reducing the likelihood they will 
engage in conflict with one another at the risk of losing or disrupting this economic 
interdependence.  
 As discussed in the literature review chapter, there is a complex problem with the 
multitude of operationalizations of economic interdependence, many of which focus on the role 
of international trade in various forms as a surrogate measure for economic interdependence 
(Mansfield and Pollins 2003). Does the use of international trade flows as a measure of economic 
interdependence meet the requirements of reliability and validity (Singleton and Straits 2005)? I 
argue that international trade flows as a measure is not valid because trade alone ignores the 
potential for broader economic interdependence between states. Furthermore, the use of 
international trade flows alone does not seem to be a reliable measure of economic 
interdependence either, since the results in the literature on international trade and conflict tend 
to offer mixed messages. Instead, I argue that international trade flows do have a pacifying effect 
on conflict, but only when it is measured specifically at the dyadic level and other economic 
interdependence measures are present between the states as well. As Mansfield and Pollins point 
out, the measures of economic interdependence used in the literature usually follow one of three 
themes: openness, vulnerability, or gain (Mansfield and Pollins 2003).  
 Openness, being the most common theme in the literature, is measured as the ratio of trade 
to total economic output. The studies examining the relationship between international trade and 
conflict have primarily used this measure. Since the openness measure is the most commonly 
employed in the literature, there is considerable evidence related to this conception of economic 
interdependence (Mansfield and Pollins 2003). For example, some studies use the openness 
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measure of international trade and find that it has a pacifying effect on the likelihood of war 
(Domke 1988; Mansfield 1994; Oneal 1996; Oneal and Russett 1999; Oneal and Russett 1997; 
Russett and Oneal 2001; Russett, Oneal, and Davis 1998). Other authors, using the same 
openness measure of international trade, have found contradictory results where the likelihood of 
war is more likely (Barbieri 1995, 1996, 1998; Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). These 
contradictory results, if nothing else, point to problems of validity and reliability with the 
measure itself. How is it possible to have such contradictory and statistically significant results 
about the same relationship? The answer is that the ratio of international trade as a measure of 
economic openness may be incomplete. The second theme highlighted by Mansfield and Pollins 
is vulnerability, which is measured as the level of trade asymmetry between two states. The 
vulnerability theme is more promising because it attempts to link the economies of states 
together, since each economy becomes vulnerable to the other states engaged in the economic 
relationship. Vulnerability is difficult, however, to measure since vulnerability must be 
calculated in a “what if” scenario. In other words, a researcher does not know how vulnerable 
one state may be to economic disruptions, but it is possible to say one state’s economy is more or 
less vulnerable than another state’s economy. Moreover, the third theme is gain, which is 
measured as the gains from trade, suffers from the same problem with developing an appropriate 
measure as the vulnerability theme. Gains from trade include not only the actual imports and 
exports volumes and profits, but also the benefit or boost an economy gains from engaging in 
trade. Similar to the vulnerability theme, it is difficult to calculate these measures, especially 
where data may be lacking.  
 The overall theme throughout the literature is that there are a variety of interpretations of 
the economic interdependence measure, as discussed in the literature review chapter. The attempt 
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to reduce the complexity of economic interdependence between two states into a simple measure 
is daunting. It is no surprise that there are many alternative measurements aimed at the same 
phenomenon. In their edited book, Mansfield and Pollins layout where the literature is lacking in 
terms of methodology, specifically pointing to the conflicting conceptualizations across various 
studies (Mansfield and Pollins 2003). In addition, Mansfield and Pollins highlight a general need 
for a better measure of economic interdependence, with the intention to develop a measure that 
may bring consensus to the literature in terms of an appropriate measure (Baldwin 1980; 
Crescenzi 2005; Gasiorowski 1986; Rosecrance et al. 1977; Rosecrance and Stein 1973; 
Tetreault 1980). Since there are a variety of measures, there tends to be a variety of different 
results. Interestingly, the choice of measurement tends to relate to the type of results for the 
relationship between economic interdependence and conflict (Mansfield and Pollins 2003). 
Openness tends to support liberal claims of the pacifying effect on war, with the exception of 
studies mentioned above. While on the other hand, studies using the vulnerability measure tend 
to support realist claims. Why is this the case? The simple answer is that the measurement for 
economic interdependence is misspecified, and there is a need for a new measure of economic 
interdependence to understand the relationship with conflict. The proposed DEI factor score in 
this study is a different type of measure that includes three aspects of economic interdependence, 
rather than only including one dimension of an economic relationship. Furthermore, this entire 
study is restricted to the dyadic level of analysis, while past studies included analysis at the 
monadic level or mixed the level of analyses together. The error with interchanging the level of 
analysis is explained further in the research design chapter. Economic interdependence measures, 
according to the literature, follow one of two typologies in terms of the relationship between the 
states involved in the analysis. 
45 
 
 
 There are two typologies of economic interdependence defined in the literature which 
characterize the states in terms of their economic dependence. The two typologies are sensitivity 
interdependence and vulnerability interdependence, which were explained in chapter two in the 
literature review. The basic definition of each type of interdependence definition, however, is 
worth repeating here. Note that the definition of vulnerability interdependence is different from 
the theme of vulnerability described by Mansfield and Pollins (2003). Vulnerability 
interdependence is related to the costs each country would suffer if the relationship was disrupted 
(Baldwin 1980; Keohane and Nye 1977). In other words, the economies are vulnerable in the 
case of any disruption in the economic relationship, where the disruption would have dire 
consequences for either state’s economy. If one state within a dyad, which is engaged in such a 
vulnerable relationship, suffered an economic collapse then a similar collapse could be expected 
in the partner state of the dyad. Sensitivity interdependence, on the other hand, relates to the idea 
that the conditions in state A are contingent upon the conditions in state B (Baldwin 1980; 
Keohane and Nye 1977). For example, if the inflation rate rises in state B by a certain 
percentage, it would be expected that an established change in the inflation rate in state A would 
occur. In other words, the two economies are sensitive to changes in each other, unlike 
vulnerability interdependence where the states are vulnerable in a general sense. The key 
difference between the sensitivity and vulnerability, therefore, is the costs that the states would 
bear should relations be disrupted. In vulnerability interdependence the costs could be diffuse or 
generalized in the sense that economic problems affect both states. Sensitivity interdependence, 
however, focuses on specific costs or economic issues where the states are directly interlinked. 
Vulnerability and sensitivity interdependence are not mutually exclusive typologies of economic 
relationships, however, each typology accounts for different aspects of the relationships. For 
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instance, as Mansfield and Pollins point out, it is difficult to find a measure that accounts for 
both vulnerability and sensitivity interdependence (2003). Instead, studies usually adopt 
measures of economic interdependence that fit one of the typologies. DEI, proposed in this 
study, is a measure of economic interdependence that covers both typologies.  
 The DEI measurement in this study is different from previous attempts to operationalize 
economic interdependence because it encompasses a larger variety of state-level economic 
linkages at the dyadic level. DEI does not conform to one of the three themes of openness, 
vulnerability, or gain since the measure accounts for a combination of different aspects of 
economic ties. The DEI variable, however, could be classified as being closest to a vulnerability 
measure, since the exit costs that are erected serve as barriers to economic disruption, and in turn 
political conflict. These exit cost barriers are indicative of the level of dependence or 
vulnerability between two states. In terms of the typologies of economic interdependence, the 
DEI variable does meet the definition criteria set forth by Baldwin for sensitivity and 
vulnerability (Baldwin 1980). The proposed DEI measure meets the criteria to be defined as a 
vulnerability measure because dyads that are engaged in high levels of DEI have deep 
relationships that would be too costly to disrupt. Even more, the relationship is intertwined in the 
dyad to the point where the two countries may rely heavily on the partner state’s continued 
cooperation in the economic enterprise. The economies within a given dyad where high levels of 
DEI are present, therefore, are vulnerable to one another. Without the continued economic 
relationship between the states in a given dyad, it is possible that each country could lose a 
significant level of their economic base. These potential exit costs to their respective economies 
may influence the states to avoid conflict, which if pursued would likely disrupt their economic 
relationship.  
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 Second, DEI also meets the criteria for the definition of sensitivity in terms of economic 
interdependence. A dyad engaged in high levels of DEI may have become so interconnected that 
the economies tend to fluctuate together. For example, if state A and state B are engaged in high 
levels of DEI, then issues that change in one state’s economy could have similar effects on the 
other state’s economy. In other words, if state A experiences a period of inflation or economic 
stagnation, it could in turn result in consumers purchasing less in the market. State B, therefore, 
could also be affected by the slowing of the economy in state A, since the consumers in state A 
may be purchasing fewer items from state B. As a result, changes in one state’s economy are 
mirrored in the other state’s economy. If this is the case, then two countries with economies that 
are sensitive to one another could not afford to disrupt their economic relationship, with the risk 
of potentially severe economic consequences. In addition, since the economies are sensitive to 
one another, then the states may be more reluctant to follow policies that could disrupt their 
economic partner with the fear that any disruption would return to their own economy. In other 
words, if the economies of the states within a given dyad are highly sensitive to one another, then 
the states may seek to avoid conflict in an effort to maintain a level of stability. As a result, 
dyads with high levels of economic sensitivity may be restrained to engage in conflict since 
doing so could incur high exit costs.  
 The theoretical relationship between DEI and conflict is complex, but the logical reasoning 
for the theorized pacification is grounded in the neo-liberal institutionalism paradigm. The 
proposed DEI variable in this study builds on this neo-liberal idea as a manifestation of the type 
of interaction that can lead to these levels of trust, which in turn may lead to more peaceful 
interactions. For instance, economic relationships and cooperation through international 
institutions at the dyadic level can build trust between the states, which in turn can lead to more 
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cooperative and trusting relationships. From an economic perspective, the existence of exit costs 
generated from a deep economic relationship is the actual mechanism that aids decision makers 
to avoid conflict. It is the development of trust and cooperation, however, that leads to the high 
level of DEI and in turn high exit costs.  
 According to Mansfield and Pollins, there is a problem of three parts within the literature 
about the lack of causal explanations included in theories between economic interdependence 
and the likelihood of conflict (Mansfield and Pollins 2003). The first problem is that there is a 
wide variety of actors involved in the relationship between economic interdependence and 
conflict. Essentially, it is difficult to attempt to offer a full explanation for the behavior between 
these two phenomena because the actors encompass entire states, but also the complex 
interactions of private economic actors. Mansfield and Pollins label this first issue as the many 
actors problem (2003). The second problem Mansfield and Pollins mention is about the 
complexity of strategic interactions used to pursue goals. In other words, it is not clear, or at least 
the strategic interactions are hidden from scrutiny, how actors choose to carry out their goals. 
The third problem is about the type of interactions that must occur to alter the political decisions 
about conflict. In other words, Mansfield and Pollins are referring to the causal mechanism that 
links the economic interactions and political decision makers. These three problems are pointed 
at the link between the idea that economic interdependence reduces conflict. This is an important 
question because if DEI is shown to reduce the likelihood of conflict, then the next question 
should be how does DEI have a pacifying effect. Which actors are involved, and how do they 
pursue their goals? How are political decision makers influenced enough to affect the likelihood 
of conflict? The answer to this question is that high levels of dyadic DEI generates high exit 
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costs, therefore, providing states with an incentive to avoid engaging in conflict and incurring the 
exit costs.  
 Exit costs to breaking an economic relationship between states are created when the states 
within a dyad become dependent on one another to a point where the economies need each other 
to be healthy. Without the presence of economic transactions and interactions within the dyad, 
the economies may become stagnant and suffer. The potential for stagnation and economic 
problems to each of the states in the dyad are the exit costs that are generated as DEI increases. 
As a result, higher DEI levels are associated with higher exit costs, thereby reducing the 
likelihood either state in a dyad would be willing to engage in conflict and suffer those exit costs. 
In other words, if the exit costs are high, then a state will have to pay higher economic costs if 
they choose to engage in conflict. If this is the case, then dyads with higher levels of DEI will 
have higher exit costs, and these costs may have a detrimental economic impact on the states. 
States within a dyad that want to maintain their economic strength, therefore, will tend to be risk 
averse in terms of disrupting the dyadic economic relationship and potentially incurring exit 
costs. States within dyads, wanting to preserve the beneficial status of having high levels of DEI, 
are less likely to disrupt the economic relationship with one another to avoid incurring exit costs. 
The calculation of exit costs is not straightforward, but they can be understood better by 
examining the different types of economic interdependence that may lead to them. Economic 
interdependence can take on two forms as either sensitivity interdependence or vulnerability 
interdependence.  
 The exit cost definition technically falls within the vulnerability typology of economic 
interdependence, but is an entirely new approach to address the economic interdependence and 
conflict relationship (Baldwin 1980; Crescenzi 2005; Mansfield and Pollins 2003). Exit costs are 
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a novel approach to examining the economic and conflict relationship that is outside the three 
more common themes in the literature of openness, vulnerability, and gains from trade. The key 
difference with the exit cost approach is that it is an attempt to formalize the causal mechanism 
between economic interdependence and the pacification of conflict, while the previous themes in 
the literature were focused on measuring economic interdependence. Although causal claims 
were offered in previous studies, those claims lacked the economic principles and clarity of the 
exit cost approach. One of the issues highlighted in the literature is that measures of economic 
interdependence fail to explain why the relationship with conflict exists, especially since the 
relationships tend to be strong (Crescenzi 2005; Mansfield and Pollins 2003). The usefulness of 
the exit cost conception is that it offers an explanation of the theoretical relationship between 
economic interdependence and conflict. According to Crescenzi, the creation of exit costs is a 
result of economic interdependence which influence political decisions about conflict. For 
instance, Crescenzi defines economic interdependence in terms of exit costs: 
 
Economic interdependence exists when there are exit costs for any two states vis-a-vis 
their economic relationship. These costs are a function of market structure, asset 
specificity, and salience. The salience of interaction exacerbates interdependence, but 
only when market conditions constrain adaptation. Thus, the highest forms of 
interdependence exist when exit options are scarce, adaption is costly, and the economic 
relationship is highly salient (Crescenzi 2005, 43). 
 
 Previous theoretical arguments for exit costs, and the proposed theoretical relationships 
between economic interdependence and conflict were fully discussed in the literature review 
chapter, but some of the main points will be emphasized to support my theoretical contentions. 
The three components of exit costs are the structure of the market, asset specificity in relation to 
the trading industries, and the salience of the interdependence. The proposed DEI variable in this 
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study is the type of economic interdependence measurement that meets the criteria of exit costs 
as defined by Crescenzi. Note that the three criteria for exit costs argued by Crescenzi are related 
to international relationships, more specifically to foreign economic activities. The term asset 
specificity is about industries where the means of production are highly specialized and cannot 
be easily, or more precisely, would not be cost effective to change the product offering of a 
factory or to sell it. In other words, highly asset specific industries that have invested capital into 
factories overseas for a certain purpose are essentially tied to those investments. Other 
corporations, or the local population, cannot use the factories and the investing corporation 
cannot easily modify the type of production being performed at the factory. The market structure 
term is related to the composition of the economic market, where the market’s structure favors 
some industries or corporations over others. Finally, the term salience is used to describe how 
well the economic interdependence relationship is known. Together these three criteria, 
according to Crenscenzi, comprise the costs in his exit cost definition of economic 
interdependence. I argue that the DEI factor score, and the independent variables in this study, 
can generate the type of exit costs Crescenzi described.  
 Each of the three independent variables used to generate the DEI factor score aid in the 
development of exit costs at the dyadic level. First, since free trade agreements are designed to 
promote long-term economic relationships, there should be an increased likelihood of higher 
asset specificity among the industries involved in trade. Second, dyads with high levels of dyadic 
trade density are highly involved economically with each other and cannot easily break that 
relationship. Third, dyads with joint membership in economically-focused IGOs improve the 
salience of the economic relationship, because the relationship is publicized through the IGOs. In 
terms of Crescenzi’s exit cost definition, free trade agreements make adaptation costly, dyadic 
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trade density makes exit options scarce, and joint membership in economically-focused IGOs 
makes the economic relationship highly salient. First, I will relate free trade agreements with 
Crescenzi’s asset specificity criteria. Industries engaged in costly investments with their trading 
partners want to maintain peaceful and stable relations to ensure their investment is not 
squandered. For instance, multinational corporations (MNCs), operating in a given dyad that 
recently reached high levels of DEI, can begin to increase the level of foreign direct investment 
from their home state to the partner state in the dyad. These MNCs, therefore, are more willing to 
invest assets in the foreign market of the partner state that are specific to a particular product. In 
other words, the level of asset specificity would increase within dyads that have high levels of 
DEI because the invested assets may only be used for a specific purpose, and cannot be sold or 
retrofitted to perform different tasks. This is not a problem in a dyad with high levels of DEI, 
since I argue that this type of economic relationship leads to lasting peaceful relationships. 
MNCs operating in dyads with low levels of DEI, on the other hand, cannot trust that the 
political relationship will not sour and therefore are less likely to direct FDI into asset specific 
areas. If this is the case, then high asset specificity increases the amount of exit costs to the dyad.  
 Second, I will explain how dyadic trade density influences the market structure criteria in 
Crescenzi’s definition. The structure of a dyadic market is altered by the level of dyadic trade 
density since the economies are linked together through trade. Dyads with high levels of dyadic 
trade density have economies that are heavily dependent on one another since the prosperity of 
either of the states’ economies depends on the success of the trading relationship. The structure 
of the market within a dyad with high levels of dyadic trade density, therefore, is configured to 
maximize import and export efficiencies, economies of scale, and potentially a comparative 
advantage. If this is the case, then the dyadic market is structured to support the dyadic trading 
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relationship when there are high levels of dyadic trade density, therefore, increasing the amount 
of exit costs to the dyad.  
 Third, I will explain how the salience of an economic relationship, a criteria in Crescenzi’s 
definition, is improved through the joint membership in economically-focused IGOs. The 
salience of the economic relationship is publicized because both states in a given dyad are 
members of an IGO which is designed to promote economic relations. Membership in such an 
IGO, therefore, is a form of legitimization of the relationship and makes states more likely to 
adhere to their agreements. Dyads that break economic agreements, and are members of 
economically-focused IGOs, may have their decisions scrutinized publicly. Dyads without 
membership in such IGOs can essentially break their commitments behind closed doors. As a 
result, dyads with joint membership in economically-focused IGOs have higher exit costs 
because the economic relationship is highly salient. In the language of Crescenzi’s exit cost 
definition, dyads with high levels of DEI are highly salient, exit options are costly, and the dyads 
are less able to adapt to rapid changes in the economic relationship because the investing MNCs 
expect a peaceful relationship and are less risk averse. High levels of DEI, therefore, represent all 
three aspects of the exit cost definition of economic interdependence.  
 The exit costs are technically calculable observations about a given dyadic relationship, but 
it is not necessary to calculate these costs for the purposes of this study. Instead, exit costs are the 
causal mechanism between DEI and conflict, which produce the pacifying effect. For this study, 
I am concerned with developing a theory that explains why DEI pacifies conflict. Exit costs, 
therefore, are the mechanism through which DEI pacifies conflict by erecting high exit costs that 
either state would have to incur to engage in conflict with the partner state. In other words, high 
levels of DEI leads to high exit costs, which in turn reduces the likelihood the states in a dyad 
54 
 
 
would want to incur those exit costs. As a result, politicians and economic leaders have 
incentives to avoid incurring the exit costs and thereby maintaining peaceful relations with the 
dyadic partner state. The role of exit costs may appear during the course of bargaining, where 
costliness related to foregoing economic exchange is highlighted. Furthermore, private actors 
could use their considerable financial assets and clout to influence political decision makers 
about policies related to conflict that could disrupt the level of economic exchange. Economic 
and business leaders have purely financial incentives to avoid the exit costs, while politicians 
have electoral incentives to maintain a healthy economy and may also feel direct pressure from 
the economic and business leaders to avoid conflict. 
 MNCs are concerned with their financial well-being, and are only concerned with 
international politics in terms of the rules they must follow. If it is possible for an MNC to 
influence policies related to international trade or economic relationships with other states, then 
an MNC may attempt to influence decision makers. The primary goal of MNCs, like all 
businesses, is to pursue a return on their investments to appease shareholders. What then of 
politics? These private actors, however, are required to operate according to the rules set forth by 
the political decision makers. MNCs have the ability to persuade political decision makers into 
thinking about the economic repercussions before acting hastily with other nations. Since the 
global economy demands active participation for a country to be prosperous, countries that 
meddle in the affairs of MNCs and private actors introduce artificial constraints and disturbances 
into the regular flows of capital and goods. For these reasons, most states pursue liberal 
economic approaches, and private actors are the driving force behind economic prosperity. 
MNCs pursue profits and opportunities for growth with the only concern to observe the 
minimum legal requirements. If this is the case, then what is international politics to a 
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corporation? International politics is nothing more than another issue that must be addressed in 
the pursuit of profits. Corporations are not in the business of making moral decisions, instead 
morality and setting legal limits is up to the politicians to regulate the corporations. MNCs, 
therefore, are in the business of making money. As a result, corporations will doggedly pursue 
the objective to maintain reliable avenues for trade and economic integration with other nations 
if it is financially beneficial. The presence of exit costs within a given dyad serve the purpose of 
an economic incentive for corporations, and politicians, to maintain the current economic 
relationship. Politics, then, are on the receiving end of the persuasion from economic interests to 
maintain peaceful interactions with nations, or at a minimum avoid disrupting economic 
potential. Since the MNCs and other private actors benefit from high levels of DEI within a 
given dyad, they will use whatever influence at their disposal to maintain or improve the dyadic 
economic relationship. In other words, private actors, who benefit from high levels of DEI and 
stable interactions, would prefer to maintain that level of economic interaction. Private actors, 
therefore, will influence public decision makers to avoid conflict by bringing their concerns to 
the bargaining table. The high exit costs will be felt by the economy as a whole, but private 
actors engaged in the actual trading will suffer as well.  
Research Question 
 The research question of my dissertation explores the relationship between economics and 
the likelihood of conflict. Specifically, the relationship between DEI and dyadic conflict at 
different stages is examined. The relationships between DEI and war, MIDs, and the escalation 
of MIDs are tested. The following research question is aimed at exploring the potential of a 
pacifying relationship between the proposed DEI variable and the conflict stages already 
mentioned. The following is the research question: 
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Do high levels of dense economic integration (DEI) between two states reduce the 
likelihood of escalating conflict up to, and including, the level of interstate war? 
 
The research question is one-tailed because it asks about a pacifying effect on the likelihood of 
conflict. The hypothesized relationship between DEI and conflict, therefore, is that they are 
inversely related to one another. In other words, I argue that when the level of DEI increases 
within a dyad, that dyad should see a reduced likelihood of conflict. Three hypotheses are used to 
the test the relationships described in the research question.  
Hypotheses 
 The hypotheses in this study are designed to test the effect of DEI on the onset of war, the 
onset of MIDs, and escalation of MIDs. Thus, there are three hypotheses which test for the 
potential pacifying effects of DEI on the various stages of conflict. All of the hypotheses are 
looking for an inverse relationship between DEI and conflict. In other words, I hypothesize that 
as the level of DEI increases, the likelihood of dyadic conflict decreases. Moreover, the logic of 
the argument indicates that when the level of DEI decreases, the likelihood of conflict increases. 
The DEI variable and the dependent variables, therefore, are theorized to change in opposite 
directions. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, dyads with high levels of DEI are 
deterred from engaging in conflict by the existence of high exit costs. The exit costs are erected 
because of the high levels of DEI, and are the mechanisms through which DEI may have a 
pacifying effect on conflict. The results from hypothesis testing will be provided in the results 
chapter, and the specific testing decisions about the null hypotheses are detailed in the discussion 
section of the results chapter.  
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 The first hypothesis tests the relationship between DEI and the onset of dyadic war. The 
hypothesis is designed to test for an inverse relationship between DEI and the onset of war. 
Furthermore, the question at the heart of hypothesis one asks whether dyads that exhibit higher 
levels of DEI are less likely to engage in war. Specifically, hypothesis one states that increases in 
the level of DEI present within a dyad are correlated with a lower likelihood of the onset of 
dyadic war. Only new wars are considered in the analysis, while ongoing wars are ignored for 
the theoretical reasons discussed in the research design chapter. Furthermore, the war dependent 
variable will also be defined and explored in the research design chapter. Note that since only 
new wars are considered, the occurrence of war in the dataset is a rather rare event. Thus, 
hypothesis one states that:  
 
H1: Dyadic dense economic integration (DEI) is postulated to vary inversely with the 
onset of war. 
 
 The second hypothesis tests the relationship between DEI and the onset of dyadic MIDs. 
The hypothesis is designed to test for an inverse relationship between DEI and the onset of 
MIDs. Furthermore, the question at the heart of hypothesis two asks whether dyads that exhibit 
higher levels of DEI are less likely to engage in MIDs. Specifically, hypothesis two states that 
increases in the level of DEI present within a dyad are correlated with a lower likelihood of the 
onset of dyadic MIDs. Since MIDs occur more often than wars, the likelihood of generating 
meaningful results is increased since the sample size is larger. Only new MIDs are considered in 
the analysis, while ongoing MIDs are ignored for the theoretical reasons discussed in the 
research design chapter. Furthermore, the MIDs dependent variable will also be defined and 
explored in the research design chapter. Thus, hypothesis two states that:  
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H2: Dyadic dense economic integration (DEI) is postulated to vary inversely with the 
onset of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). 
 
 The third hypothesis tests the relationship between DEI and the escalation of MIDs. The 
hypothesis is designed to test for an inverse relationship between DEI and the escalation of 
MIDs. Furthermore, the question at the heart of hypothesis three asks whether dyads that exhibit 
higher levels of DEI are less likely to engage in escalatory behavior with one another. 
Specifically, hypothesis three states that increases in DEI present within a dyad are correlated 
with a lower likelihood of the escalation of dyadic MIDs. Conflict escalation is a measure of the 
behavior of states in terms of the degree of hostile foreign relations. Specifically, conflict 
escalation includes five different stages of international relations at the dyadic level that range 
from peaceful interactions to interstate war. The stages of conflict are represented by five levels 
where level one indicates there is no dispute, level two indicates a threat, level three indicates the 
display of force, level four indicates the use of force, and level five indicates interstate war. Each 
of the five levels of hostility are possible observations for each dyad at any given time, but this 
study uses only the highest level of hostility at the dyadic level recorded on an annual basis. The 
construction of the escalation dependent variable is fully defined and examined in the research 
design chapter. The five levels of hostility are measured on an ordinal scale, where at each level I 
argue that DEI reduces the likelihood of a dyad reaching higher levels. Hypothesis three, in other 
words, examines the proposition that higher levels of DEI reduces the likelihood of a dyad 
increasing the level of hostility along the different stages towards war. Unlike the onset of war 
and MIDs variables, which only measure new conflicts, the escalation of MIDs variable 
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measures the hostility in a given year regardless if that hostility level was associated with a new 
or ongoing conflict. Thus, hypothesis three states that: 
 
H3: Dyadic dense economic integration (DEI) is postulated to vary inversely with the 
escalation of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). 
 
Hypothesis three is also important because there is a lack of research within the economic 
interdependence literature involving conflict escalation (Mansfield and Pollins 2003). According 
to some theorists, economics may have different effects at the various stages of conflict 
escalation (see Gartzke 2003). Since the escalation of MIDs variable is ordinal, the appropriate 
statistical technique is ordered logistic regression. The choices about statistical models and their 
interpretations are discussed at length in the research design chapter. As with the onset of war 
and onset of MIDs variables, the escalation of MIDs variable will be tested using traditional 
hypothesis testing. These results are included in the results chapter. Based on the statistical 
technique used to assess the relationship between DEI and escalation, however, results for 
individual escalation stages are difficult to interpret. As a result, predicted probability differences 
for each of the stages of conflict will be examined to understand the effect DEI may have at each 
level of hostility. For example, high levels of DEI may have a strong pacifying effect at the 
threat level of hostility, but a weaker effect at the use of force level. These individual effects will 
be explored in the discussion section of the results chapter. 
 Much of the literature, according to Mansfield and Pollins, provides considerable insight 
into the onset of conflict and the role economic interdependence plays, but there is little available 
evidence on the influences economic interdependence may have on conflict escalation (For a 
discussion about the lack of evidence on the escalation of conflict see Mansfield, Pevehouse, and 
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Bearce 1999; Morrow 2003). In fact, studies have focused on generating empirical results on the 
onset of conflict, but the evidence on the escalation of conflict is lacking (Mansfield and Pollins 
2003). Although conflict escalation is not a new area of study, it is theoretically different from 
studying the onset of new conflicts. Conflict escalation does not differentiate between new and 
existing conflicts, and instead the variable measures the state of conflict within a dyad. For this 
reason, there are three separate dependent variables and three hypotheses. The first two 
dependent variables measure the onset of war and the onset of MIDs, while the third dependent 
variable measures the level of conflict escalation. My dissertation, therefore, evaluates both the 
onset and escalation of conflict at the dyadic level. The hypotheses postulate that DEI varies 
inversely with each of the three dependent variables.  
 To test for the pacifying effect of DEI on the likelihood of dyadic conflict and escalation, 
three dependent variables measured at different stages of conflict were used: the onset of dyadic 
war, the onset of dyadic MIDs, and the escalation of dyadic MIDs. The onset of war variable is a 
dichotomous measure of the occurrence of new wars between two states. The onset of MIDs 
variable is a dichotomous measure of the occurrence of new MIDs between two states. The 
escalation variable is an ordinal measure of the escalation of MIDs between two states. 
Furthermore, the escalation of conflict is an area where more research is needed in terms of the 
relationship with economic interdependence. These variables are explicitly defined and explored 
in the data section on dependent variables located in the research design chapter. 
 To reduce the potential for confounding or spurious relationships, various variables were 
controlled for. Based on previous research, the following control variables have been shown to 
be related to the likelihood of conflict at varying stages: contiguity, distance between states, 
military balance, presence of nuclear weapons, presence of a military alliance, absence of 
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territorial conflict, regime type, and cultural distance. The evidence about these variables has 
shown that, through various research studies, each has a relationship with interstate conflict. To 
ensure that the relationship between DEI and conflict is not spurious, the effects of the listed 
variables must be controlled for. These variables are defined and explored in the data section on 
control variables, where the relationships with conflict are explained.  
 In conclusion, the theoretical foundations of my dissertation are laid out in the preceding 
chapter. I have shown that there is a lack of consensus not only about the relationship between 
economics and conflict, but also about the conception of economic interdependence. As argued 
in this chapter, economic interdependence is theoretically useful, but the measure itself has been 
operationalized in different ways. In addition, as Mansfield and Pollins explain, the majority of 
studies about economic interdependence and conflict revolve around the theme of openness, and 
therefore, around trade flows. The proposed DEI factor score variable, however, is designed to 
capture three important aspects of a given dyadic economic relationship. Free trade agreements 
capture the level of commitment to the economic relationship. Dyadic trade density captures the 
amount of trade dependence within a given dyad. Joint membership in economically-focused 
IGOs captures the level of economic cooperation and communication within a given dyad. The 
reasons why dyadic DEI affects the likelihood of conflict was also explored. Exit costs were 
introduced and the theoretical concepts were broken down to illustrate how DEI meets the 
criteria of exit costs defined by Crescenzi. Dyads with high levels of DEI erect exit costs; 
therefore, reducing the likelihood the economic relationship will be disrupted and in turn reduces 
the likelihood of conflict. Political and economic leaders react to the exit costs because the 
financial incentive is to avoid paying them. In other words, exit costs serve the purpose of 
influencing the decision makers to avoid disruptive activities, including conflict with their 
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partner states. The theoretical contribution of this study includes a new set of measures to use in 
the study about economics and conflict, and also develops a causal explanation for the 
pacification of conflict.  
 In the following chapter, the research design of the study is fully expanded. Each of the 
proposed variables are operationalized and clearly defined. The construction of the data and 
sources of information are explained. In addition, the models are constructed and the statistical 
techniques are discussed. The development of the hypothesis testing and measures used to 
explore the relationships between DEI and the various conflict stages is also included.  
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CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The intent of this chapter is to explain the research design of my dissertation by 
expanding upon the overall design structure of the study, the methodology used to test the 
theorized relationships, and to discuss the variables used in constructing the dataset. Further, this 
chapter will detail how I have approached the research question about the relationship between 
DEI and conflict. How the data was gathered, which sources were used, and important coding 
decisions about the data are considered at length. The models and statistical methods selected to 
test the hypotheses are also discussed in depth.  
The spatial domain of my dissertation covers all dyadic relationships in the international 
system. Dyads are formed based on a pair of states’ country codes in a given year according to 
the Correlates of War (COW) project's codebook. The temporal domain of this study ranges from 
1965 to 2001 since some of the variables limit the range of coverage due to data availability. The 
earliest data available for annual dyadic international organization data is 1965. Prior to 1965, 
dyadic international organization data is only available in five-year increments. The most recent 
dyadic conflict data available from the COW and Maoz datasets is 2001. This temporal period 
covers interstate interactions during the latter part of the cold war and the post-cold war periods. 
There is an interesting opportunity available since the temporal domain covers cold war and 
post-cold war periods. I will be able to test my models during the cold war and after it had ended 
to see if my results remain the same. It is interesting because the world system changed from a 
bipolar to a unipolar world during the temporal domain of this study. The analysis of this 
opportunity will be conducted as a robustness check in chapter six. 
The units of analysis for my dissertation are interstate dyads, aggregated annually. In 
other words, the units under analysis will be the dyads for each year. This unit of analysis, only 
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examining dyadic relationships on an annual basis, has some impact on the variables in the 
study. For example, the dependent variable on conflict escalation may report multiple stages of 
escalation throughout a given year, but only the highest level of hostility in a given year will be 
recorded. Furthermore, since this study is examining the potential pacifying effect of DEI on the 
likelihood of conflict at the dyadic level, the appropriate unit of analysis must be at the same 
level of analysis.  
 There are 479,179 observations that span the temporal and spatial domains. This number 
may seem large since the study only ranges from 1965 to 2001, but it is the nature of dyadic 
relationships that make the number large. Each record, or observation, in the dataset represents 
one dyadic relationship in a given year which consists of two states. For example, USA and 
China in 1981 would be one record. Since this dataset is constructed as a non-directional dyad 
year dataset, however, there is only one record per dyad per year. For example, USA-China in 
1981 is a record, but China-USA in 1981 is not a record.4 There are a total of 19,120 distinct 
dyads in the dataset covering the years from 1965 to 2001. Note that the number of dyads in a 
given year is likely different since some states dissolved and others entered the system. For 
example, the dissolution of the Soviet Union added a number of new states, and thus new dyads, 
to the international system, while at the same time removing other dyads. The coding decisions 
regarding state membership in a given year are provided in the COW project codebook.  
Another type of dyadic data is the directed dyad year dataset, which contains two records 
for every dyad for each year. If such a dataset was used in this study, then the number of 
observations would be much larger. In a directed dyad year dataset, therefore, there would be 
                                                
4 On a practical level, the dataset is structured according to the COW project codebook so that the state with the 
lower country code is listed first. For example, USA's country code is 2 while China's country code is 710, thus the 
only records that will appear for this dyad is USA-China for each year from 1965 to 2001. There will never be a 
dyad listed for China-USA. 
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two records for USA and China in 1981: USA-China 1981 and China-USA 1981. The 
underlying logical choice between the two types of datasets is related to the type of analysis and 
if there is a need to include initiator information. A directed dyad year dataset, containing two 
records for each dyad, can distinguish which state initiated a given conflict. In addition, a 
directed dataset provides information about which state conceded first in a given conflict. My 
dissertation, however, uses a non-directed dataset, with one record per dyad, because my analysis 
does not require the distinction about which state initiated and which state conceded in a given 
conflict. The lack of initiator information is the inherent limitation in a non-directed dyad year 
dataset, but is not of concern for this study since it does not affect my analysis.  
 There are two reasons I selected a non-directed dyad year dataset for this study. First, from 
a theoretical perspective the additional information about conflict initiators was not necessary for 
my analysis. For instance, the hypotheses are designed to test the potential pacifying effects of 
DEI on various stages of dyadic conflict, rather than on which state in the dyad was the aggressor 
or pacifying force. Although those are interesting inquiries, that analysis must be examined in a 
future study. Second, on a more practical level, much of the data for the various independent and 
control variables was primarily available in the non-directed dyad year format. As a result, the 
data in this case is the limiting factor. In the future, it is likely that more datasets will be 
converted into directed dyad year format because the demand in the field points to analysis that 
includes the level of detail about initiators. Directed dyad datasets, therefore, will likely become 
the standard for future data construction (Bennett 2003).  
Methodology 
 Two statistical techniques were used to test each of the three hypotheses in this study. First, 
logistic regression was used to test hypothesis one for the onset of war, and hypothesis two for 
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the onset of MIDs because both dependent variables are dichotomous. Logistic regression 
calculates the log-odds of seeing an outcome of 1, or in the case of the dependent variables the 
log-odds of conflict occurring. As with the more common ordinary least squares regression, 
logistic regression allows the researcher to control for the effects of potential confounding 
variables, by in effect holding those variables constant. Second, ordered logistic regression was 
used to test hypothesis three for the escalation of conflict since the dependent variable is rank 
ordered from one to five. Ordered logistic regression, is intended for analysis where the 
dependent variable is rank ordered in a finite set, and is therefore not a continuous variable. The 
ordered logistic regression model calculates the ordered log-odds of one of the higher categories 
occurring. For example, the log-odds of a high hostility level of war compared to a lower 
hostility level of threat occurring. Otherwise, the ordered logistic regression is similar to the 
logistic regression model in terms of interpretation.  
 Two models were used to test the relationship between DEI and the three dependent 
variables. First, the independent variables were used in a multivariate model individually to test 
the relationship between each independent variable and the three dependent variables. Second, 
factor analysis was used to create the DEI variable used in a separate analysis on the three 
dependent variables. So, in sum, there are six total models used in the analysis. There are three 
multivariate models that test the independent variables against each of the three dependent 
variables. In addition, there are three factor score models that test the factor score of DEI against 
each of the three dependent variables. One important note is that the three factor score models 
were used for hypothesis testing. Hypothesis one, testing for the inverse relationship between 
DEI and the onset of war, is analyzed in the first factor score model. Hypothesis two, testing for 
the inverse relationship between DEI and the onset of a MID, is analyzed in the second factor 
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score model. Hypothesis three, testing for the inverse relationship between DEI and the 
escalation of conflict, is analyzed in the third factor score model. The multivariate models were 
used to only better understand the individual effects of the independent variables.  
 Factor analysis was used to create a composite measure of DEI since the independent 
variables are correlated with each other. Since standard ordinary least squares regression can 
produce results that are misspecified when there are high levels of multicollinearity, factor 
analysis was used to create a composite score for use in analysis. In fact, the three independent 
variables in the study are operationalized as DEI, and moderate to high levels of multicollinearity 
between the independent variables supports my theoretical contention that each variable is an 
aspect of economic integration between states. The independent variables, in other words, are 
measuring different but related aspects of dyadic economic interaction. The user-written program 
Polychoric for Stata was used to create the factor score (Kolenikov 2004). This program was 
used because two of the three independent variables are dichotomous, and the standard Stata 
factor score package is meant to handle continuous variables. Only one factor score met the 
eigenvalue threshold of at least 1.0, and was the only score kept for analysis (Kennedy 2008; 
Kim and Mueller 1978). This factor represents the operationalized variable of DEI. Figure 1 
illustrates the relationships of the factor analysis model in a structural equation model format. 
Note that DEI is a latent variable and the three independent variables are observed. 
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Figure 1: Structural Equation Model for DEI Factor Score 
 
 
 The multivariate models were used to assess the individual effects of each independent 
variable on each of the three dependent variables. The multivariate models include the following 
independent variables: free trade agreements, dyadic trade density, and joint membership in 
economically-focused IGOs. Free trade agreements are measured as a dichotomous measure for 
the presence of an agreement within a dyad. Dyadic trade density is a calculated variable that 
measures the level of trade within a dyad. Joint membership in economically-focused IGOs is a 
dichotomous measure for the presence of dyadic membership in at least one of these 
organizations. These independent variables are fully explored in the next section on variables. 
Equation 1 illustrates the relationships in the multivariate model. 
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Temporal Dependence 
 A potential risk to this study is the possibility for temporal dependence among the 
dependent variables because they may be correlated over time. Temporal dependence is a 
complex problem that is especially troublesome for studies in international relations. Studies, 
like this one, that span both time and space may suffer from temporal dependence. The logic 
behind the problem is that dyadic behavior may be dependent on what happened in the past. For 
instance, if heightened hostilities exist for three years between two states, then what happens in 
the fourth year of conflict may be largely dependent on the level of conflict in the last few years. 
Using an example is useful to illustrate the problem. In the case of the conflict between the USA 
and Afghanistan during the recent Operation Enduring Freedom, the likelihood of conflict in 
2005 may largely be dependent on the level of conflict in 2004 and the previous years of conflict. 
There have been a variety of techniques used in the literature to attempt to correct for the 
potential distorting effects of temporal dependence. One of the original techniques was to simply 
cluster the standard errors at the dyad level, but it is a method of treating temporal dependence as 
a nuisance rather than attempting to interpret the effects of temporal dependence. The clustering 
technique also ignored the dynamic effects of temporal dependence and essentially did not do 
enough to correct the potentially misleading results from models suffering from temporal 
dependence.  
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 Another technique to correct for temporal dependence involves the use of creating lagged 
dependent variables. The dependent variables in the study would be lagged by one year, or some 
other year based on theory, and then those variables would be included as control variables in the 
model. In other words, the idea of lagged dependent variables is to include a variable in the 
analysis that represents the level of conflict for a previous year. The effect of the lagged 
dependent variables is that the potential distorting effect of temporal dependence is controlled; 
however, the lagged variable technique has some flaws. First, the researcher has to decide at 
what level to lag the dependent variables. A one year lag seems to be the convention, but that 
number could be incorrect especially depending on the structure of the study. Having the 
researcher determine a potentially arbitrary level of lag for the dependent variables is 
problematic. Second, the use of a single lagged variable at a certain lag year does not fully 
control for the effects of temporal dependence. In fact, the preceding years before the lag may 
actually influence the likelihood of conflict even more. As a result, using lagged dependent 
variables is one technique to control for this phenomenon, but it is not the ideal approach. 
Instead, the techniques available to researchers have improved and so has the ease of 
implementation.  
 There have been developments on the issue of temporal dependence and more advanced 
methods are available. In this study, to control for temporal dependence, I employed the time 
cubed approach. The time cubed approach is a technique where the researcher creates variables 
to control for temporal dependence, which are then included as control variables in the model 
(for an introduction and discussion of the technique and examples comparing the time cubed 
approach to other methods see Carter and Signorino 2010). Although the lagged dependent 
variable and time cubed approaches have a similar implementation in terms of including the 
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created variables in the analysis, the techniques are in fact very different. Where the lagged 
dependent variable approach uses an arbitrary time period lag, the time cubed approach uses a 
cubic polynomial method to create the time variables. The time cubed technique is extremely 
easy to implement since the researcher simply creates three variables. First, a base variable is 
created that counts the years since the last conflict occurred, which can be performed through 
built-in options in Stata or through a user-written program like BTSCS. The mathematical 
calculation for this first time variable is built on the work by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998). In 
their 1998 work, the authors illustrated how binary time-series, cross-sectional data is essentially 
hazard data (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). As a result, studies using data structured in that 
format could use hazard models or create cubic spline variables to control for temporal 
dependence. Hazard models made available a new statistical technique that scholars in 
international relations could use in their studies, and cubic splines provided a much improved 
technique for dealing with temporal dependence.  
 The problem with the cubic spline approach to control for temporal dependence, however 
is that it required the analyst to have the forethought of when the data will be influenced by time. 
In other words, the researcher would be required to select cubic knot points where the effects of 
time would be most influential. As Carter and Signorino explain, however, there is a no agreed 
upon way to choose cubic knots in international relations (Carter and Signorino 2010). Instead, 
the researcher is essentially selecting knots at random or basing their selection from previous 
research even if the data or time periods differ. The time cubed approach solves this dilemma 
with a simple mathematical technique, which leads to the second and third variables that the 
researcher creates. The second and third variables are simply the square and cube of the original 
time since the last conflict variable. The results from the time cubed approach roughly duplicate 
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the results from the cubic spline approach, and avoids the pitfalls of choosing cubic knots (Carter 
and Signorino 2010). Another benefit of the time cubed technique compared to the lagged 
dependent variable technique, is it includes multiple time periods to control for the effects of 
temporal dependence. The lagged dependent variable technique only includes one time period, if 
the technique is used in the common way, or possibly multiple arbitrary time periods. Time 
cubed is a powerful technique that is simple to implement, and in turn provides the researcher a 
method for not only controlling for temporal dependence, but for analyzing the effects as well. In 
summary, the time cubed approach is implemented by including the time since the last conflict 
within the dyad, and that time squared and cubed in the model (for a thorough and clear 
discussion of the issue of temporal dependence see Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998; Carter and 
Signorino 2010; Crescenzi and Enterline 2001; De Boef and Keele 2008). Equation 2 from 
(Carter and Signorino 2010) shows the modified logistic regression equation used to include the 
time cubed technique to control for temporal dependence: 
 
 
 
 Another potential problem with dyadic international relations data is that the standard 
errors may be correlated. As a result, the model may be misspecified and it may incorrectly 
predict outcomes (for a discussion on the use of robust standard errors with empirical 
comparisons see Zorn 2006). In addition, since standard errors are used in significance level 
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tests, the model may be too optimistic and produce results that are significant erroneously. The 
problem stems from the fact that there is correlation among the residuals. Standard error 
calculations therefore may be wrong since the assumption is that there is no correlation among 
the residuals. Robust standard errors, clustered on unique dyad identities, allows arbitrary 
correlation among the residuals for each dyad, but assumes independence between different 
dyads. For example, the dyad of USA and China would be one cluster, which would be the same 
cluster for all of the years the dyad is present in the dataset. Clustering on the dyad identity 
assumes that the relationship between USA and China is dependent throughout the years in the 
study, but that clustered dyad is independent from other dyads in the dataset. The models in this 
study, therefore, were clustered on the dyadic units to control for potential serial correlation 
among the residuals, which resulted in 19,120 clusters used in the analysis. 
 Two techniques have been used in the models in this study to control for the effects of 
temporal dependence, and for the effects of serial correlation among the residuals. Both 
potentially distorting effects are possible because of the structure of large-N dyadic datasets 
commonly employed in international relations. The time cubed technique was used to control for 
the effects of temporal dependence that may have altered the results. In addition, robust standard 
errors, clustered on the unique dyadic identities was used to control for potential effects of 
correlation among the residuals within dyads. 
Variables 
The theoretical arguments and hypotheses of this study will be tested using available data 
from various sources. The data, therefore, are derived from separate datasets each with its own 
advantages and concerns. Since my dissertation is a large-N design and includes many variables, 
each of the independent variables and control variables were retrieved from different sources. 
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The underlying theoretical reasons for using a specific variable and the coding decisions 
pertaining to the imported data are described throughout the remainder of the chapter. Data 
sources are separated into categories of dependent, independent, and control variables for clarity. 
Dependent Variables 
 To test for the potential pacifying effect of DEI on dyadic conflict, three dependent 
variables have been used to represent three different stages in dyadic conflict. The first 
dependent variable represents the onset of dyadic war, the second represents the onset of MIDs 
within a dyad, and the third represents the escalation of MIDs within a dyad. The data on conflict 
was gathered from the Maoz dataset, which represents a modified version of the original MIDs 
data available from the Correlates of War (COW) project (Maoz 2005). Other than filling in the 
dyadic MIDs data prior to 1993, the Maoz dataset includes original historical research for 
individual observations to improve clarity. MIDs data from Maoz covers the dyad-years from 
1816 to 2001, but this study will only use data from 1965 to 2001 because of the time constraints 
of the independent variables. The Maoz dataset contains variables already coded for each of the 
three dependent variables. This study adopted the same coding decisions used in the Maoz 
dataset to maintain the standard convention. The dataset contains a variable for new wars that 
was used as the first dependent variable for the onset of war in this study. New wars are distinct 
in that only the first year of a given war is coded, while subsequent years of the same war are 
coded as if there is no war. This is an important distinction that will be explained later in this 
section. The Maoz dataset also includes a measure for new MIDs which was used as the second 
dependent variable for the onset of MIDs in this study. The third dependent variable on the 
escalation of MIDs is included in the Maoz dataset as the highest recorded hostility level within a 
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dyad in a given year. The coding decisions of the dependent variables will be described further 
below. 
Onset of War 
 The first dependent variable represents the onset of dyadic war. The Maoz data for the 
onset of war was coded as a dichotomous dummy variable where dyads that engaged in a new 
war in a given year were coded as 1, while dyads that were absent of war or had an ongoing war 
were coded as 0. War, as defined by the COW project, “must involve sustained combat, 
involving organized armed forces, resulting in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related combatant 
fatalities within a twelve month period” (Small and Singer 1982).  
Onset of MIDs 
 The second dependent variable represents the onset of MIDs within a dyad. The Maoz data 
for the onset of MIDs was coded as a dichotomous dummy variable where dyads that engaged in 
a new MID in a given year were coded as 1, while dyads that were absent of a MID or had an 
ongoing MID were coded as 0. 
Escalation of MIDs 
 The third dependent variable represents the escalation of MIDs within a dyad. The Maoz 
data on hostility levels was used to measure escalatory behavior. The data is coded on a scale 
from one to five. A hostility level of one represents no conflict, level two is for threat, level three 
is for the display of force, level four is for the use of force, and level five represents interstate 
war. Although multiple levels of hostility in a given year may be reached within a dyad, only the 
highest level of hostility is coded. For example, if a dyad engaged in a display of force early in a 
given year and then engaged in a use of force later in the year, then the only hostility level 
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recorded that year would be the use of force. Table 1 lists the coding decisions and contents of 
the three dependent variables. 
 
Table 1: Dependent Variables 
 
 
 There is a clear distinction between the third dependent variable on escalation and the first 
two dependent variables on war and MIDs, respectively. The third dependent variable for 
conflict escalation includes both new and ongoing conflicts. In other words, the escalation of 
MIDs variable is coded to include all of the available annual data on hostility levels, which 
includes new heightened hostilities and ones that last for years within a dyad. The first two 
dependent variables, on the other hand, on war and MIDs are coded to only include new conflicts 
that occur within a dyad. Thus, the first two dependent variables are distinguished as the onset of 
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war and the onset of MIDs. The difference may seem subtle, but the consequences of this coding 
decision may severely impact the results.  
 There is a theoretical reason for coding the dependent variables in this way. The inclusion 
of ongoing conflict distorts not only the theoretical contentions, but also has serious implications 
on the results of the models. For instance, a given independent variable may have a strong 
relationship with reducing the likelihood of new conflicts emerging within a dyad, while 
simultaneously having very little influence on ending a war that is already in progress. Similarly, 
an independent variable that is shown to end hostilities within a dyad may do little to prevent the 
occurrence of new conflicts in the future. The distinction, therefore, is both necessary and 
prudent to ensure that the results provided in the analysis are measuring the phenomena 
appropriately. Failure to separate new conflicts from ongoing conflicts can, at a minimum, inflate 
statistical significant results thereby misleading the researcher to make false conclusions.  
 In one comprehensive survey of the literature in international relations on conflict, the 
authors lay out the theoretical reasons for distinguishing between new and ongoing conflicts 
(Bennett and Stam 2003). Bennett and Stam argue that there is a theoretical difference between 
the onset of conflict and the continuation of conflict, and warn researchers to consider this 
difference in developing their models. For instance, Bennett and Stam argue that a phenomenon 
that starts a new war may have a different effect on the war continuing into the following year 
(2003). If this is the case, then models that do not differentiate between new and ongoing 
conflicts could suffer from either misspecification or inflated results. One reason is that the 
number of wars and MIDs is drastically reduced if only new conflicts are used in the analysis. 
Another reason is related to the researcher’s theoretical relationship since one could question 
whether the model is having an effect on increasing or decreasing the likelihood of conflict or the 
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likelihood of continuing the conflict, the effect on the former is a much different question than 
the latter. To ensure the theorized relationships are accurate in analyses, researchers must 
distinguish between new and ongoing wars. The theoretical relationship under examination in 
this study is that DEI has an inverse relationship with the onset of war, the onset of MIDs, and 
the escalation of MIDs. For this reason, the war and MIDs dependent variables were coded as 
new conflicts to reflect this distinction, while the escalation of conflict dependent variables was 
coded to include new and ongoing conflicts. The escalation of conflict dependent variable was 
coded as new and ongoing conflicts because the changes in hostility level may change during a 
MID. For example, a MID may last five years and in each year the hostility level could range 
from a threat to an interstate war. This level of variation is valuable to understand how DEI 
affects the hostility levels within dyads. The first two dependent variables on the onset of war 
and MIDs, on the other hand, would only be coded as a new conflict in the first year and ignore 
the remainder of the conflict. For example, a five-year war would be coded as a war in the first 
year only to signify it as the onset of the war. In terms of coding decisions, the onset of conflict 
was coded as 1 in the first year of conflict, while the subsequent years of the same conflict were 
coded as 0. In addition, any years of peace were also coded as 0. These coding decisions are 
shown below in table 2. In the following table, the USA-Iraq dyad is used as an example to 
illustrate how coding only new disputes changes the total number of recorded disputes for use in 
analysis. 
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Table 2: Onset v. Ongoing Coding Decisions - USA-Iraq Example 
 
 
 As shown in table 2, by coding only new disputes the total number of disputes for use in 
analysis is reduced by half. As a result, for the purposes of this study, there were only seven new 
disputes in the USA-Iraq dyad from 1985 to 2001. Only these seven disputes were used in the 
statistical analysis for the onset of MIDs, or the onset of war in the cases that the disputes 
reached that level of hostility. For the conflict escalation variable, however, the ongoing dispute 
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coding was used because the variable is designed to measure annual changes in hostility levels 
regardless if there was a new dispute or not. 
Independent Variables 
 There are three independent variables in this study which capture different aspects of 
economic integration. The first independent variable is the presence of an FTA within the dyad, 
the second is the presence of joint membership in economically-focused IGOs, and the third is 
high levels of dyadic trade density. From a theoretical perspective, each of the three independent 
variables is explained below. In addition, the coding decisions used to create each variable is 
detailed. For hypothesis testing DEI has been operationalized as a factor score based on these 
three independent variables. The creation of the DEI factor score was discussed earlier. 
Free Trade Agreements 
 Free trade agreements are arrangements where “governments eliminate tariffs on goods 
entering their markets from their FTA partners” while simultaneously maintaining autonomous 
tariffs with non-FTA partners (Oatley 2012). FTAs tend to be bilateral agreements where two 
states agree to trade specified goods without artificial government interference. I argue that when 
countries have committed to a bilateral FTA, then those countries may be less likely to break that 
trade agreement to engage in conflict. An FTA, therefore, is a consideration that must be 
examined in rational calculations for conflict. If nothing else, the presence of an FTA adds a 
level of interdependence within that dyad that must be consciously broken if the dyad were to 
engage in conflict. For instance, trade linkages “increase the opportunity cost of war as a military 
conflict would destroy those gains by destroying trade” (Martin 2010). In other words, FTAs 
increase the exit costs within a given dyad. Economic leaders and multinational firms, whose 
international business may be drastically affected by the removal of an FTA, may attempt to 
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persuade political leaders to avoid conflict if possible. In addition, FTAs create lasting economic 
linkages where economies within the dyad may become dependent on one another because the 
economic success of a country may depend on free trade with a partner country. Breaking an 
FTA to engage in conflict, therefore, may substantially impact a country’s economy by 
disrupting trade flows the economy relies on, and by incurring exit costs. If this is the case, then 
one might expect that FTAs play a part in reducing the likelihood of dyadic conflict if countries 
are not willing to break the trading agreement to engage in conflict. In other words, the countries 
in the dyad may have economic incentives to not engage in conflict with their FTA partners. 
FTAs, therefore, are a form of high exit costs since breaking these economic relationships could 
have dramatic effects on state’s economy (Crescenzi 2005).  
 Data on FTAs between states is available from an online dataset (De Sousa 2011). The 
temporal coverage of the data includes all FTAs recorded with the World Trade Organization 
from 1958 to 2008. This dyadic dataset includes a coded dichotomous variable on the presence 
of an FTA or not within a given dyad. FTA data was coded as 1 to represent the presence of an 
FTA for a given dyad-year, and was coded as 0 to represent the lack of an FTA. 
Dyadic Trade Density 
 The debate over trade has focused on the volume of trade between two states and the effect 
it has on conflict. Specifically, major authors in the trade literature have used a ratio of bilateral 
trade and gross domestic product to measure the level of dependence a state’s economy has on 
trade relations (see Bliss and Russett 1998; Oneal and Russett 1999, 1999; Oneal and Russett 
1997). I argue that a trade dependence ratio alone does not reflect the type of relationship I want 
to examine between two states. Instead I will calculate a variable to measure the density of trade 
as a ratio to the total trade of each state within the dyad. In addition, it has been argued that the 
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ratio of trade to economic output within a country is a valid measure of economic openness in 
terms of both sensitivity and vulnerability interdependence, however Mansfield and Pollins 
disagree (Mansfield and Pollins 2003). Instead, the authors contend that economic openness is a 
useful measure of sensitivity interdependence since it captures the extent the economies are 
intertwined, but that openness as an indicator of vulnerability interdependence can be questioned 
on three grounds (Mansfield and Pollins 2003). First, the size of trade as a percentage of national 
income may not reflect the costs to the states if their economic relations were disrupted. Second, 
the ratio tends to be highly correlated with each state’s economic size. Third, the cost conception 
in such openness measures is too restrictive. Dyadic trade density, used in this study, however 
does not suffer from these critiques since it is not measuring the level of dependence a state’s 
economy has on trade with a dyadic partner or the level of openness in the economy. Instead, 
dyadic trade density is a measure of trade denseness in terms of the total amount of a state’s trade 
that is linked to its dyadic partner’s total trade. As a result, the size of one dyadic partner’s 
economy does not influence the dyadic trade density statistic, nor could the statistic be correlated 
with the size of a state’s economy, since the economic size is not part of the measure. Dyadic 
trade density, therefore, is operationalized as the ratio of bilateral trade to the total trade of each 
country within the dyad. This variable measures the density of trade within the dyad and allows 
for comparisons across dyads.  
 Data on dyadic trade density is available from the COW project annually for each dyad-
year (Barbieri 2008). Data is available annually from 1870 to 2006. The volume of dyadic trade 
flows will be used to calculate the density of trade within a given dyad. Data on annual trade 
flows will be combined for both countries within a given dyad. The combined bilateral trade 
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flows will be used to calculate a ratio from the total monadic trade flows of each country.5 Since 
some dyads do not have trading relationships, there is a chance for a dyad to have zero dyadic 
trade density. There are two situations where this could occur. First, and the more likely 
scenario, is where each state in a given dyad will have trading partners with states outside of the 
dyad, but they simply do not trade with each other. Second, it is possible that the states within a 
dyad do not trade at all, although very unlikely. In each situation, the calculation I proposed for 
dyadic trade density will result in zero, since zero divided by any number is zero. This is not a 
theoretical problem because a dyad exhibiting zero trade density is not arbitrary since zero means 
something. It does, however, pose a mathematical problem when you try to take the natural 
logarithm function of a zero. The natural logarithm of dyadic trade density is used since the 
numbers are not normally distributed. Instead, they are skewed with a number of dyads having a 
ratio near ten percent, while others hover close to zero. As a result, I have added a constant 
number of 0.01 to all dyads to correct the mathematical issue with logarithms (for a discussion 
on the use of constants to calculate logarithms see Pampel 2000). The numbers are essentially 
unchanged and the distribution remains intact. Equation 3 below illustrates the proposed 
calculation of the dyadic trade density variable: 
 
 
 
                                                
5 Bilateral flows are comprised of bilateral imports and exports. 
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Joint Membership in Economically-Focused IGOs 
 According to neo-liberal institutionalism, states can work towards peace by improving 
information about other states through international institutions (Keohane and Nye 1989, 2012; 
Nye 2002). The joint membership in economically-focused IGOs variable is designed to capture 
the cooperation activity among states from the increased chances for communication between 
dyadic partners. Since the variable measures the presence of joint membership in these 
institutions, the idea is that if both states in a dyad are members of at least one economically-
focused IGO, then they have more opportunities to communicate and cooperate with one 
another. In addition, members of such IGOs are likely to be more committed to international 
economic cooperation than non-members, and those members understand the benefits of 
international economic integration. Joint membership in an IGO between two states, therefore, 
should increase information about each member state and reduce the likelihood of conflict. The 
possibility of improving information about other states plays a vital role in neo-liberal 
institutionalism. As opposed to the realist paradigm, which considers information about other 
states untrustworthy, neo-liberal institutionalism contends that states can improve the 
information about other states to a point where the intentions of other states can be trusted to 
some extent. If this is the case, then international institutions are the mechanism through which 
information can be improved. In the interest of this study, I argue that economically-focused 
IGOs play an important role in both improving information about partner states’ intentions, and 
in coordinating a deeper economic relationship.  
 Data on IGO membership is available from the COW project (Pevehouse 2004). The data 
contains information about a given state’s IGO membership for each year from 1965 to 2005, 
with data prior to 1965 available in five-year increments. The extensive codebook associated 
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with this dataset was used to make a list of all IGOs I considered to be economically focused.6 
Dyads were formed based on year and the presence of joint IGO membership or not. The data 
was coded as a dichotomous variable as 1 to represent the presence of joint membership in an 
economically-focused IGO for a given dyad-year, and coded as 0 to represent no joint 
membership. Table 3 lists the coding decisions and contents of the three independent variables. 
 
Table 3: Independent Variables 
 
 
Control Variables 
 There are eleven variables used in this study to control for potential confounding effects 
and spurious relationships that are based on previous research in the literature on conflict. The 
control variables represent the culmination of important work performed by a number of scholars 
which have all shown that these phenomena affect the likelihood of conflict in some manner. 
Controlling for these effects, therefore, improves the quality of the results in this study by 
                                                
6 The full list of IGOs included in the analysis is provided in the appendix. 
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ensuring that there are not extraneous phenomena affecting the relationship between DEI and 
conflict. The theoretical relationships and the coding decisions for each control variable are 
below.  
Contiguity 
 Research has shown that war between dyads that share a land border, or a narrow water 
border are more likely to engage in conflict (Geller and Singer 1998). Literature on contiguous 
states is consistent about the effects on conflict. Some studies provide evidence about the 
increased likelihood of escalation to the level of war between contiguous dyads (see Mihalka 
1976; Moul 1988). Other research indicates that contiguous dyads are significantly more war 
prone than non-contiguous dyads (see Bremer 1992; Weede 1975). This study will control for 
the effects of contiguity within dyads, especially since common borders may be related to 
economic integration.  
 Data is available on contiguity from the COW project (Stinnett 2002). The data was coded 
as a dichotomous variable where noncontiguous dyads were coded as 0, and dyads that share a 
common land border, or have a water border less than 150 miles were coded as 1. Similar 
variable construction can be found in previous literature (see Gochman 1990).  
Distance 
 The evidence on the distance, or the proximity, between states has consistently illustrated 
the effects it has on the likelihood of conflict. Specifically, the distance between a dyad is 
inversely related to conflict (see Geller and Singer 1998; Gleditsch 1995). Furthermore, dyads 
which engaged in conflict were "geographically more proximate" than non-warring dyads 
(Garnham 1976). In another study, the authors found that the "average distance between capitals 
of warring dyads was significantly less than the average capital distance between non-warring 
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dyads" (Gleditsch 1975). For this study, a distance variable will be used to control for the effects 
of proximity at the dyadic level on the likelihood of conflict.  
 Data on the distance between capital cities was used and is available at the dyadic level 
(Bennett 2000; Gleditsch and Ward 2001). Since the distance between capital cities can vary so 
widely, the natural logarithm function of the distance is used.  
Military balance 
 The balance of military capabilities between two states has been examined in the literature, 
and the evidence is clear and convincing. The distribution of, and shifts in, capabilities within a 
dyad are a "principal factor associated with interstate conflict" (Geller and Singer 1998). There 
are two competing theoretical frameworks related to military balance which revolve around the 
issues of static and dynamic capability distribution. The static, or stable capability, distribution 
theoretical framework focuses on the competing realities of dyadic parity versus preponderance. 
Theories following this framework study relationships at the dyadic level. For example, theories 
of balance of power and power preponderance illustrate the effects military capabilities have on 
the likelihood of conflict (Blainey 1973; Waltz 1979; Wright 1964). On the other hand, the 
dynamic or unstable capability distribution theoretical framework focuses on large shifts or 
transitions in the structure of great powers, rather than on dyadic relationships. For example, 
dynamic studies include power transition theorists (Organski 1958; Organski 1980), hegemonic 
decline theory (Gilpin 1981), and long cycle theories (Modelski 1983; Thompson 1988). The 
static theoretical framework will be used for this study to control for effects of military balance 
on interstate conflict.  
 The data for this control variable is available from the COW project. Data on the dyadic 
distribution of capabilities to represent a military balance (parity) or an imbalance 
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(preponderance) using the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score calculation was 
used (Bennett 2000; Singer 1972, 1987; Small 1969). Thus, a dichotomous variable was created 
where dyadic parity was coded as 1, and dyadic preponderance was coded as 0. Dyadic parity is 
coded as 1 because a dyad in parity is associated with a higher likelihood of conflict (Geller and 
Singer 1998). The dyadic CINC scores were calculated by summing the data for each of the six 
capability components for each state within a dyad in a given year, averaging across the six 
components, and finally calculating each state's share of the pooled capabilities in the dyad.7 For 
example, if state A had 60 percent of the shared capabilities, then state B must have 40 percent. 
The threshold used to determine if a dyad was in parity or not was adopted from previous 
research. A threshold of 20 percent was used, by coding dyads that differed in capabilities by 20 
percent or more as being in a state of preponderance for a given year (for a discussion of dyadic 
CINC scores and this threshold see Organski 1980, 47-49). 
Nuclear weapons 
 The evidence in the literature on the relationship between nuclear weapons and conflict 
behavior is clear. Two findings illustrate the different effects of nuclear and non-nuclear status. 
For instance, non-nuclear states are not impeded by nuclear weapons in escalating behavior 
(Geller 1990). On the other hand, dual nuclear dyads are less likely to escalate to the intervention 
level (Bueno de Mesquita and Riker 1982). Conflicts between nuclear states had “different 
escalatory patterns” than conflicts between dyads where at least one state did not possess nuclear 
weapons (Geller 2012). Evidence indicates that states with nuclear weapons are more willing to 
escalate conflict. Interestingly, state behavior follows the stability-instability paradox which 
states that nations will avoid full nuclear war in dual nuclear dyads, but are more likely to 
                                                
7 The six components consist of military personnel, military expenditure, energy consumption, total population, 
urban population, and iron and steel production. 
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escalate conflict at lower levels. In fact, dual nuclear dyads "had approximately a seven times 
greater probability of escalating" conflict than did dyads where neither state possessed nuclear 
weapons (Geller 1990, 2012). The theoretical framework that relates to this study falls under the 
risk manipulation, escalating, and limited war theories in the nuclear weapons literature.  
 Data is available on the nuclear status of states from their initial acquisition of the weapons 
(Jo and Gartzke 2007). The data was coded as two dichotomous variables representing a dual 
nuclear dyad and the other a dyad where at least one state possesses nuclear weapons. The first 
control variable was coded as 1 for a dyad where both states possess nuclear weapons, and was 
coded as 0 for dyads where neither state possessed nuclear weapons. The second control variable 
was coded as 1 for dyads where one state possessed nuclear weapons, and was coded as 0 where 
neither state possessed nuclear weapons. Information about the possession of nuclear weapons 
was used to code the data accordingly based on the year of acquisition. Any state that obtained 
nuclear weapons would possess those nuclear weapons for each subsequent year. For example, 
the United States developed nuclear weapons in 1945 and would be coded as a nuclear state 
beginning in 1945 until the present. Or, as some have said, "once you got, you always got" (Jo 
and Gartzke 2007). The status of nuclear weapon possession, therefore, was filled in for all 
subsequent years after the year of acquisition.  
Alliances 
 There is an interesting literature on the relationship between alliance membership and the 
likelihood of conflict. Research has revolved around two schools of thought which have 
examined alliances within dyads and alliances external to dyads. In the literature on alliances 
within dyads conventional wisdom suggests that alliance membership should reduce the 
likelihood of conflict. Some argue, however, that alliance membership can actually increase the 
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likelihood of war, which seems counterintuitive, but is supported in bivariate results (Bremer 
1992; Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Ray 1990). On the other hand, the proposition that alliance 
membership increases the war-proness of a dyad is refuted in multivariate results (Bremer 1992; 
Weede 1975). Specifically, Bremer finds that there is an interaction effect with the level of 
militarization in a given dyad and the relationship of alliance membership and war. In the 
literature on alliances external to dyads the evidence is clear and consistent. Dyads with only one 
state having membership in an external alliance are more war-prone, while dyads with both 
states having membership in an external alliance are less war-prone (see Kim 1991; Mihalka 
1976; Siverson 1984; Weede 1975, 1989).  
 Data on alliances was obtained from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions 
(ATOP) project (Leeds 2002). The ATOP dataset included information about alliances through 
the year 2001, as opposed to the COW project’s alliance data that stopped at the year 2000. The 
data for within dyad alliances was coded as a dichotomous variable where dyads engaged in a 
bilateral alliance were coded as 1, while dyads without bilateral alliances were coded as 0. The 
data for alliances external to dyads was coded as a dichotomous variable where dyads with both 
states having membership in an external alliance were coded as 1, and dyads with neither state 
having membership in an external alliance were coded as 0. 
Absence of territorial conflict 
 The relationship of territory and conflict has been examined in the literature from the 
perspective of territorial change. Specifically, territorial changes are viewed as the outcomes 
from territorial disputes between states. The territorial change, however, may either further 
escalate hostilities or may resolve the territorial dispute. Some argue that territory is a principal 
issue of war, at least until World War II (Holsti 1991; Weede 1973). Empirical research has 
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focused on the effects of territorial disputes and the likelihood of generating conflict (see Diehl 
and Goertz 1991, 1991; Goertz 1990, 1992; Kacowicz 1994). For example, one study finds that a 
third of territorial changes involved conflict prior to World War II, while that number is smaller 
since 1945 (Goertz 1992). Furthermore, Goertz and Diehl found that almost 40 percent of the 
members involved in a territorial change engage in a MID within 30 years (1992). Territorial 
conflict will be controlled in this study to ensure that lasting disputes between states will not 
affect the economic integration relationship under examination.  
 Data on territorial conflict is available from the COW project, territorial change dataset 
(Tir et al. 1998). The data was coded as a dichotomous variable where dyads that involve a 
territorial conflict were coded as 1, while dyads that are absent of territorial conflict were coded 
as 0.  
Regime Type 
 The literature on the democratic peace has shown that regime types matter, and certain 
regime types are more likely to engage in conflict. Specifically, the democratic peace literature 
has found that regime types within a given dyad are strongly related with the probability of 
conflict. For instance, the democratic peace tells us that a dyad of two non-democratic states is 
40 times more likely to engage in war than democratic dyads (Bremer 1993). Thus, the regime 
types within the dyads under study will be controlled for to avoid any confounding effects on the 
probability of conflict.  
 Data on regime types is available from the Polity IV dataset which provides information on 
the categorical regime types for all states within this study. Data was coded according to the 
regime categories suggested by the authors of the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2011). 
The polity scores were converted into three categories where scores from -10 to -6 are 
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autocracies, scores from -5 to +5 are anocracies, and scores from +6 to +10 are democracies. 
This information was converted into two separate dichotomous variables at the dyadic level. The 
first variable is coded for dual democracies, where 1 is used for a dual democracy dyad and 0 is 
used for a dyad where at least one state is not a democracy. The second variable is coded for dual 
autocracies, where 1 is used for a dual autocracy dyad and 0 is used for a dyad where at least on 
state is not an autocracy. The variables were coded in this manner to be consistent with the 
prevailing research about regime type and conflict, where dual democratic dyads tend to be more 
peaceful than dual autocratic dyads.  
Cultural Distance 
 A variety of studies have used cultural distance measures to understand the relationship it 
may have with conflict and other aspects of political unrest. Cultural distance measures include 
variables that operationalize the realities of cultural and ethnic divisions and similarities. For 
instance, there are studies on the relationship between ethnic or cultural divisions and the 
likelihood of conflict (Collier 2001; J. Fearon, and D. Laitin 2003; Hibbs 1973; Horowitz 1985; 
Powell 1982; VanHanen 1999). One notable study in international relations focused on the 
relationship of cultural differences and war (Huntington 1996). Huntington argued that the future 
of conflict would occur between different civilizations, or major cultural groups. According to 
Huntington, interstate rivalries would be less important than divisions between global ethnic 
groups. Other studies have considered ethnic divisions as a predictive variable in regime changes 
(Przeworski 2001). While some examine the roles of ethnic groups and political upheavals 
(Dudley 1998; Fearon 1999; Gurr 1993, 1997; Lindstrom 1995). In addition, Ken Waltz argues, 
“the fiercest civil wars and the bloodiest international [conflicts] have been fought within arenas 
populated by highly similar people whose affairs had become quite closely knit together” (Waltz 
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1970, 205) quoted in (McMillan 1997, 41). Based on this literature, there is evidence that ethnic 
differences may have an effect on conflict. Cultural distance, therefore, will be used as a control 
variable to ensure that ethnic differences will not have a confounding effect on the likelihood of 
conflict. Since the unit of analysis of this study is at the dyadic level, the cultural distance 
between countries in a given dyad may have an effect on the likelihood of conflict.  
 Data is available for the cultural composition of each country from a variety of sources 
(Ellingsen 2000; J. D. Fearon 2003; State.gov 2012). The data categorizes each country’s 
cultural majority based on the largest ethnic group present. The dataset provided by Ellingsen 
was used as the main source of information. This data was already temporally structured for a 
majority of the years used in this study. Where information was lacking, the dataset provided by 
Fearon was used to fill in the gaps. A majority of the missing information was found in Fearon's 
dataset. The primary logic for not using Fearon's data alone was that his data provided only static 
snapshots of the cultural identity of states. Since Ellingsen’s data listed the cultural identity of 
each state by year, it was used as the primary data source. Where information was lacking 
altogether, the U.S. State Department website was used to fill in a handful of missing cultural 
identities. The data was converted into a dyadic dataset and was used to construct a dichotomous 
variable. The dummy variable was coded as 1 for countries that share an ethnic similarity, and 
was coded as 0 if the countries do not share an ethnic similarity. Table 4 lists the coding 
decisions and contents of the eleven control variables. 
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Table 4: Control Variables 
 
 
 In conclusion, the focus of this chapter was to lay out the research design of my 
dissertation by highlighting the design of the study, the methodology used to test the theorized 
relationships, and to discuss the variables used in constructing the dataset. In the following 
chapter, the results from these designed tests are illustrated and discussed.   
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CHAPTER 5 RESULTS 
 The results of my dissertation are discussed and interpreted in this chapter. First, the 
modeled statistical findings about the relationships between DEI and conflict are illustrated and 
explained in detail. Each model is examined to highlight the important findings and how they 
should be interpreted. In addition, a section is dedicated to the discussion of the findings and the 
formal hypothesis testing results. The results are also subjected to predictive modeling to 
understand how a wide range of DEI levels may affect the likelihood of dyadic conflict. The 
results are also placed in the larger context of the debate over the relationship between 
economics and conflict. Finally, the models are treated to a series of robustness checks, to assess 
whether the findings will remain consistent under different scenarios. Overall, the results 
indicated below are highly supportive of the hypothesized propositions, and are surprisingly 
robust. In fact, the findings show that high levels of DEI do have a pacifying effect on dyadic 
conflict, specifically the onset and escalation of MIDs. The inverse relationship between DEI and 
conflict is not only strong and statistically significant, but it is also robust against a battery of 
robustness tests. The results of my dissertation follow below.  
 The results from the full models in the study are presented below in tables 5, 6, and 7. Each 
of the three tables presents two separate models used to test the indicated dependent variable. In 
other words, the multivariate model results and the factor score model results are combined in 
each of the three tables, based on the dependent variable. So, there are three tables with the full 
results for this study, with one table for each of the three dependent variables. In each of the 
three results tables, the multivariate model appears first on the left, while the factor score model 
appears on the right of the table. The multivariate model measures the effects of the three 
independent variables on the examined dependent variable indicated in that table. The factor 
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score model measures the effects of the factor score variable of DEI on the examined dependent 
variable indicated in that table. Note that the factor score model results were used to test the three 
hypotheses on each of the dependent variables. The multivariate model results were used to 
better understand the relationships between the independent variables and the dependent 
variables. The onset of war dependent variable results for both the multivariate and factor score 
model are listed in table 5, where the factor score model was used to test the first hypothesis. The 
onset of MIDs dependent variable results for both the multivariate and factor score model are 
listed in table 6, where the factor score model was used to test the second hypothesis. The 
escalation of MIDs dependent variables results for both the multivariate and factor score model 
are listed in table 7, where the factor score model was used to test the third hypothesis.  
 The layout of the results tables is consistent for the three multivariate and three factor score 
models. The dependent variable examined is indicated in the title of the table. The independent 
variables are listed first under the predictors heading. The control variables are then listed next. 
At the bottom of the control variables section, however, there are three variables generated from 
the time cubed approach. The time cubed technique was discussed in the research design chapter, 
and was used to control for the effects of temporal dependence. The three variables, therefore, 
are generated using the procedure as discussed. The columns of each table are separated by the 
model type, with three columns for the multivariate model and three for the factor score model. 
The first column for each model lists the coefficients in the standard log-odds units generated 
from logistic regression. Once again, logistic regression was employed since the dependent 
variables are dichotomous for the onset of war and the onset of MIDs. Ordered logistic 
regression was used for the escalation of MIDs dependent variable, but the coefficients have the 
same interpretation. The coefficients indicate the level of increase in the predicted log-odds in 
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the dependent variable equaling 1 that would be predicted by a 1 unit increase in the independent 
variable, holding all other variables constant. The direction and strength of the coefficients, 
however, are indicated similarly to the results from OLS regression. First, the direction of the 
relationship is indicated by the sign of the coefficient, where negative coefficients indicate an 
inverse relationship. For instance, when an independent variable with a negative coefficient 
increases by one unit, the dependent variable decreases by the amount of the indicated 
coefficient. Second, the strength of the relationship is indicated by the value of the coefficient, 
and whether it is statistically significant or not is illustrated with star symbols that represent the 
different p-value levels, which will be discussed later. The second column for each model lists 
the robust standard error values, which were clustered on the dyad identity, for each coefficient. 
The third column for each model includes a calculated statistic to aid in the interpretation of the 
coefficients. Since the interpretation of log-odds units is difficult to make the differences 
meaningful in one's mind, the percentage change in the odds is also included in each table. This 
statistic is calculated using the odds ratio produced in logistic regression in Stata. The odds ratio 
is interpreted as the predicted change in odds for a one unit increase in the independent variable. 
To calculate the percentage change in odds you first subtract 1 from the odds ratio, and then 
multiply that value by 100. The percentage change in odds statistic, therefore, is interpreted as 
every unit increase in a given independent variable is associated with a certain percentage change 
in the odds of the dependent variable occurring. The percentage change in the odds statistic is 
useful to aid in the interpretation of the relationships indicated by the coefficients. A percentage 
change in odds, therefore, is more intuitive than a coefficient defined in terms of the changes in 
the log-odds units.  
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 Located at the bottom of table 5, 6, and 7 are statistics used to measure the strength and 
predictive quality of the models. First, each table indicates the number of observations included 
in the model. Note that all six models, three multivariate and three factor score models, include 
all 479,179 observations contained in the dataset. The second statistic is the degrees of freedom 
which is a count of the number of variables included in the model. The third statistic is the chi-
square value, which taken with the associated probability value is important. The p-value for the 
chi-square statistic is indicated by the number of stars, in similar fashion to each of the 
coefficients. Each model has a different chi-square statistic and associated p-value, which 
examined together provides a test if the model is statistically significant or not. The p-value of 
the chi-square statistic is interpreted as the probability of obtaining the given chi-square value if 
the null hypothesis were true, or simply if there was no effect of the independent variables on the 
dependent variable. The fourth statistic included with each results table is the proportional 
reduction in error measure, which I will discuss later. The log likelihood statistic has no intrinsic 
interpretation for the model, but can be used in calculations to compare nested models. The final 
statistic included at the bottom of each results table is the pseudo R-squared (pseudo R2) 
measure. The pseudo R2 should not be mistaken with the more common R-square calculated 
with standard OLS regression, which calculates the proportion of variance explained by the 
predictor variables, since the pseudo R2 has no agreed upon interpretation. The pseudo R2 
statistic, however, may be useful in comparing models from the same dataset on the same 
dependent variable, and it is generally accepted that larger pseudo R2 numbers indicate that more 
variance is explained. As mentioned, the fourth statistic is the proportional reduction in error 
measure that deserves a separate explanation. 
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 A proportional reduction in error (PRE) statistic is included at the bottom of each results 
table for the models. PRE provides a method for calculating the improved or worsened level of 
prediction of the proposed model compared to the natural expectation. In other words, what the 
expected chance of the phenomenon occurring is without studying it formally. A positive PRE 
statistic is desirable for a proposed model since it indicates that the model is an improvement in 
prediction over the natural expectation of the phenomenon. A negative PRE statistic, on the other 
hand, indicates that the proposed model is actually worse at predicting the studied phenomenon 
then would otherwise be expected naturally. All six of the models in this study have a positive 
PRE statistic, indicating that each model is an improvement over the natural expectation. This is 
an interesting statistic since it calculates the relative value of a model by indicating the change in 
predictive capabilities.  
 The various levels of significance are indicated as a footnote for each of the three results 
tables. To ensure conservative results in terms of conclusions about the relationship between DEI 
and conflict, the alpha level used for hypothesis testing was .05 in this study. Each p-value is 
illustrated using the convention of stars, where .05 is one star (*), .01 is two stars (**), and .001 
is three stars (***). Although the .05 significance level was used in hypothesis testing, the p-
value of .10 is also indicated in the results using the carrot (^) symbol to illustrate the variables 
that are more important in the model. In addition, the p-values in this study are one-tailed since 
the research question and hypotheses examine an inverse relationship where the likelihood of 
conflict decreases as the level of DEI increases.  
 The actual results tables for this study follow below. Each of the results from the models 
will be presented and key points of interest will be highlighted, however, the full discussion and 
hypothesis testing will follow in the subsequent section. First, table 5 will be examined which 
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includes the results for the multivariate and factor score models on the onset of war dependent 
variable. The factor score model in this first table was used to test the first hypothesis on whether 
there is an inverse relationship between DEI and the onset of war. The multivariate model will be 
considered first. The multivariate model itself is statistically significant with the probability of 
the chi-square value occurring if the null hypothesis were true being less than .001, which means 
that the independent variables do have an effect on the dependent variable. The PRE value for 
the multivariate model is 1.78 percent, indicating that the model improves the level of prediction 
compared to the natural prediction of the onset of war. As theorized, the FTA and dyadic trade 
density variables are inversely related to the onset of war, but the joint economic IGO 
membership variable is shown to have a positive effect. Out of the main theoretical variables, 
however, only dyadic trade density has a statistically significant relationship with the onset of 
war. With a p-value less than .05, dyadic trade density reduces the odds of the onset of war by 
approximately 64 percent. In other words, dyadic trade density is shown to have an inverse 
relationship, or pacifying effect on the onset of war, holding the other variables constant.  
 The factor score model in table 5 is statistically significant with the probability of the chi-
square value occurring if the null hypothesis were true being less than .001, which means that the 
factor score variable DEI does have an effect on the onset of war. The PRE value for the factor 
score model is 1.72 percent, indicating that the model improves the level of prediction compared 
to the natural prediction of the onset of war. As theorized, the DEI variable is inversely related to 
the onset of war. The DEI variable, however, does not meet the alpha level threshold of this 
study of having a p-value of less than .05. Instead, the DEI variable has a p-value less than .1, but 
greater than .05. As a result, the variable is shown to have a mild pacifying effect on the onset of 
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war of roughly 22 percent while holding the other variables constant; however, the DEI variable 
cannot be labeled as being statistically significant by the requirements in this study.  
 
Table 5: Logistic Regression Models for the Onset of War 
 
 
 Table 6 includes the results for the multivariate and factor score models on the onset of 
MIDs dependent variable. The factor score model in this second table was used to test the second 
hypothesis on whether there is an inverse relationship between DEI and the onset of MIDs. The 
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multivariate model will be considered first. The multivariate model itself is statistically 
significant with the probability of the chi-square value occurring if the null hypothesis were true 
being less than .001, which means that the independent variables do have an effect on the 
dependent variable. The PRE value for the multivariate model is 4.07 percent, indicating that the 
model improves the level of prediction compared to the natural prediction of the onset of war. As 
theorized, the FTA, dyadic trade density, and joint economic IGO membership variables are 
inversely related to the onset of MIDs. In addition, the FTA and joint economic IGO 
membership variables have statistically significant relationships with the onset of MIDs. FTAs 
have a strong inverse relationship with the onset of MIDs with a p-value less than .001, and 
reduce the odds of the onset of MIDs by approximately 68 percent. Joint economic IGO 
membership also has an inverse relationship with the onset of MIDs with a p-value less than .01, 
and reduces the odds of the onset of MIDs by roughly 27 percent. FTAs and dyads having joint 
membership in economically-focused IGOs are shown to have an inverse relationship, or 
pacifying effect on the onset of MIDS, holding other variables constant. Dyadic trade density, on 
the other hand, is not statistically significant even though the indicated direction of the 
coefficient is inversely related to the onset of MIDs.  
 The factor score model in table 6 is statistically significant with the probability of the chi-
square value occurring if the null hypothesis were true being less than .001, which means that the 
factor score variable DEI does have an effect on the onset of MIDs. The PRE value for the factor 
score model is 4.03 percent, indicating that the model improves the level of prediction compared 
to the natural prediction of the onset of MIDs. As theorized, the DEI variable is inversely related 
to the onset of MIDs. Also, the DEI variable is shown to have a strong inverse relationship with 
the onset of MIDs. In fact, the DEI variable has a p-value less than .001, and reduces the odds of 
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the onset of MIDs by approximately 17 percent. The strength of the inverse relationship between 
DEI and the onset of MIDs is remarkably strong, and indicates that DEI has a strong pacifying 
effect on the onset of MIDs, while holding the other variables constant.  
 
Table 6: Logistic Regression Models for the Onset of MIDs 
 
 
 Table 7 includes the results for the multivariate and factor score models on the escalation 
of MIDs dependent variable. The factor score model in this second table was used to test the 
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third hypothesis on whether there is an inverse relationship between DEI and the escalation of 
MIDs. The multivariate model will be considered first. The multivariate model itself is 
statistically significant with the probability of the chi-square value occurring if the null 
hypothesis were true being less than .001, which means that the independent variables do have 
an effect on the dependent variable. The PRE value for the multivariate model is 1.62 percent, 
indicating that the model improves the level of prediction compared to the natural prediction of 
the onset of war. As theorized, the FTA, dyadic trade density, and joint economic IGO 
membership variables are inversely related to the escalation of MIDs. Additionally, all three 
independent variables are shown to have a statistically significant relationship with the escalation 
of MIDs. The FTA variable has the strongest inverse relationship with the escalation of MIDs 
compared to the other two independent variables. Specifically, FTAs have a p-value less than 
.001, and reduce the odds of the escalation of MIDS by approximately 68 percent. Dyadic trade 
density has a p-value less than .05, and reduces the odds of the escalation of MIDs by roughly 36 
percent. Joint economic IGO membership has a p-value less than .01, and reduces the odds of the 
escalation of MIDs by roughly 31 percent. All three independent variables, therefore, are shown 
to have an inverse, or pacifying effect on the escalation of MIDs, holding the other variables 
constant.  
 The factor score model in table 7 is statistically significant with the probability of the chi-
square value occurring if the null hypothesis were true being less than .001, which means that the 
factor score variable DEI does have an effect on the escalation of MIDs. The PRE value for the 
factor score model is 1.62 percent, indicating that the model improves the level of prediction 
compared to the natural prediction of the escalation of MIDs. As theorized, the DEI variable is 
inversely related to the escalation of MIDs. Also, the DEI variable is shown to have a strong 
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inverse relationship with the escalation of MIDs. In fact, the DEI variable has a p-value less than 
.001, and reduces the odds of the escalation of MIDs by approximately 24 percent. The strength 
of the inverse relationship between DEI and the onset of MIDs is remarkably strong, and 
indicates that DEI has a strong pacifying effect on the escalation of MIDs, while holding the 
other variables constant.  
 
Table 7: Ordered Logistic Regression Models for the Escalation of MIDs 
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 Note that in some of the tables and figures that follow, the DEI variable was recoded to 
illustrate the effects of DEI on conflict. Specifically in table 8 and figure 2 below, DEI was 
divided into three groups ranging from low to high levels of dyadic DEI. In addition, in figure 3 
DEI was categorized into its various levels to simplify the graphic. The factor score variable of 
DEI has values that range from -0.71 to 9.47, indicating varying levels of dyadic economic 
interaction. It was necessary to recode DEI to generate a meaningful variable to further interpret 
the interactions between DEI and conflict. Essentially, the DEI variable was recoded into 
categories ranging from 0 to 10 for the ease of graphing and illustrating the differences. The 
dyadic DEI levels where then grouped as either being low, medium, or high within a given dyad. 
DEI groups were coded as low if the level of dyadic DEI was below 2, as medium if the level of 
dyadic DEI was below 5 but greater than or equal to 2, and as high if the level of dyadic DEI was 
greater than or equal to 5.  
 In table 8 below, the relationship between DEI and conflict escalation is further detailed. 
Table 8 illustrates an interesting relationship between dyadic DEI levels and the stages of 
conflict escalation. The numbers in table four represent the actual occurrences of disputes in the 
dataset from 1965 to 2001. This two-way table illustrates that the inverse relationship between 
DEI and escalation is clear and consistent in favor of the theorized relationship. In addition, the 
table shows the strength of the inverse relationship with a gamma of -.269, indicating that when 
the level of DEI increases the likelihood for conflict and escalation is reduced. The gamma 
statistic measures the strength of the association in a cross tabulated table when the variables are 
on the ordinal scale. The value of gamma ranges from -1 to +1, where -1 indicates perfect 
inverse association and +1 is a perfect positive association. Dyads with low levels of DEI were 
far more likely to engage in escalatory behavior than dyads with high, or even medium, levels of 
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DEI. In fact, 89 percent of the dyads engaged in hostile relations had low levels of DEI, where 
1,646 disputes occurred between low DEI dyads compared to the total of 1,853 disputes during 
the temporal period of this study. Dyads with high levels of DEI, on the other hand, were nearly 
absent of hostilities with only 27 disputes. Note that there are 1,853 observations because the 
escalation dependent variable, highest hostility level, includes both new and ongoing conflicts. In 
comparison, the MID and war dependent variables include only new conflicts. For each of the 
five hostility levels, the dyads with high levels of DEI were less likely to engage in disputes. For 
the disputes at the threat level, zero dyads with high levels of DEI engaged in this behavior. For 
disputes at the display of force level, two percent of the dyads engaged in this behavior had high 
levels of DEI. For disputes at the use of force level, less than two percent of the dyads engaged 
in this behavior had high levels of DEI. For disputes at the war level, less than one percent of the 
dyads engaged in this behavior had high levels of DEI. Finally, the probability of the chi-square 
value occurring if there were no association between the two variables is less than .001.  
 
Table 8: Levels of DEI and Highest Dyadic Hostility Levels 
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 In the following three figures, the relationships between varying levels of dyadic DEI and 
stages of conflict are presented graphically. Figure 2 illustrates how dyads with lower levels of 
DEI engage in more new MIDs than dyads with medium or high levels of DEI. Figure 3 shows 
the number of disputes between dyads at different levels of DEI. Figure 4 is an illustrated version 
of the simulated predicted probabilities for the three dependent variables. 
 In figure 2 below, the relationship between the onset of new MIDs and the various levels of 
dyadic DEI are illustrated. Note, that the three levels of DEI are coded in the same manner as 
those found in table 8, where dyads can exhibit low, medium, or high levels of DEI. Also, note 
that the number of new MIDs is shown on the y-axis where each of the three DEI levels is 
illustrated according to the key. Lastly, the x-axis represents the years in this study from 1965 to 
2001. Figure 2 is interesting because it shows the number of new MIDs dyads engaged in 
according to their different levels of DEI. Additionally, figure 2 makes it clear that dyads with 
low levels of DEI have engaged in far more new MIDs than dyads with higher levels of DEI. For 
instance, out of the 1,280 new MIDs that occurred from 1965 to 2001, 86 percent occurred 
between dyads with low levels of DEI, while only 26 new MIDs occurred between dyads with 
high levels of DEI. It is clear in this figure that low DEI dyads are more likely to engage in new 
MIDs. Figure 2 does not, however, plot new wars since the number of wars were so few it was 
not necessary to graph them, but the distribution is interesting. For instance, out of the 52 new 
wars that occurred from 1965 to 2001, 96 percent occurred between dyads with low levels of 
DEI. In fact, only one war occurred between dyads with high levels of DEI.  
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Figure 2: New Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) by Year 
 
 
 In figure 3 below, the relationship between the various categories of dyadic DEI and 
conflict are illustrated. Note that the categories of DEI on the x-axis were recoded from the DEI 
factor score variable. As noted earlier, the DEI variable was recoded for some of the figures and 
tables to simplify the relationship. Essentially, the original range of the DEI variable from -0.71 
to 9.47 was recoded and is depicted as the range from 0 to 10 in figure 3. Also, note that figure 3 
has three separate plots, each one indicating a different relationship with DEI. The first plot is the 
number of new MIDs based on the level of DEI. For example, at the lowest level of DEI of zero, 
there were 411 new MIDs from 1965 - 2001. On the other hand, at the highest level of DEI of 
ten, there were three new MIDs that occurred from 1965 to 2001. Thus, figure 3 shows that as 
the level of DEI increases, the number of new MIDs decreases. The second plot is the number of 
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new wars based on the level of DEI, which is interpreted similarly to the new MIDs plot. For 
example, at the lowest level of DEI of zero, there were 15 new wars from 1965 - 2001. On the 
other hand, at the highest level of DEI of ten, there were zero new wars that occurred from 1965 
to 2001. Thus, figure 3 shows that as the level of DEI increases, the number of new wars 
decreases. Both of the first two plots of new MIDs and wars are measured on the first, left y-axis. 
Unlike the first two plots, the third plot is depicted on a different scale on the second, right y-
axis. The third plot is the average number of dyads which saw a decrease in hostilities over time. 
This plot was calculated by averaging the number of dyads that engaged in lower levels of 
hostility compared to the previous year, grouped by the level of DEI. It is an interesting plot 
because it shows that dyads are more likely to engage in lower levels of hostility with one 
another if that dyad is engaged in higher levels of DEI. In other words, as the level of DEI 
increases, the average number of dyads with decreasing hostility levels actually increases. So, 
dyads with high levels of DEI are more likely to see reduced hostility levels from one year to the 
next. For example, at the lowest level of DEI of zero, an average of .07 dyads had a decrease in 
hostilities from one year to the next. On the other hand, at the highest level of DEI of ten, an 
average of .23 dyads had a decrease in hostilities from one year to the next. 
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Figure 3: New Disputes and Average Hostility Level Decreases by Levels of DEI 
 
 
 In figure 4 below, the predicted probabilities of the dependent variables are examined over 
a range of DEI values. Specifically, figure 4 illustrates the predicted probability results for each 
of the three dependent variables from 1,000 simulations using the Clarify software package for 
Stata (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003). Clarify is a 
powerful tool that can be used to run a large number of simulated predictions to generate the 
predicted probability at different levels of an inputted variable. Essentially, the researcher can 
either hold variables in their model constant or allow only certain variables to vary. In this study, 
I held all of the control variables in the models described earlier at their mean values, and only 
allowed the DEI variable to vary. As a result, the predicted probabilities illustrated in this figure 
are indicative of the effect of DEI on these dependent variables. Note that all predicted 
probabilities are at the 95 percent confidence level. The y-axis consists of the various predicted 
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probability levels. Note that the occurrence of dyadic conflict has a low probability compared to 
the number of peaceful dyads; however, the changes illustrated in this figure are substantial. The 
DEI values on the x-axis are expanded beyond the actual range from -0.71 to 9.47 since the 
Clarify software predicts what the effects on the dependent variable would be if the predictor 
variables were to reach the indicated levels. As a result, the x-axis ranges from a low DEI level 
of 0 to a high DEI level of 50. The three lines depicting the dependent variables, therefore, are 
interpreted as the predicted probabilities of occurrence at the potential levels of DEI. Predicted 
probabilities are useful for purposes of interpretation compared to standard coefficients produced 
in results tables because the effects are easily comprehended. In addition, since this study uses 
logistic regression, and the interpretation of log-odds units is difficult as mentioned, the 
predicted probabilities generated in Clarify are much easier to understand. For instance, in Figure 
4 the predicted probabilities of the dependent variables decrease as the level of DEI increases, 
which is in the theorized direction of this study. Dyads that engage in higher levels of DEI, levels 
high enough that they are beyond the current 9.47 maximum value, see a very small predicted 
probability of conflict. The onset of war had a decline in predicted probability from 3.9 percent 
at the lowest level of DEI to 1.4 percent at the highest level of DEI, with an average percentage 
change of 61 percent. The onset of MIDs had a decline in predicted probability from 5.7 percent 
at the lowest level of DEI to 1.1 percent at the highest level of DEI, with an average percentage 
change of 80 percent. Out of the three dependent variables, conflict escalation had the steepest 
decline in predicted probability from 7.6 percent at the lowest level of DEI to .6 percent at the 
highest level of DEI, with an average percentage change in predicted probabilities of 92 percent. 
The predicted probability statistics shown in figure 4 are further examined and listed in table 9 
below.  
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Figure 4: Predicted Probabilities by Levels of Dense Economic Integration 
  
 
 Table 9 lists the change in predicted probabilities for each of the dependent variables 
ranging from low to high levels of DEI. The first column lists the dependent variables examined 
using Clarify to estimate predicted probabilities. The second column lists the predicted 
probability values for dyads with the lowest level of DEI. The 95 percent confidence intervals for 
the predicted probability value are indicated in brackets. Column three is similar to the previous 
column, but lists the predicted probability values for dyads with the highest level of DEI. The 
last column lists the average percentage change in predicted probabilities based on the sample of 
1,000 simulations. Note that the average predicted probability numbers are based on 1,000 
simulations and the percentage changes are averaged over those simulations. Overall, the average 
percentage changes in predicted probabilities for all three dependent variables are negative as 
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theorized, meaning that as DEI increases from low to high the predicted probability of conflict is 
decreased. For the onset of war dependent variable, other things being equal, a dyad with high 
levels of DEI is on average 61 percent less likely to engage in a new war than a dyad with low 
levels of DEI. For the onset of MIDs dependent variable, other things being equal, a dyad with 
high levels of DEI is on average 80 percent less likely to engage in a new MID than a dyad with 
low levels of DEI. For the escalation of MIDs dependent variable, other things being equal, a 
dyad with high levels of DEI is on average 92 percent less likely to engage in escalatory 
behavior than a dyad with low levels of DEI.  
 Table 9 also breaks down conflict escalation into the five hostility levels the dependent 
variable is based on. All of the average percentage changes in predicted probabilities for the 
individual conflict escalation levels are negative, as theorized. The one caveat is the category of 
“No Dispute” having a positive change, but that also is in line with the theorized relationship. 
For instance, dyads with high levels of DEI are more likely to not be engaged in a dispute than 
dyads with low levels of DEI. At each level of escalation, therefore, high levels of DEI reduce 
the likelihood of conflict. For the level of no dispute, other things being equal, a dyad with high 
levels of DEI is on average 35 percent more likely to not engage in a dispute, or in other words 
have peaceful relations, than a dyad with low levels of DEI. For threat, other things being equal, 
a dyad with high levels of DEI is on average 86 percent less likely to engage in a threatening 
behavior than a dyad with low levels of DEI. For the display of force, other things being equal, a 
dyad with high levels of DEI is on average 87 percent less likely to engage in a display of force 
than a dyad with low levels of DEI. For the use of force, other things being equal, a dyad with 
high levels of DEI is on average 91 percent less likely to engage in a use of force than a dyad 
with low levels of DEI. For war, other things being equal, a dyad with high levels of DEI is on 
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average 93 percent less likely to engage in a war than a dyad with low levels of DEI. Note that 
the escalation level of war is different from the results on the onset of war, which measure two 
different things. The escalation level of war measures both new and ongoing wars in a given 
year. The onset of war, on the other hand, only measures new wars since there is a distinct 
theoretical difference between new and ongoing wars.8 Overall, table 9 illustrates the strength of 
the relationship between DEI and conflict, and shows how increases in levels of DEI can reduce 
the predicted probability of conflict at different stages. 
 
Table 9: Changes in Predicted Probabilities from Low to High DEI 
 
 
 The predicted probabilities for each of the hostility levels are illustrated in figure 5 below. 
As shown, and described in table 9, the predicted probability of escalatory behavior is reduced at 
                                                
8 See chapter 4 on research design for a full discussion on the differences between new and ongoing conflicts from a 
theoretical perspective. 
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each stage of escalation as the level of dyadic DEI increases. The graphical interpretation of 
these predicted probabilities shows the level of dyadic escalatory behavior that can be predicted 
based on the various levels of DEI. Note that as DEI reaches the highest predicted value of 50, 
the predicted probability of conflict escalation is nearly zero. 
 
Figure 5: Predicted Probabilities by Levels of Hostility 
 
 
Discussion 
 
 Based on the results above, we can begin to draw some conclusions about the hypothesized 
relationship between DEI and conflict. The results are clear and consistent in support of a 
statistically significant relationship between the proposed variable DEI in this study and the 
various examined stages of conflict at the dyadic level. The plan of this discussion section is to 
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clearly assess the three hypotheses in this study, and to examine the implications of the results. 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 will be considered together since the relationships between DEI and the 
onset of war and MIDs are only measuring new dyadic conflicts. Hypothesis 3 examines the 
escalation of conflict, however, and will be discussed separately because it includes both new 
and ongoing conflicts. As discussed in chapter four, there is a distinct theoretical difference 
between examining relationships that reduce the likelihood of new conflicts as opposed to 
relationships examining stages of ongoing conflicts. Next, the interesting results from the 
multivariate models will be explored to better understand the implications of the findings. For 
example, free trade agreements are shown to have strong inverse relationships with conflict with 
impressive statistical significance. In addition, for the sake of thoroughness and curiosity I will 
construct different scenarios holding various control variables constant to explore the influence 
of DEI absent of some controls. Specifically, the predicted probabilities of conflict will be 
predicted based on the different scenarios. For example, one scenario may look at dyads that 
have high levels of DEI and both states are democracies, but neither state possesses nuclear 
weapons. These scenarios, however, are not intended to replace traditional robustness testing. 
Instead, the final section of this chapter is dedicated to performing robustness tests. The 
scenarios, therefore, are used as a discussion tool to explore the relationship between DEI and 
war.  
 Overall, the results indicate that when dyads engage in high levels of DEI the likelihood of 
engaging in conflict is reduced. In addition, the results are remarkably strong and consistent 
across the various models explored in the last section. The relationship is both important and 
interesting because it provides a clear argument for the pacification of conflict through economic 
relations. First, DEI has been shown to have an effect on reducing the likelihood of dyads 
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engaging in new conflicts. Specifically, dyads are less likely to engage in new wars and in new 
MIDs with each other when the given dyad has high levels of DEI. In other words, dyadic DEI 
has the effect of reducing the likelihood of new conflicts emerging between the dyads exhibiting 
that type of economic behavior. Second, DEI has an effect on reducing the likelihood of dyads 
engaging in escalatory behavior with each other. The results related to the escalation of conflict 
are particularly important because, as Mansfield and Pollins point out, there is a general lack of 
evidence in the literature about how economic relations may affect escalatory behavior 
(Mansfield and Pollins 2003).  
 Each of the three hypotheses is considered below and decisions are made about the null 
hypotheses. All of the following hypothesis testing results are measured at a threshold of a .05 
alpha level using one-tailed p-values, as discussed earlier. The results, therefore, are at the 95 
confidence level. One-tailed p-values are used since the hypotheses and research question of this 
study examine the potential inverse relationship between DEI and conflict. Additionally, this 
study is concerned with the possibility that DEI can pacify conflict. With an alpha level of .05, I 
find statistical support for two out of the three hypotheses in this study. Specifically, hypotheses 
two on the onset of MIDs and three on the escalation of MIDs are supported, while I fail to find 
support for hypothesis one on the onset of war. The results of the hypothesis testing are 
remarkably strong even using such a conservative alpha level.  
 The first two hypotheses are considered first, and highlight promising results for the 
pacification of new conflicts when dyads engage in high levels of DEI. Specifically, the onset of 
new dyadic wars and the onset of new dyadic MIDs are examined. DEI, from a theoretical 
perspective, influences the political decision to avoid war by increasing the amount of exit costs 
for either state. In other words, states in a given dyad are less likely to engage in conflict because 
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the exit costs to breaking economic ties with each other are too costly. The exit costs of breaking 
the economic ties to engage in new conflicts were erected or bolstered between the states as the 
level of DEI increased. States in a dyad, therefore, are more likely to work through their trusted 
economic channels to pacify political hostilities to avoid incurring high exit costs.  
Hypothesis 1 Results 
 Based on the conservative alpha level of .05, I fail to find statistically significant support 
for hypothesis one on the onset of war. The relationship between DEI and the onset of war is 
negative as theorized, however the p-value falls between .05 and .1 therefore failing to meet the 
.05 alpha level. As a result, we fail to reject the null hypothesis. The relationship between DEI 
and the onset of war, however, is important and since the p-value for DEI is roughly .07 we can 
conclude that DEI does have at least some influence on the likelihood of reducing new dyadic 
wars. The onset of war, in other words, is less likely to occur when a dyad has engaged in high 
levels of DEI, but we can only make this claim at the .1 alpha level. Among the results for the 
three hypotheses, DEI has the least amount of influence on new wars compared to either new 
MIDs or escalatory behavior. The weakness of the relationship may stem from the fact that 
during the entire temporal period of this study, only 52 new wars occurred. The rarity of new 
wars in the dataset is matched by the rarity that dyads with high levels of DEI engaged in war. In 
fact, out of the 52 new wars only one occurred between a dyad engaged in high levels of DEI. 
Note that this finding says nothing about stopping ongoing wars, but instead only relates to the 
creation of new wars.  
Hypothesis 2 Results 
 The onset of MIDs does not suffer from the problem of rarity as does the onset of war, and 
the relationship between DEI and the onset of MIDs is much stronger. At an alpha level of .05, I 
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find statistically significant support for hypothesis two on the onset of MIDs. The relationship 
between DEI and the onset of MIDs is negative as theorized, and is statistically significant at the 
.001 level. As a result, we can reject the null hypothesis that the onset of MIDs does not vary 
with the level of dyadic DEI. The strength of the statistical relationship stands out because the 
chance that the results occurred by chance is less than .1 percent or we can say that we are 99.9 
percent confident that the results did not occur by chance. The strength of the relationship 
indicates that dyads with high levels of DEI benefit from the barrier of exit costs, which leads to 
peaceful relations. In fact, dyads with high levels of DEI see a 17 percent reduction in the odds 
of a new MID occurring. The statistical significance of the relationship between DEI and the 
onset of MIDs is further tested in the robustness section where the results remain true over a 
series of different tests.  
 The third hypothesis varies from the first two hypotheses because it focuses on new and 
ongoing conflicts. In hypothesis 3 the escalation of MIDs is examined by measuring the 
relationship between DEI at each of the stages of conflict escalation. The escalation of MIDs is 
measured as both new and ongoing disputes because it simply measures the highest level of 
hostility within a dyad in a given year, as discussed in chapter four. The relationship between 
DEI and escalation is more complex than the relationships between the onset of war and MIDs 
because it is an ordinal measure rather than a dichotomous one. So, hypothesis 3 measures the 
effect DEI has on the likelihood escalation is avoided, or more accurately reduced. For instance, 
as DEI increases states in a given dyad may be more likely to reduce their hostilities with one 
another compared to a dyad without DEI. A dyad with high levels of DEI, therefore, would be 
more likely to reduce hostilities from a level three, the display of force, to a level two or one, 
threat or no dispute respectively.  
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Hypothesis 3 Results 
 At an alpha level of .05, I find statistically significant support for hypothesis three on the 
escalation of MIDs. The relationship between DEI and the escalation of MIDs is negative as 
theorized, and is statistically significant at the .001 level. As a result, we can reject the null 
hypothesis that the escalation of MIDs does not vary with the level of dyadic DEI. The fact that 
high levels of DEI reduces the likelihood that dyads will engage in escalatory behavior is an 
extremely important finding that sheds light on a subject that has remained allusive in the 
literature. In fact, high levels of DEI are shown to reduce the likelihood of escalatory behavior at 
each of the stages of conflict escalation. The results are clear and consistent in favor of the 
pacification of escalation between dyads that engage in high levels of DEI with one another. The 
relationship between DEI and conflict escalation is remarkably strong and the results indicate 
that dyads with high levels of DEI tend to avoid escalatory behavior. Thus, states that engage in 
high levels of DEI are more likely to avoid escalatory behavior. Similar to the argument for the 
onset of conflict, states within a dyad that have high levels of DEI benefit from high exit costs 
and aim to maintain those relations. In other words, dyads with high levels of DEI are less likely 
to escalate conflict from one level of hostility to the next.  
Multivariate Model Results 
 Although the proposed factor score variable of DEI is the only measure used in hypothesis 
testing, the results from the multivariate models are interesting, and in some cases exhibit 
considerably strong relationships. The independent variables with strong relationships with the 
dependent variables included in the multivariate models will be discussed. The three independent 
variables in the study are free trade agreements, dyadic trade density, and joint membership in 
economically-focused IGOs. Three points stand out as the most promising and interesting 
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relationships. First, free trade agreements are shown to have consistently strong relationships 
with each of the three dependent variables. In fact, the percentage changes in odds for each of the 
dependent variables range from a 60 to 70 percent reduction in the odds of conflict. Specifically, 
free trade agreements have statistically significant relationships with the onset and escalation of 
MIDs at the dyadic level with p-values below the .001 level. As theorized, free trade agreements 
have an influential impact on reducing the likelihood of conflict between states. These findings 
support my proposition that free trade agreements are special relationships that build trust and 
can bring peaceful relations to a given dyad, since they impose high exit costs to each state.  
 Second, dyadic trade density is the only variable in any model to have a statistically 
significant relationship with the onset of war below the .05 alpha level. As illustrated in table 1 
above, dyadic trade density is inversely related to the onset of war and reduces the odds of war 
by 64 percent. This is an important finding because dyads that exhibit high levels of dyadic trade 
density are less likely to engage in new wars with one another. The increase in economic ties 
within the dyad as a ratio to the total trade of each state in the dyad influences the likelihood of 
war. Dyads with high levels of dyadic trade density may avoid war, therefore, to possibly avoid 
economic disruptions and avoid exit costs since war has the ability to severely cripple states, 
including their economic infrastructure. The relationships between free trade agreements and 
MIDs, and dyadic trade density and war, are illustrated in figure 6 below. The first graph on the 
left separates dyads with and without free trade agreements, and shows the number of new MIDs 
over time. As shown, dyads with free trade agreements are significantly less likely to engage in 
new MIDs. The second graph on the right illustrates the number of dyads engaged in new wars 
based on the level of dyadic trade density. As shown, as the level of dyadic trade density 
increases, the likelihood of war decreases dramatically. Note that the dyadic trade density 
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variable is measured as a natural logarithm, so values are all negative and those closer to zero are 
higher. In the case of dyadic trade density in figure 6 below, -5 represents the lowest level of 
dyadic trade density while -2 represents the highest level of dyadic trade density. 
 
Figure 6: Relationships between FTAs, Dyadic Trade Density, and Conflict 
 
 
 Third, all three independent variables have strong negative and statistically significant 
relationships with the escalation of conflict. Dyads that engage in any of the independent 
variables in this study are less likely to engage in escalatory behavior. The strength of the 
statistical relationships are clear and consistent in that free trade agreements, dyadic trade 
density, and joint membership in economically-focused IGOs are all inversely related to the 
escalation of dyadic conflict.  
 As mentioned earlier, the following analyses on different predicted scenarios was 
conducted to understand the effects of DEI under different conditions, and for the sake of 
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curiosity. The results below are not indicative of the entire model already discussed, rather they 
highlight specific relationships between DEI and the onset of MIDs under various scenarios. 
Table 10 below includes these analyses.  
 
Table 10: Predicted Scenarios Affecting the Likelihood of the Onset of MIDs 
 
 
 Table 10 lists the results from analyses where different aspects of interstate relations were 
controlled. First, I examined the different dyadic regime types controlling for dual democratic 
dyads and dual autocratic dyads. In dual democratic dyads and dual autocratic dyads, the effects 
of DEI on the onset of MIDs is similar to earlier findings. Dual democratic and dual autocratic 
dyads with high levels of DEI, ceteris paribus, are 81 percent less likely to engage in MIDs than 
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dyads with low DEI. In addition, dual democratic dyads without nuclear weapons have a similar 
81 percent reduction in the likelihood of the onset of MIDs. Dual democratic dyads with nuclear 
weapons, however, see a smaller reduction in the likelihood of the onset of MIDs with 55 
percent. In fact, dual democratic dyads with nuclear weapons have a comparatively high 
predicted probability of conflict near 70 percent in dyads with low DEI, but that probability is 
reduced to 33 percent in dyads with high DEI. Similar to dual democratic dyads with nuclear 
weapons, dyads with a military balance and dyads that are ethnically similar both have a high 
predicted probability of conflict, however, those dyads with high levels of DEI are 44 and 35 
percent less likely to engage in MIDs, respectively. Finally, contiguous dyads have a high 
predicted probability of conflict, and see a modest three percent reduction in the likelihood of the 
onset of MIDs in contiguous dyads with high levels of DEI. For each scenario, therefore, dyads 
with high levels of DEI are less likely to engage in MIDs than dyads with low levels of DEI.  
 In conclusion, although this study only covers the years from 1965 to 2001, the findings 
are strong and robust against a variety of alternatives. In this time period dyads refrained, almost 
entirely, from engaging in conflict when a given dyad reached high levels of DEI. Why is this 
the case? Without making normative predictions about the intentions of leaders, I can offer some 
theoretical foundations. First, dyads that make the commitment to develop long lasting economic 
relationships have a mutual benefit in preserving those relationships. Surely, no advanced 
economy can prosper in isolation, and thus states must engage in economic relationships with 
other states. If a political disagreement or potential conflictual issue arises, it may be the 
economic leaders, and politicians, that realize there is too much to lose economically if the states 
were to engage in conflict. Leaders must ask themselves if the costs of cutting the economic ties 
with a given state to engage in conflict outweigh the benefits, or the political goals. This causal 
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mechanism to reduce the chance of conflict is known as exit costs. A second reason may be that 
states which interact intensively with each other for economic means may develop high levels of 
trust and strong cooperative ties. When a conflictual issue arises, the leaders may work through 
the trusted channels developed through economic ties to pacify conflict. This line of reasoning 
fits well within the neo-liberal institutionalism paradigm where states can improve information 
about other states through international cooperation.  
Robustness 
Robustness testing is performed to ensure that the results are strong against a variety of 
changes to the standard models in a study. The idea for conducting robustness checks, therefore, 
is to ensure that the relationships are still meaningful if the model is changed. There is no agreed 
upon set of robustness checks that can be used in every study because much of the choice 
depends on the structure and type of data. Choosing robustness tests, after all, is a theoretical 
endeavor to imagine ways to modify the model under study to increase reliability and confidence 
in the results. One common way to conduct a robustness check is to remove some of the 
variables in a model. Another method is to drop certain observations or groups of observations 
based on theoretical considerations. For instance, a researcher can question whether certain types 
of observations are more influential than others. User-written programs for use with statistical 
software packages are the most complex, and sometimes the most thorough method to conduct 
robustness checks, especially with large datasets.  
 The findings presented above are robust against a variety of robustness tests. Specifically, 
the results are robust against attempts to drop certain dyads from the analysis, robust against the 
temporal change during the cold war eras, and robust against alternative model specifications. 
First, the findings are robust against dropping two high profile dyads, and one highly influential 
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state from the analysis completely. The USA-Russia dyad was dropped in one iteration of 
analysis because of the heightened hostilities between the two states during the cold war. The 
USA-Canada dyad was dropped in one iteration of analysis because of high levels of free trade 
after NAFTA was enacted between the two states. The USA was dropped entirely from one 
iteration because the USA tends to be the most interdependent and influential state. The core 
findings of the study illustrated in tables 5, 6, and 7, however, are robust against all three 
iterations of analysis where a dyad or state was dropped from the models. In other words, the 
findings remain the same even when these high profile observations are dropped from the 
analysis. This is important because these dyads, or states in the case of the USA, may skew the 
results since they have the potential to be highly influential for the reasons stated. Although it 
could be argued that other states or dyads may have a highly proportionate level of influence, I 
believe that the observations dropped from the different iterations best capture the relationship 
under study.  
 Second, the results were tested against the world state system change from a bipolar to a 
unipolar world after the cold war ended. It could be argued that the pattern of international 
conflict during the bipolar world order of the cold war was different from the current unipolar 
order. For instance, maybe the bipolarity of the world system had a pacifying effect on the 
interactions of dyads that considered themselves aligned with the USA or Soviet Union. On the 
other hand, the tension in the world may have increased the likelihood of conflict escalation. To 
test against these possibilities, I created two dummy variables to account for the separate 
temporal periods. Then, I conducted analysis which restricted the data based on one of the cold 
war temporal periods specified. In the end, I found that the results were robust during the cold 
war era from 1965 to 1990, and during the post-cold war era from 1991 to 2001. In other words, 
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the variables that were statistically significant in the original analysis were also significant for 
each of the cold war periods. Even more, the variables were in the same direction meaning that 
negative relationships in the original analysis were also negative during both cold war periods. 
Since the results remain the same during and after the cold war, it is safe to assume that DEI has 
an effect during the entire temporal period of the study from 1965 to 2001.  
 Third, the results were tested using a user-written software package to test a large variety 
of changes by systematically removing variables in the model in alternating iterations. The 
software “Checkrob” for Stata was used to automatically test 2,048 alternative model 
specifications where each iteration of the test dropped a different variable from the model 
(Barslund 2007). Interestingly, the findings are robust against a majority of the alternative model 
specifications. In fact, the full models performed better than 87 percent of the other model 
constructions generated by the software package. Furthermore, 71 percent of the alternative 
models had the same negative coefficients for the key independent variables as in the original 
models. In other words, this robustness check illustrates that the same inverse relationship 
between DEI and conflict that exists in the full models explained earlier in the chapter, also 
exists in 71 percent of the alternative models produced by the software package. Equally 
important, in 75 percent of the alternative models the same key independent variables were 
statistically significant as in the full models. So, the statistical significance of the relationships 
between DEI and conflict are robust against a large variety of different model specifications. 
 In conclusion, the results from this study are remarkably strong and provide clear 
indications that the level of DEI is inversely related to conflict. I found support for hypotheses 2 
and 3 on the onset of MIDs and escalation of MIDs, while I failed to find support for hypothesis 
3 on the onset of war. There were a number of interesting and strong relationships between the 
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independent variables and the dependent variables in the multivariate models as well. Finally, all 
of the results were treated to a variety of robustness checks to improve the confidence in the 
findings. In the next chapter, three dyads are considered as case studies in an attempt to apply 
these findings. 
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CHAPTER 6 CASE STUDIES 
The study of DEI in my dissertation has focused on developing the theoretical aspects 
about the relationship between DEI and conflict. As discussed in chapter five, I have found 
evidence in support of my research question about the pacification of conflict through high levels 
of DEI. Specifically, I found statistically significant support for two out of the three hypotheses, 
showing that DEI reduces the likelihood of MIDs and conflict escalation. To explore these 
theoretical ideas and empirical findings, an application of the principles discussed throughout 
this study will be useful. As a result, the relationship between DEI and the likelihood of conflict 
within three relevant dyads will be examined. The following dyads will be used in this analysis: 
India-Pakistan, China-Taiwan, and Greece-Turkey. These three dyads were selected because 
over the years they have received international attention for their conflicts in the past, and all 
three have the potential for future and broader conflicts with each other.  
Each of the three dyads under examination have a unique area of land where territorial 
control is contested. First, the India and Pakistan dyad has had numerous clashes over the 
Kashmir region, and which country ultimately possesses the land. Second, conflict in the China 
and Taiwan dyad is over the unification of Taiwan into the mainland of China. Third, the Greece 
and Turkey dyad has had a long history of conflict over the island of Cyprus, and which country 
controls it. The plan of this chapter is to understand the potential economic forces at work in the 
prevention of escalating conflict in each of these three cases. For each dyad an abbreviated 
history will be provided, which will aim to build a background for the areas under contention. 
The goal is to understand the nature of the contentious dyadic relationships, and set up a 
foundation for the application of my theoretical arguments. In addition, recent conflicts that 
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occurred during the temporal period of this study from 1965 to 2001 will be examined, and the 
role played by economic forces will be explored.  
Based on the theory explained throughout this study, I argue that economic relationships 
within the dyads, specifically the levels of DEI, played a role in the likelihood of conflict, 
including the escalation to full interstate war. Interestingly, these three dyads have rarely 
engaged in full interstate war during the time period from 1965 to 2001, even though the 
conditions were ripe for war and open hostilities existed as various times. In fact, the Greece-
Turkey and China-Taiwan dyads reached the use of force hostility level, while the India-Pakistan 
dyad reached the war hostility level. India and Pakistan engaged in three wars, the Second 
Kashmir War in 1965, the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, and the Kargil War in 1999. In addition, 
India and Pakistan nearly engaged in interstate war in 2001 when both states moved troops to 
their respective borders of Kashmir. Greece and Turkey did engage in war through the country of 
Cyrpus in 1974 during the Turco-Cypriot War, but Greece and Turkey did not fight directly. One 
of the factors in preventing interstate war, therefore, may have been the levels of DEI that existed 
within these dyads. On the other hand, the timing of the dyads that exhibited low levels of DEI 
may have coincided with conflict during the time period when economic relationships were 
weak. This chapter seeks to explore these propositions about the role low or high levels of DEI 
may have had on the likelihood of conflict. Since the statistical analysis of these propositions are 
covered in the previous chapters, I will focus on the trends of economic integration and conflict 
within the dyads.  
An interesting analysis is included below for each dyad where the status of the dyads is 
indicated at the annual level. Examining the dyads on an annual basis is possible because the 
dataset used in this study includes the necessary data. As a result, for each of the three dyads the 
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level of conflict and economic relationship status will be listed for every year from 1965 to 2001. 
With this data, trends may emerge over the time period where a dyad may have changing levels 
of economic integration, which may coincide with changing levels of conflict. There may be a 
dyad where economic integration increased over a period of time, and that dyad saw a decrease 
in the amount of conflict. For each dyad, the type of conflict will be separated into the annual 
hostility level and whether or not the conflict was new or ongoing. Note that the theoretical 
contention of this study argues that DEI reduces the likelihood of new MIDs, new wars, and the 
escalation of MIDs.  
There were also major incidents in each dyad between 1965 and 2001 that I will include 
in this analysis. Each of the incidents had the potential to escalate into full interstate war. There 
are bound to be numerous political, economic, and societal factors that led to the decisions about 
conflict; however, my case analysis is designed to determine if the proposed theoretical model 
had an effect on the likelihood of war, or the escalation to war based on the level of dyadic DEI. 
The first dyad examined includes a discussion of the Kargil War of 1999 between India and 
Pakistan, which had the potential to escalate into a dangerous war. A full scale war between 
India and Pakistan would be extremely dangerous because both states are nuclear powers. 
Interestingly, private enterprise executives in India played a unique, but important part in 
persuading elected officials to end the conflict. The second dyad examined includes an analysis 
of the Taiwan Strait Crises of 1996 between China and Taiwan, which was related to the 
presidential elections in Taiwan, but provides an interesting case about economics and conflict. 
The China-Taiwan dyad is complex because Taiwan has become a strong player in the global 
economy, and receives political support from powerful western democracies like the United 
States. Taiwan, however, has an intricate economic relationship with mainland China as well, 
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which may have played a role in preventing open conflict in 1996. The third and final dyad 
examined includes a discussion about the relationship between Greece and Turkey, which has 
been strained over issues in the Aegean Sea and the island of Cyprus for some time. For instance, 
the border clash between Greece and Turkey in 1986, and the Sismik incident in 1987 
highlighted the potential for a larger conflict during that time period. Greece and Turkey 
maintained economic ties during this time, and the two countries continued to settle disputes 
without engaging in full interstate war. Interestingly, in all three cases economic ties were 
evident, and although there were some casualties the states avoided further conflict. These cases 
will be explored in-depth to understand the role dense economic integration may have played in 
avoiding conflict.  
India-Pakistan 
The India and Pakistan dyad has had numerous conflicts over the land area known as 
Kashmir, with each side laying claim and attempting to push their own borders further into the 
region. It is over this contested region that the conflicts during the temporal period of this study 
(1965-2001) took place. China is the third party involved in the control over Kashmir, but China 
has not been as involved over the region as India and Pakistan have. The primary conflict over 
territorial control of Kashmir is between India and Pakistan. The history over Kashmir begins 
with the creation of the modern states of India and Pakistan. The area of land known as Kashmir 
is a remnant of British partitions that occurred when Great Britain released colonial control over 
the entire region in 1947 (Wolpert 2011). There are native residents of Kashmir, but India and 
Pakistan each contend that the territory should become part of their state. The relationship 
between India and Pakistan has centered around the control of Kashmir, where the issue has been 
a lightning rod which has sparked numerous conflicts and division. Not all conflict between the 
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states involve Kashmir, but instead are the result of competing religious views between Muslims 
and Hindus. More often, however, the primary dividing issue turns back to Kashmir. The 
conflicts between India and Pakistan have garnered global attention more recently since both 
states have obtained nuclear weapons. For instance, Stanley Wolpert argued that: 
 
"With their capitals and major cities less than ten ballistic missile-minutes from each 
other the two countries have become the world's most dangerous match for the potential 
ignition of a nuclear war that could decimate South Asia and poison every region on 
earth. So unthinkable a global tragedy almost occurred in the summer of 1999 in Kargil 
... " (Wolpert 2011, 2). 
 
In addition, a similar conflict between the two nuclear powers almost ignited in 2001 over an 
attempted terrorist attack on Indian political leaders. Pakistan, which is a country where 
dangerous terrorist organizations exist, is in a unique geographical position. The United States 
views Pakistan as a barrier to the countries it views as being more dangerous, namely 
Afghanistan and Iran (Wolpert 2011). For this reason, Pakistan has received military aid from the 
United States at various times. For instance, after the attacks on September 11 in 2001, the 
United States restored military aid to Pakistan in an effort to combat terrorism. The trouble is 
that, depending on the source, Pakistan may actually be financially sponsoring certain terrorist 
groups or acts. Although this argument is vehemently denied by Pakistani officials, the truth 
remains that terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda retain a strong and well-known presence in Pakistan. 
All of these issues complicate the relationship between India, Pakistan, and international players 
like the United Nations and United States. Truly, the India and Pakistan relationship is one that 
will be watched closely by the international community. 
In terms of conflicts, there were a total of three wars that occurred within the temporal 
period of this study from 1965 to 2001, but the two wars over the region of Kashmir stand out as 
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the most troubling. This is especially true because the conflict over territorial control of Kashmir 
is still to this day far from resolved. One war that occurred that did not involve Kashmir was the 
Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. The war in 1971 between India and Pakistan eventually led to the 
creation of the country of Bangladesh, an area that some Pakistanis believed to be inhabited by 
people that were not Pakistani enough (Wolpert 2011). During this conflict Pakistan requested 
aid from China and the United States, but did not receive the support they required to stop the 
breakup of eastern Pakistan into the new state of Bangladesh. Instead, India, with military aid 
from the Soviet Union, was able to support the creation of Bangladesh.  
There were two wars between India and Pakistan over Kashmir from 1965 to 2001. What 
is known as the Second Kashmir War occurred in 1965, where India attempted to move their 
border farther within Kashmir (Wolpert 2011). The war ended with international pressure for a 
ceasefire, which ultimately lasted until the war in 1971. A more recent conflict over Kashmir, 
one that occurred when it was feared India and Pakistan may result to the use of nuclear 
weapons, is the Kargil War. The incident during the conflict over Kashmir stands out because it 
was the first conflict between the states with the potential to escalate to the use of nuclear 
weapons. The Kargil War in 1999 between India and Pakistan began over the contested area of 
Kashmir; which by 1999 the two countries had been engaged in open conflict with each other 
over the past six years. As mentioned, Kashmir is a long disputed territory between India and 
Pakistan, but aggressive “nibbling” in 1999 by Pakistan is cited as the spark that escalated the 
conflict into a dangerous clash with India (Chari 2007). The conflict was escalated in October of 
1998 when General Pervez Musharraf moved troops into Kashmir by infiltrating “Indian-built 
bunkers on the Line of Control in Kargil” (Wolpert 2011, 73). The bunkers were unoccupied by 
Indian forces during the cold months in this mountainous region. These Pakistani troops, 
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however, were moved in to Kashmir without informing Nawaz Sharif, who was the prime 
minister in Pakistan at the time. General Musharraf appeared to act opportunistically, but 
whether or not the prime minister was aware of the infiltration is unclear. In retaliation to 
Pakistan’s attempt to push into Kashmir, India commenced attacks against the Pakistani-backed 
troops who moved past the established line of control (BBC 2002). In fact, India responded with 
“heavy artillery, troops, and planes, … and Pakistan had lost more than a thousand men” 
(Wolpert 2011, 73). The conflict appeared to be spiraling out of control and garnered attention 
from the international community. For instance, President Clinton told Pakistan to pull out of 
Kashmir, or the “United States would not be able to stop India from ‘escalating’ the war,” 
implying the potential for a full scale invasion or the use of nuclear weapons (Wolpert 2011, 74). 
Soon after that meeting there was a ceasefire declared in July 1999 between India and Pakistan. 
The ceasefire, unfortunately, only lasted a short time when the states nearly engaged in yet 
another conflict in 2001. 
The standoff in 2001 between India and Pakistan did not begin over Kashmir, rather it 
began with an attempted terrorist attack on Indian government leaders. The terrorists, who 
originated from Pakistan, were stopped before killing any elected officials, but some Indian 
guards died in the assault. In response to this attack, India moved its massive army to the border 
of Kashmir (Wolpert 2011). Pakistan responded and moved troops to the Kashmir border as well 
where war, and the threat of a nuclear exchange was a real possibility. Two things happened that 
forced India to pull back from the brink of war. First, in June 2002 the US State Department 
labeled India as being too dangerous for United States citizens, and encouraged US citizens to 
leave the country immediately (Wolpert 2011). Second, large multinational corporations 
operating in India, like General Electric, pulled their staff and threatened to pull their invested 
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capital out of India over fears of war (Wolpert 2011). For instance, it has been stated that 
business executives in the information technology sector pressured the Indian government to 
avoid further escalating the conflict between the two states (Friedman 2002a). Friedman explains 
how an Indian executive received an email from an American company about concerns for 
military hostilities, and was concerned with how it may affect their back room technology 
facility in India. Furthermore, N. Krishnakumar, the president of the Indian-based company 
MindTree, stated that "conflict can cause chaos if there is a disruption," referring to the potential 
economic issues from conflict between India and Pakistan (Friedman 2002b). In other words, 
conflict between the countries can disrupt normal business activities, or threaten the existence of 
those corporations altogether. Avoiding such conflicts provides corporations with the required 
political-economic stability needed to operate. Business leaders in India lobbied the government 
to avoid the disruptions of conflict through the Confederation of India Industry (CII) interest 
group. The stated goal of the CII is that it "works to create and sustain an environment conducive 
to the growth of industry in India, partnering industry and government alike through advisory 
and consultative processes" (CII 2013). Although the CII states that its purpose is not to interfere 
with foreign policy, the interest groups does have considerable leverage in terms of making 
political officials aware of the economic costs of conflict. Such costs to the country would 
include the loss of FDI, which is essential to the Indian economy that is so intricately tied to the 
global economy. Economic leaders, therefore, may have felt there was too much to lose 
financially if India escalated the conflict with Pakistan. India buckled under this pressure because 
although it has a vibrant and growing economy, the Indian economy is still highly dependent on 
foreign direct investment and providing back room support for multinational corporations. In the 
end, Pakistan and India bowed to strong American and international pressure to avoid escalating 
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the conflict any further. It appears, therefore, that economic ties may have played a role in the 
pacification of conflict escalation where international political and economic forces converged to 
avoid the potential for war.  
The role of international economic pressure is examined below within the context of this 
study on the role of DEI. As illustrated in table 11, the level of DEI and the conflict status for the 
India-Pakistan dyad is indicated from 1965 to 2001. The table also shows whether the dyad had 
an FTA, had joint membership in an economically-focused IGO, what the level of dyadic trade 
density was, and the highest dyadic hostility level recorded during a given year. The new dispute 
column indicates whether the conflict between the states was a new dispute or was ongoing from 
a previous year. The total number of years an FTA or IGO membership was present in the dyad 
is indicated at the bottom of the table. Also, the average level of dyadic trade density and the 
average hostility level is listed at the bottom of the table.  
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Table 11: India-Pakistan Dyad Statistics 
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The data in table 11 illustrates how contentious the relationship between India and 
Pakistan has been over the years. In all of the years from 1965 to 2001, the dyad has exhibited 
low levels of DEI and has been involved in conflict a majority of the time. In fact, India and 
Pakistan have been involved in MIDs with each other in 65 percent of the years from 1965 to 
2001. In addition, 96 percent of those MIDs between India and Pakistan have included the use of 
force. Although I have highlighted three wars within the dyad, the states have been living under 
the threat of conflict in most years.  
The potential for peace between India and Pakistan is unlikely until the issues over 
Kashmir are fully resolved. At any given time, either country may provoke the other over this 
territorial dispute and reignite old conflicts. As Stanley Wolpert argues, “bilateral Indo-Pakistani 
agreements specifying greater cooperation economically, educationally, and culturally between 
New Delhi and Islamabad would ... be required as part of ... [a] permanent peace process" 
(Wolpert 2011, 99). Without such integration between the states, Wolpert believes that the states 
will not be able to resolve the issues they have over Kashmir.  
China-Taiwan 
The China and Taiwan dyad is unique because China does not even recognize Taiwan as 
a sovereign state, but rather a rogue attempt to remain separate from the mainland of China. 
Taiwan, however, desires to be recognized internationally as a sovereign state, whereas today the 
country only receives unofficial support. Thus, the contention over the land is complicated and 
looks to remain unresolved for some time. The China-Taiwan dyad is different from the India-
Pakistan and Greece-Turkey dyads, which focus on periphery territories, because in the China-
Taiwan dyad, Taiwan itself is the territory under dispute. China calls for the unification of 
Taiwan with the mainland. Taiwan, wanting to retain pseudo independence, must balance 
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between resisting unification with China on one hand, while simultaneously maintaining 
peaceful relations with China on the other. In other words, the goal is to resist China’s ambitions 
for unification without provoking China into an aggressive stance. The current state of the 
relationship requires that Taiwanese officials pay at least lip service for the potential for 
unification (see Gong 2000; Rigger 2011; Tian 2006). For instance, Shelly Rigger states that: 
 
balancing Taiwan citizens’ desire to maintain, even enrich, the benefits they enjoy as a 
self-governing democracy with the need to pacify, or at least keep at bay, the PRC’s 
demand for unification. Differences of opinion about precisely what Taiwan should be 
striving for and how to achieve it are at the heart of the island’s political life (Rigger 
2011, 6).  
 
Taiwan maintains a highly political active population where there are a variety of long-held 
views about how Taiwan can achieve its goals. The unique relationship between China and 
Taiwan is a result of troubled history for the island of Taiwan, which has been the pawn in wars 
and claimed by competing colonial powers throughout history. The population of the island, 
therefore, is a mix of different cultures and people supplanted over time. A short history about 
the island will bring clarity to why the relationship is so contentious between China and Taiwan.  
Taiwan originally was an unsettled island which was occupied four thousand years ago 
by Austronesians (Rigger 2011). The natives still live on the island today, but in a diminished, 
sometimes nonexistent role. In more recent history, Taiwan was settled by the Dutch East India 
Company in 1623 that used the island as a trading post. Later in 1626, the Spanish arrived on the 
island. Together the European powers expanded their settlements on the island and promoted in-
fighting among the natives to safeguard their presence. It was not until 1683 when China first 
incorporated Taiwan under the Qing Empire. China maintained control of Taiwan for over two 
hundred years before ceding the island to Japan in 1895 following a war between the countries. 
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Japan worked to modernize the island of Taiwan, and used the island as a showplace to the world 
that Japan was a major colonial power. For this reason, Taiwan benefitted from large 
infrastructure and education investments from Japan (Rigger 2011). Japan was still very much a 
colonial power and the people of Taiwan had little control over their own land. Taiwan remained 
under Japanese control until the end of World War II, when Japan, as part of their surrender, 
ceded control of Taiwan to China in 1945. Specifically, Japan ceded control of the island to the 
Republic of China (Rigger 2011, 24).  
The government in China at the time was the Republic of China (ROC), which was 
worried over the growing communist faction within the state. The ROC government was 
ultimately ousted from the mainland by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, and the 
remaining members of the ROC fled to Taiwan. The PRC is a communist government that won 
supporters during a time when China was suffering economically, and its military was exhausted 
from conflicts (Rigger 2011). The ROC operating in Taiwan viewed the PRC as a force that had 
to be overturned to reclaim China. As Shelly Rigger explains, the ROC members that fled to 
Taiwan: 
 
believed the Chinese mainland was trapped under the boot heel of un-Chinese, tyrannical 
outlaws, and it was the sacred responsibility of all Chinese, including the Chinese on 
Taiwan, to rescue their motherland from Communism. Their vision for Taiwan was clear: 
it must be built into a bastion of Chinese nationalism from which the campaign to recover 
the mainland could be mounted. To accomplish that vision they believed it was necessary 
to enforce political conformity, inculcate nationalist zeal, rebuild economic prosperity, 
and acquire military might. Those four tasks were the pillars on which the Republic of 
China on Taiwan was built. (Rigger 2011, 28). 
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Today the PRC controls China, while the ROC is the recognized government of Taiwan. The 
relationship is complicated, and Taiwan cannot declare its true independence because of the 
threat imposed by China. As Shelly Rigger explains: 
  
to survive as an autonomous political entity, Taiwan has accepted a compromise. It 
cannot call itself the Republic of Taiwan, but it can and does assert the statehood of the 
Republic of China [ROC], a state once universally recognized, now reduced in territory 
but still robust within its own jurisdiction. That compromise satisfies everyone, and it 
satisfies no one. (Rigger 2011, 9). 
 
Taiwan is therefore internationally known as the ROC, but that practice only maintains the 
lingering call for unification from China alive. Taiwan’s government, in other words, has China 
in its name. As the ROC, Taiwan sounds very much like it is an island governed by China, even 
though the citizens of Taiwan do not see themselves as being part of China. China, on the other 
hand, is content with Taiwan calling itself the ROC, but it fails to meet the long sought after end 
goal of unification. As Rigger argued, the current state of political affairs appeases China’s 
desire for unification, and keeps Taiwan from asserting too much freedom as an autonomous 
state. Taiwan, however, has been able to resist he communist regime in China and pursue a 
democratic form of government. The line Taiwan is balancing on is difficult to maintain, and the 
fear of provoking China is a real threat. One path Taiwan has pursued is integrating into the 
Chinese economy, which may help maintain current peaceful relations. For instance, as United 
States Senator James Leach has said, “Taiwan can have democracy or independence, but not 
both. Increasingly, too, Taiwan’s economic prosperity rests on maintaining cooperative relations 
with China, which is its top target for trade and investment” (Rigger 2011, 6).  
Although Taiwan resists political unification with China, the country realizes the benefits 
for economic integration with the mainland. China also realizes these economic benefits and has 
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begun opening trade relations with Taiwan. In fact, as I will show in table 12, China and Taiwan 
have steadily increased their level of DEI with each other, reaching the highest levels in the 
2000s. The inherent danger for Taiwan with increasing cooperation with China is that China may 
choose to use its position as leverage against Taiwan, especially if Taiwan’s economy becomes 
too dependent on China. As Shelly Rigger argues, the strategy of increased cooperation with 
China benefits: 
 
Taiwan in the short run. It minimizes the chances of conflict with the PRC, it maximizes 
mutually beneficial cooperation between the two sides, and it does not rule out any 
possibility in the long term. But there is risk in this approach. Interdependence constrains 
the PRC, but it constrains Taiwan, too, and many Taiwanese worry that being the small 
player in this game puts Taiwan at particular risk. Today’s cooperative engagement can 
become tomorrow’s coercive leverage, and China is vastly larger and insists it will 
sacrifice its people’s short-term interests to achieve its strategic goals. (Rigger 2011, 9). 
 
For Taiwan, however, the strategy of increasing cooperation with China seems to be the best for 
the country right now. Taiwan’s economy has become a global power and part of that growth 
began with integrating with the Chinese economy. Even more, abandoning economic relations 
with China may provoke China to seek unification more aggressively to bring Taiwan’s 
economy under their control. 
The most recent conflict between China and Taiwan had the potential to escalate into 
war, and involved countries like the United States who participated in support of Taiwan. This 
conflict highlights the political tension between the states that remains despite their increased 
economic cooperation. The Taiwan Strait Crises of 1996 originated with Chinese opposition to 
the leading candidate in the presidential elections in Taiwan (Ross 2000; Rubinstein 2007; 
Tucker 2005). In the conflict, China conducted a show of force by firing missiles in the water 
near a busy port in Taiwan. The move by China was aimed at compelling Taiwan to not vote for 
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Lee Teng-Hui, who was running for president on a platform against the Chinese policy of 
unification. In other words, Lee Teng-Hui was working towards establishing permanent 
Taiwanese independence, directly in opposition to the status quo agreement of a non-permanent 
independent Taiwan. Lee Teng-Hui wanted to shut the door on the possibility of unification, and 
focus on building a politically and economically strong Taiwan that was not associated with 
China. Before hostilities escalated out of control, China backed down from their aggressive 
stance primarily from pressure the United States was applying to support independence in 
Taiwan. In fact, President Clinton moved a naval battle group as a show of force that the United 
States was willing to intervene.  
Another aspect of the conflict involved the growing level of China-Taiwan economic 
interdependence. At the time of the crisis, for instance, China and Taiwan had only recently 
started to increase their economic integration, and this economic cooperation may have played a 
part in pacifying further conflict. China and Taiwan were beginning to benefit from the increased 
economic integration, and these financial benefits would have erected exit costs within the dyad. 
In other words, breaking the burgeoning economic ties may have proved to be too costly for 
China and Taiwan. For instance, business association groups like the Overseas Chinese Affairs 
Council in Taiwan, and the China Enterprise Confederation (CEC) in China serve as a link 
between enterprises and government. These associations, therefore, function to make 
government aware of the impacts various policies may have on their economic initiatives and 
function. As one commenter wrote, "people in Taiwan understand their economic dependence on 
the mainland and they have no intention to provoke the Chinese leadership. Even President Chen 
Shui-bian ... in 2000 had to pledge not to violate Beijing's Baseline" (Cheng 2012). Similarly, the 
chairman of the Taiwan Mergers & Acquisitions and Private Equity Council stated that, 
146 
 
 
"economic convergence will gradually lead to political convergence" (Enav 2010). This view is 
shared by other members of the business community in similar statements about the future of 
economic and political ties between China and Taiwan. As the head of research at Taiwan's 
Yuanta Investment Consulting argues, "the two economies have now converged ... my estimate 
is that 40-60 percent of the market capitalization of the Taiwan Stock Exchange is oriented 
toward China" (Enav 2010). These optimistic views of economic ties bringing China and Taiwan 
together politically may be short-lived. For example, more recently economic tensions have 
developed between Taiwan and China when Taiwan was excluded from some new FTAs in the 
region mainly as a result of Chinese pressure (Economist 2010). The China and Taiwan 
relationship is complex and China is able to leverage its position as a global economic power. 
The role played in the conflict by economic groups like the business associations in China and 
Taiwan is not clear, but the potential for influencing the governments was possible. In the end, 
therefore, the two forces of international political economy, political pressure from the United 
States and dyadic economic cooperation, may have worked in tandem to pacify this conflict.  
As illustrated in table 12, the level of DEI and the conflict status for the China-Taiwan 
dyad is indicated from 1965 to 2001. The table also shows whether the dyad had an FTA, had 
joint membership in an economically-focused IGO, what the level of dyadic trade density was, 
and the highest dyadic hostility level recorded during a given year. The new dispute column 
indicates whether the conflict between the states was a new dispute or was ongoing from a 
previous year. The total number of years an FTA or IGO membership was present in the dyad is 
indicated at the bottom of the table. Also, the average level of dyadic trade density and the 
average hostility level is listed at the bottom of the table.  
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Table 12: China-Taiwan Dyad Statistics 
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The data in table 12 illustrates the tense relationship between China and Taiwan, but 
compared to India and Pakistan, the China-Taiwan dyad is less conflictual. In fact, China and 
Taiwan were engaged in conflict during 35 percent of the years from 1965 to 2001. The years of 
conflict, however, were not all violent with 46 percent of those MIDs between China and Taiwan 
including the use of force. For the majority of the temporal period, from 1965 to 1990, China and 
Taiwan maintained their lowest levels of DEI. The dyad, however, began to integrate their 
economies in 1991 and continued on through 2001. During the last four years of the temporal 
period from 1998 to 2001, the dyad reached medium levels of DEI. Furthermore, from the start 
of the economic integration period in 1991 through 2001 the dyad only once resorted to the use 
of force. In addition, there was no use of force between the states when the dyad reached the 
medium DEI levels. This implies that DEI may have pacified the relations between the states, a 
similar argument about the role of economic interdependence was made in previous research 
about the China-Taiwan dyad (see Kastner 2009). Increases in the level of economic integration 
within the dyad is important because the China and Taiwan relationship is far from resolved, but 
this data points to economic cooperation that may lead to political cooperation.  
The future of the China-Taiwan dyad is complicated and unclear. It seems likely that 
China will continue to call for the unification of Taiwan and the mainland to form one China. On 
the other side, the goals of Taiwan seem resolute in the fact that the state remains committed to 
democracy and increasing their economic presence in the world. One group within Taiwan, 
however, may see things differently. It is possible that the original goals of the ROC to reclaim 
China from communist rule may resurface in Taiwan, but the chance of gaining a majority of 
Taiwanese to support this initiative seems unlikely. This is especially true because China has the 
economic and military might to dominate Taiwan if it chose to. As seen with the Taiwan Strait 
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Crisis in 1996, however, other states are keeping a close eye and will come to the aid of Taiwan 
in the face of an aggressive China. As Richard Bush, a former Taiwan policy maker serving 
under Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush, stated in an interview with Shelley Rigger: 
 
On the importance of Taiwan, there are a variety of answers that I might give. It’s a 
touchstone of American credibility for both our allies and others. It’s a debt we owe to 
the people of Taiwan for having ignored their interests as we cut strategic bargains [with 
Beijing]. But my current answer to the question is that how the Taiwan Strait issue is 
resolved is an important test— perhaps the most important test— of what kind of great 
power China will be and of how the U.S. will play its role as the guardian of the 
international system (Rigger 2011, 193). 
 
Greece-Turkey 
The Greece and Turkey dyad has had a long history of contention, primarily over the 
island of Cyprus. In fact, the conflicts that occurred between Greece and Turkey during the 
temporal period of this study (1965-2001) originated over issues involving Cyprus and territorial 
control in the Aegean Sea. From a historical perspective, Cyprus, originally used as a trading 
post, has been viewed as little more than a pawn in larger political conflicts. The island played a 
role in the Crimean War, serving as a conquest interest of the Ottoman Empire although in 
reality it was Britain who obtained Cyprus. Later, during World Wars I and II, Cyprus remained 
under British control until 1960 when the island was granted independence. Britain, however, 
remained as a guarantor power of Cyprus. The overall issue with Cyprus has been the territorial 
control over the island, which Greece and Turkey continue to conflict over. The population on 
the island is comprised of people from Greece and Turkey, with Greek Cypriots making up the 
majority with roughly 70 percent (CIA.gov 2012). Turkish Cypriots make up less than the 
remaining 30 percent of the population. Complicating matters is that each side operates 
independently, where Greece Cyprus has become a European Union member, while Turkey 
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Cyprus was declined membership. The officially recognized government by the United Nations 
is the Republic of Cyprus, which represents the southern Greek Cypriot nation. Only Turkey 
recognizes the separate northern portion of Cyprus called the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus. The island was considered a British colony until the constitution was ratified in 1960, 
where Britain began serving as an administrative power. Under the 1960 constitution, a Greek 
Cypriot serves as the president, while a Turkish Cypriot serves as the vice president. 
Complicating matters further is that the economic opportunities are different for the Greek and 
Turkish sides of the island. The Greek side is integrated into the European Union, therefore 
benefiting from the free trade of capital and labor. The Turkish side of the island, however, is 
essentially economically isolated from the outside world.  
The incidents that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s between Greece and Turkey were 
instigated over territorial disputes. The conflict between Greece and Turkey on the island of 
Cyprus, known as the Turco-Cypriot War of 1974, is the most recent and bloody conflict 
between the states (Oberling 1982). The conflict began when Eoka and junta generals in Greece 
decided to stage a coup d'état to overthrow the Greek president Makarios serving on the island of 
Cyprus. Turkey initially responded to this attack by reaching out to Britain, who was still serving 
as an administrative power. Britain did not provide assistance, and Turkey moved troops to the 
northern part of the Cyprus since that is the area populated mostly by Turkish Cypriots. Within 
24 hours a ceasefire was agreed upon through the United Nations, and the ousted Greek president 
was reinstated. The result of the conflict was the institution of a peace line, known as the Attila 
Line, which was facilitated by United Nations Peacekeepers. This peace line had the result of 
dividing the island with the northern portion being held by the Turkish Cypriots, and the 
southern portion being held by the Greek Cypriots. This dividing line remains today, and 
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essentially separates the island into the internationally recognized state of southern Cyprus 
known as the Republic of Cyprus, and the northern Cyprus state of the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus recognized only by Turkey.  
The border clash in 1986 and the Sismik incident in 1987, highlight the contentious 
relationship between Greece and Turkey over territorial control in the Aegean (Gianaris 1988; 
Polyviou 1980; L. A. Times 1986; N. Y. Times 1986). Although the two states have reconciled 
their relationship in recent years, disputes over territory in the Aegean Sea from 1986 to 1987 
had the potential to escalate into a broader conflict. The border clash in 1986, involved Greek 
and Turkish troops firing at one another resulting in three casualties. Both sides claim competing 
accounts of the incident about whether Turkish or Greek troops crossed the border and which 
side fired first. It was reported by the Greek Defense Ministry that both sides met and agreed that 
the clash was only a “local incident” (L. A. Times 1986; N. Y. Times 1986). No further military 
actions were taken by either side following this short border clash. In another incident in 1987, 
Turkey announced plans to send a survey ship named the Sismik-1, accompanied by warships, to 
search for oil in waters claimed by Greece in the Aegean Sea (Cowell 1987). Greece responded 
by announcing that the survey vessel would be sunk if found in territorial waters. In response, 
Turkey stated they “will act in the same way against” Greece vessels (Cowell 1987). Both Greek 
and Turkish militaries were set on alert and war seemed a definite possibility. Turkey, however, 
made a decision to keep the survey ship in Turkish waters following pressure from NATO and 
the United States. This reconsideration by Turkey ended the conflict with Greece over the 
Sismik-1 vessel. Interestingly, Greece and Turkey had low levels of economic integration during 
this time period, but that changed in the years following this incident. In fact, Greece and Turkey 
began to increase their economic relationship in 1989, and it could be argued that these 
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interactions may have helped to pacify the escalation of further conflicts. For instance, a joint 
business community between the states supported peaceful relations. The Turkish-Greek 
Business Council, founded in 1988, strives "to contribute to the development of the relations 
between the two countries" (Turkey-Now.org 2013). In addition, (Balkir 2010, 1) argues that, 
"the Turkish Cypriot business community is an increasingly leading political actor striving for 
the solution of the conflict." Even more, (Balkir 2010, 4) states that, "the objective of achieving 
integration between the two countries in the economic and financial fields as well as achieving 
partial integration in matters of security, defense and foreign affairs has always been the first and 
foremost item on the agenda." The business community between the states, therefore, may have a 
played an important role in creating an economic bridge between Turkey and Greece which has 
spilled over into the political realm.  
As illustrated in table 13, the level of DEI and the conflict status for the Greece-Turkey 
dyad is indicated from 1965 to 2001. The table also shows whether the dyad had an FTA, had 
joint membership in an economically-focused IGO, what the level of dyadic trade density was, 
and the highest dyadic hostility level recorded during a given year. The new dispute column 
indicates whether the conflict between the states was a new dispute or was ongoing from a 
previous year. The total number of years an FTA or IGO membership was present in the dyad is 
indicated at the bottom of the table. Also, the average level of dyadic trade density and the 
average hostility level is listed at the bottom of the table.  
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Table 13: Greece-Turkey Dyad Statistics 
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The data in table 13 illustrates that relationship between Greece and Turkey is somewhat 
mixed in terms of peace and conflict, but the dyad tends to be conflictual more often. In fact, the 
dyad was engaged in conflict during 57 percent of the years from 1965 to 2001. During those 
conflict years, 52 percent of the MIDs between Greece and Turkey included the use of force. So, 
more than half of the MIDs within the dyad became violent. Greece and Turkey had their lowest 
levels of DEI from 1965 to 1988, but began integrating minimally from 1989 to 1995. During the 
last six years of the temporal period in 1996 to 2001, the dyad reached medium levels of DEI. In 
addition, Greece and Turkey increased their level of DEI even more from 1997 to 2001. During 
this time, however, the dyad still remained conflictual. Although over the final three years, when 
the levels of DEI were the highest, the dyad did not engage in the use of force with each other. 
The future of Greece and Turkey relations is difficult to speculate about because they 
have such a long and ingrained history of conflict. Even more, both sides seem to hold a level of 
contempt for one another even though the states are willing to cooperate economically. The most 
recent incident that bolstered this contempt occurred in 1997 with the controversial aid of 
Abdullah Ocalan by Greece. Ocalan was wanted by Turkish officials for organizing and 
conducting violence and killings of Turkish civilians, where “to the majority of the Turkish 
people, Abdullah Ocalan is a child murderer and terrorist whose violent campaign for Kurdish 
autonomy threatens the very foundation of modern-day multi-ethnic Turkey” (Witschi 2005). 
Ocalan, originally operating in Syria, fled in Russia, then to Italy and Greece seeking asylum 
from Turkey. Ocalan was eventually captured by Turkish forces in a sting operation where 
Ocalan was hiding in the Greek embassy of Kenya in 1999 (Weiner 1999). The fact that Greece 
was hiding Ocalan in their Kenyan embassy stoked the flames of anger in Turkish citizens, who 
felt betrayed by Greece who knew about the actions Ocalan had committed against Turkey. In 
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terms of where this leaves Turkey and Greece, the relationship is complex and old habits of 
conflict may linger. It is possible, however, that increased levels of economic integration will 
improve overall cooperation between the states and lead to more peaceful relations. The fact that 
Greece is a member of the European Union, while Turkey has been denied membership since its 
original application to be a member of the European Union since 1963 has also been a source of 
anger and confusion (EurActiv.com [2005] 2012). In the end, the resolution of contempt in the 
relationship between Greece and Turkey is not likely to occur for some time. 
Summary 
The relationships between the dyads explored in the three cases were complex, and each 
dyad had a complicated history that preceded the temporal period of this study from 1965 to 
2001. What I have shown in the preceding analysis is that DEI may play a role in reducing the 
likelihood of conflict at the dyadic level, but in the case of these three dyads, the benefits of 
higher levels of DEI have yet to be felt. One reason is that in each of the dyads the level of DEI 
has only recently increased. It is possible that future relations between the states will be more 
peaceful when, and if, the dyads reach high levels of DEI. Although the future political and 
economic relationship between states is pure speculation, the evidence in this study shows that if 
a dyad increases their level of DEI to a high level they will see a reduction in the likelihood of 
conflict. For instance, based on predicted probabilities for 1,000 samples shown in the previous 
chapter, dyads that had increases in the level of DEI were predicted to have an 80 percent 
reduction in the likelihood of engaging in a new MID. In other words, by strengthening 
economic ties with each other, the dyads may increase the level of exit costs, therefore, reducing 
the likelihood each state would choose to engage in conflict with each other. 
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Since this is a case study analysis, the selection of cases is important and was not 
arbitrary. As stated, these dyads have been the focus of international attention and each has had a 
long standing history of conflict. These dyads are unique, however, in that each has an ongoing 
conflict over a territory or region. For the sake of comparison, some descriptive statistics about 
the level of conflict in the dyads under analysis, and where they fit in with other dyads, are 
provided below in table 14.  
 
Table 14: Descriptive Statistics Comparison 
 
 
In table 14, it is apparent that although the dyads have seen more conflict from 1965 to 
2001 than most dyads, the distribution of conflicts by the level of DEI is similar. As shown, the 
majority of new MIDs and wars occurred at the lowest levels of DEI. Note that new MIDs and 
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wars only count the first year of the conflict since that is technically the only year the conflict is 
considered new. This is important because many of the conflicts within the three case study 
dyads tended to span a number of years. For example, India and Pakistan engaged in war from 
1993 to 1999, however, only the year 1993 is counted as a new war since that is the year the 
conflict began. Since new MIDs and wars are still a rare occurrence even within these three 
contentious dyads, the distribution is similar to all the dyads in this study. For instance, roughly 
86 percent of new MIDs occurred when dyads had low DEI for all of the dyads, while 84 percent 
of new MIDs occurred when the three case study dyads had low DEI. New wars also occurred at 
similar rates between all of the dyads in the study and the case study dyads with low DEI, with 
96 percent and 100 percent respectively. In addition, the level of hostility is separated in two 
columns representing low levels of hostility of threats and displays of force, and a second 
column representing the use of force and war. Once again, the case study dyads resemble all of 
the dyads in the study with similar rates of occurrence based on the level of DEI. 
In a similar analysis performed in chapter five, the measure of association between DEI 
and the levels of hostility is examined. As illustrated in contingency table 15 below, the rate each 
of the case study dyads exhibited hostilities is listed and separated by the level of DEI. Note that 
table 15 is a replica of table 8 from chapter five, however, table 15 only includes data from the 
three case studies whereas table 8 included all the data in the entire study. With a similar 
analysis, therefore, I can compare the behavior of these three dyads to see if they differ from the 
data on all dyads.  
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Table 15: Levels of DEI and Highest Dyadic Hostility Levels (Case Study Dyads Only*) 
 
 
The behaviors of the case study dyads mimics that of the entire dataset, where a majority 
of the conflicts occurred at low levels of DEI. In fact, 49 out of the 58 conflicts between the case 
study dyads occurred when the dyads exhibited low levels of DEI. At the medium level of DEI, 
only 9 conflicts occurred between the case study dyads. Since none of the case study dyads 
reached the highest level of DEI during the temporal period of this study, there were no conflicts 
at that level. The measure of association indicates that the level of DEI and the level of hostility 
are inversely related with a gamma of -.677, however, based on the case study dyads only this 
finding is not statistically significant. The data on all of the dyads, however, did provide 
statistically significant results where the level of DEI and the level of hostility were inversely 
related with a gamma of -.269. Based on the small sample of only three cases, it is difficult to 
make any conclusions about the behavior of these dyads, but it does appear that the dyads behave 
in a similar fashion to what I have found throughout this study. Dyads with higher levels of DEI 
see a reduction in the likelihood of conflict. Although not statistically significant for only these 
three cases, table 15 implies that the case study dyads did benefit from increasing their level of 
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DEI with each other. As a result, it is safe to assume that the selection and analysis of these three 
case study dyads is valid, even though they are viewed as being more conflictual than most other 
dyads, the rates of the various conflict levels are similar when compared according to the level of 
DEI. In short, when dyads maintain low levels of DEI, they are more likely to engage in 
conflictual behavior. The analyses in tables 14 and 15, therefore, support the hypotheses of this 
study that DEI does have an inverse relationship with conflict.  
In terms of future relations, the China-Taiwan and Greece-Turkey dyads appear to be on 
paths to reach high levels of DEI, therefore, potentially reducing the likelihood of conflict. India 
and Pakistan, however, have not started on a similar path. India by itself, on the other hand has 
had remarkable progress towards becoming a dominant global economic power. As discussed 
earlier, business executives influenced political decisions makers about the need to avoid war at 
the risk of losing foreign direct investment. Unfortunately, Pakistan has not had similar progress, 
and the lack of DEI between India and Pakistan reflects this reality. In addition, the key issue of 
contention remains between India and Pakistan over the region of Kashmir. The India-Pakistan 
dyad, therefore, does not appear to be on a path to high levels of DEI, and with the unresolved 
status of Kashmir hanging in the balance, it is more likely that a future conflict between the 
states will occur. Such a conflict brings with it the fear of a nuclear exchange. The overarching 
issue in the China-Taiwan dyad is the battle over the unification of Taiwan with China. It is an 
interesting situation because China is resisting to recognize Taiwan as a state, but understands 
the value in trading with Taiwan nonetheless. Taiwan’s prominent place in the global economy, 
and friendly relationships with pro-democracy nations, creates a buffer zone to China’s call for 
unification. Greece and Turkey appear to be advancing beyond their historical conflict with each 
other. Although only speculative, the trend in increased levels of DEI leading up to 2001, the end 
160 
 
 
of the temporal period in this study, is a promising sign. Remaining issues involve the division of 
Cyprus where the Greek Cypriot side of the island has membership in the European Union, while 
the Turkey Cypriot side, along with Turkey itself, still have not received membership.  
 
  
161 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS 
 The goal of my dissertation was to explore the relationship between economics and 
conflict, and to bring a new perspective to a lasting debate. Specifically, my dissertation was 
designed to test for the potential pacification of dyadic conflict through high levels of DEI. The 
results are strongly in favor of the pacifying effect of DEI on the onset of MIDs and the 
escalation of MIDs. These are important findings which improve our understanding about the 
complex role economic ties can play in international relations. As we have seen, dyads that 
engage in high levels of DEI see a reduced likelihood of conflict. That is, dyads that share free 
trade agreements, high levels of trade density, and have joint membership in economically-
focused IGOs are less likely to engage in conflict. Even more, my dissertation has provided a 
viable causal mechanism to explain why dyads tend to avoid conflict when they engage in DEI.  
 Chapter one began with an introduction to the enduring debate over the role economics 
may play in regard to state behavior and conflict. Can economic ties between states lead to 
peaceful dyadic relations? This is a question that has been investigated in many studies over 
time, and by researchers in both the realist and liberal camps. Part of the problem with 
understanding the relationship between economics and conflict is the lack of consensus about the 
appropriate measurements. In addition, it is difficult to develop a test of the relationship because 
economic ties and interstate conflict are equally complex state interactions. Complicating matters 
more, a theory developed to answer the question requires a link between the public and private 
actors. I argued that this missing link between the two sets of actors is best understood as exit 
costs, which are erected when a dyad engages in DEI, and serves as the casual mechanism to 
avert conflict.  
162 
 
 
 In chapter two we discovered that the answer to the question about the pacification of 
conflict through economic ties is both yes and no, but more accurately it depends on the level of 
analysis. Originally, classical liberals argued that peace in the world can be achieved through 
increased levels of economic cooperation. This classical liberal idea, however, makes a 
proposition about the behavior of states at the monadic level, which is not supported by 
evidence. My dissertation proposed DEI as a measure of economic interdependence, and it is 
measured at the dyadic level, where evidence supports the proposition that dyadic economic ties 
do have a pacifying effect on dyadic conflict. Furthermore, the literatures on economic 
interdependence and the capitalist peace were examined to understand what theoretical 
connections have been made between economic ties and conflict. Even more, the relevant 
evidence generated by those lines of inquiry were highlighted. Based on the current state of the 
literature, my dissertation can be included as an interdisciplinary work in the literatures on 
international political economy, international conflict, and economic interdependence. The 
contribution of this study, therefore, has been to provide clarity to a contentious issue over the 
role of economic integration and conflict.  
 In chapter three the theoretical foundations of my dissertation were informed by the 
literature review, and provided a stepping stone from which the hypotheses were generated. 
Next, the theoretical connections alluded to in the literature review were brought together to 
build the basis of the theory. In addition, the theory behind the development of the DEI factor 
score variable was discussed in terms of what it represents, and in what ways it related to 
previous research. The component variables of the DEI variable were also discussed, and how 
the selection of the independent variables were informed by theory. The proposed casual 
mechanism of exit costs, which are generated through the engagement of DEI at the dyadic level, 
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are explained in terms of how they work to pacify conflict between states. Exit costs serve as the 
link between political officials and private actors like multinational corporations. Both sets of 
actors, wanting to avoid incurring the exit costs from abandoning or disrupting an economic 
relationship, will work to avoid conflict. In the final section, the research question and 
hypotheses of the study were discussed. In addition, the theory behind the hypotheses, and how 
they will be tested, was detailed. This analysis of the hypotheses leads directly into the 
subsequent chapter on research design.  
 The focus of chapter four was to develop the research design of this study, and to provide 
the basis for the statistical models used in testing. In addition, the logic behind the choice of each 
statistical technique was elaborated, along with the weaknesses and interpretations of those 
techniques. The operationalization for each of the variables used in the study were explained at 
length, along with all coding decisions. There were two types of models used in the analysis, 
which were the multivariate model and the factor score model. The multivariate model was 
designed to test the individual relationships between the independent variables and each 
dependent variable. The second type of model, the type used for hypothesis testing, was designed 
to test the relationship between the factor score variable of DEI and each dependent variable. The 
background and use of factor scores was also provided. This chapter set the spatial and temporal 
boundaries of the study as well, to include all dyads from 1965 to 2001. Furthermore, the unit of 
analysis was defined as interstate dyads, aggregated annually. Other important methodological 
issues considered were the potential problems with temporal dependence and serial 
autocorrelation. Each issue is fully explained in the chapter, but in short both issues were 
addressed using statistical methods to improve the specification of the models. The results from 
the statistical tests are the focus of the next chapter.  
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 In chapter five the statistical results from the models under study were illustrated and 
interpreted. The findings are remarkably strong and consistent in favor of the proposed 
relationship between DEI and conflict. Evidence supports two of the three hypotheses in this 
study. For hypothesis one, which proposes that dyadic DEI is postulated to vary inversely with 
the onset of war, we fail to reject the null at the .05 level; however, DEI is shown to vary 
inversely with the onset of war at less than the .1 level. For hypothesis two, which proposes that 
dyadic DEI is postulated to vary inversely with the onset of MIDs, we can reject the null at the 
.001 level. For hypothesis three, which proposes that dyadic DEI is postulated to vary inversely 
with the escalation of MIDs, we can reject the null at the .001 level. The results of the hypothesis 
testing in terms of the onset and escalation of MIDs, therefore, present an extremely strong 
pacifying relationship with DEI. In fact, DEI is shown to reduce the odds of the onset of MIDs 
by 17 percent, and the escalation of MIDs by 24 percent. In addition, there were a total of 52 new 
wars that occurred from 1965 to 2001, and 96 percent of those new wars occurred in dyads with 
low levels of DEI. Furthermore, there were 1,280 new MIDs that occurred from 1965 to 2001, 
and 86 percent of those new MIDs occurred between dyads with low levels of DEI. Interestingly, 
only one new war, and only 26 new MIDs occurred between dyads with high levels of DEI. In 
terms of escalatory behavior, 89 percent of the dyads engaged in hostile relations had low levels 
of DEI. In the final analysis of the relationship between DEI and conflict, I conducted predictive 
modeling of the potential pacifying effect of DEI at all possible levels. The predicted 
probabilities from this analysis were startling, and further improve the confidence in the 
pacifying effects of DEI. For instance, based on 1,000 samples and a 95 percent confidence 
level, dyads with high levels of DEI are on average 61 percent less likely to engage in a new war, 
80 percent less likely to engage in a new MID, and 92 percent less likely to engaged in 
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escalatory behavior than dyads with low levels of DEI. Together these statistics and results point 
to the impressive relationship, and consistent pacification of conflict through DEI. In the next 
chapter, the results from the relationship between DEI and conflict were applied to three case 
studies in an effort to better understand the forces at play. 
 In chapter six three dyads were included in a series of case studies in an attempt to apply 
the theory about DEI and conflict. The cases selected were the India-Pakistan, China-Taiwan, 
and Greece-Turkey dyads. Each dyad was unique in that the interactions between the states 
tended to be conflictual, and the conflict originated over the territorial control of land. India and 
Pakistan conflicted over Kashmir, China and Taiwan conflicted over the unification of Taiwan 
back into China, and Greece and Turkey conflicted over the island of Cyprus and borders within 
the Aegean Sea. The China-Taiwan and Greece-Turkey dyads appear to be on a progressive 
track towards more peaceful relations, and in the most recent years during the temporal period in 
this study the dyads have increased their levels of DEI. In fact, the China-Taiwan and Greece-
Turkey dyads have increased their level of DEI from low to medium. If those trends continue, 
and the dyads reach high levels of DEI, then the findings suggest that the likelihood of conflict 
may be reduced dramatically. India and Pakistan, however, have not improved their level of DEI 
and based on the findings in this study, may be more likely to engage in conflict with one 
another. With the status of Kashmir hanging in the balance, and a growing economic and social 
disparity growing between India and Pakistan, future conflict seems an unfortunate possibility.  
 In conclusion, my dissertation has provided evidence in support of the proposition that DEI 
does reduce the likelihood of conflict. Specifically, the evidence shows that DEI is inversely 
related with the onset and escalation of MIDs at the dyadic level. The importance of these 
findings are indicated in the remarkable strength and consistency between DEI and conflict. The 
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results showed a strong inverse relationship, with statistically significant relationships, that 
upheld even under scrutinizing robustness tests. Moreover, most of the findings had a probability 
value less than .01, and is many cases less than .001. The strength of the findings imply that DEI 
has a meaningful impact on the likelihood of dyadic conflict.  
 In terms of future research, I believe that there remains a fertile ground for continued 
investigation into the pacifying effects of economic integration on dyadic conflict, where 
important findings and new theoretical relationships are ripe for the harvest. DEI, shown to have 
a strong and robust relationship with reducing conflict, can also be used in future research. First, 
future studies of conflict in international relations can include DEI in their analysis to control for 
the pacifying effect on the onset and escalation of MIDs. In other words, DEI can be used as a 
control variable to account for the economic relationships between states. In addition, DEI can be 
used in studies of international political economy, and other related disciplines, as a measure of 
deep economic ties between states. Second, the measure of DEI can be tested against a larger 
temporal period once the data is available. In addition, the DEI measure itself can be improved 
by more refined calculations of the elements that comprise the factor score. Future studies could 
also be developed which incorporate more aspects of dyadic economic relationships into the DEI 
variable. For now the calculation of DEI values is limited by data availability, however, once the 
data is available the coverage can be expanded. The data from this study, including the 
calculated DEI values for every dyad from 1965 to 2001, based on the theoretical foundations 
described in this study, is included in the dataset provided for use in future research.9 The 
evidence has shown, and I argue, that DEI represents a meaningful economic relationship 
between states and has the effect of averting conflict.  
                                                
9 The dataset for dyadic DEI values is available from www.MjLanglois.com/Research. 
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APPENDIX 
 
IGO  Long Name IGO 
AATPO Association of African Trade Promotion Organizations (AATPO) 
AITIC Agency for International Trade Information and Cooperation (AITIC) 
Andean Andean Common Market (ANCOM) 
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
BENELUX Benelux Economic Union 
BESCC Benelux Economic and Social Consultative Committee 
BSEC Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) 
CAECC Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) 
CARIFTA Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) 
CEAO West African Economic Community (CEAO) 
CEC Commonwealth Economic Committee 
CEFTA Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA) 
CEPGL Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries 
CMAEC Council of Ministers for Asian Economic Cooperation 
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
EACM East African Common Market (EACM) 
ECCM East Caribbean Common Market (ECCM) 
ECO Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
EEC European Economic Community/European Community 
EFTA European Free Trade Association 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
IICom International Institute of Commerce 
LAFTA Latin American Free Trade Association 
Mercosur Southern Common Market/MERCOSUR 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
OEEC Organization for European Economic Cooperation 
PTASEA Preferential Trade Agreement for Southern & Eastern Africa 
SACU Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
SELA Latin American Economic System/SELA 
SIECA General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration 
TIC Trade and Investment Council 
UDEAC Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC) 
WCDC Working Community of the Danube Countries 
WCO European Customs Union Study Group 
WTO World Trade Organization (WTO) 
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